Cryptography-Digest Digest #677, Volume #12 Thu, 14 Sep 00 04:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: question on the bible code (TaoenChristo)
Re: When I will send message to e-mail address, how to know that message has been
delivered ? (pgp651)
Re: Disappearing Email redux (Dan Kegel)
Re: Crypto Related Pangrams (wtshaw)
Re: Crypto Related Pangrams (wtshaw)
Re: Crypto Related Pangrams (wtshaw)
Re: www.curious.4ears (re-post) ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: question on the bible code ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: For the Gurus (wtshaw)
Re: Announcement (Dido Sevilla)
Re: Hash algorithms (David A Molnar)
Re: Hash algorithms (Dido Sevilla)
Re: cellular automata rng? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: When I will send message to e-mail address, how to know that message (Mok-Kong
Shen)
Re: Intel's 1.13 MHZ chip (Mok-Kong Shen)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: TaoenChristo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.bible.prophecy
Subject: Re: question on the bible code
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 02:50:02 GMT
In article <8ppbfh$q6a$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Mikal 606" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> "Jim Gillogly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > TaoenChristo wrote:
> > >
> > > In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> > > JCA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > This stuff has already been thoroughly debunked like the
> > > > scam it is.
> > >
> > > Has it really? I have seen vain attempts at dedicated
mathmeticians
> > > and staticians to "debunk" the reality of the Code, but sorry,
even the
> > > lates "debunking" will show to be nothing then a vain attempt to
> > > discredit what has allready "passed the test".
> >
> > An excerpt from http://cs.anu.edu.au/~bdm/dilugim/moby.html :
> >
> > - The following challenge was made by Michael Drosnin:
> > -
> > - When my critics find a message about the assassination of a prime
> minister
> > - encrypted in Moby Dick, I'll believe them.
> > - (Newsweek, Jun 9, 1997)
> >
> > If you're as open-minded as Drosnin claimed to be, visit the site
and
> > see the proof, and reflect on Mark 4:9. (No, I'm not a Christian,
but
> > people like me can quote scripture for their own purposed. :)
> >
> > --
> > Jim Gillogly
> > Highday, 23 Halimath S.R. 2000, 01:41
> > 12.19.7.9.17, 6 Caban 20 Mol, Eighth Lord of Night
>
> I *am* a Christian and cannot defend this book and this code-it isn't
true.
> So sorry, Taoen.
> _L_
>
>
I never have tired to defend the Drosnin book, though I did read it, of
course, I knew about the code either before or around the same time as
he did, so I'm not basing any of my findings on his book or his work. I
am basing my findings on rigorous research by others and myself and
having proved the code, I need no longer defend anything. I suppose
there will always be critics, and closed-minded people, who cannot
understand, or are not willing to spend the time to research the thing
for themselves. I am the one who is sorry, sorry that I haven't the
time to share every bit of research I have done, and to teach you
Hebrew and how the names are transliterated or how the numbers are
derived, or the calendar dates.. it would take much too long, and I am
not at all sure anyone would really be interested. I was, and I am now
quite positive, through over 5 years of research, that the code is
genuine.
I am not sure it is worth my time to check on the web pages above
claims, since I myself have tested the code against Moby Dick, as well
as A Tale of Two cities and just recently the entire dekalogy of L. Ron
Hubbards Mission Earth. I will check out the claims of the site above,
as I am always interested in adding to my list of failed critics... I
will post a rebuttal here, shall I?
--
Romans 1 20 For the invisible things of him from the creation of the
world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,
even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
Date: 14 Sep 2000 03:21:08 -0000
From: pgp651 <Use-Author-Supplied-Address-Header@[127.1]>
Subject: Re: When I will send message to e-mail address, how to know that message has
been delivered ?
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy.anon-server
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
It's OK.
I know that +acksend works. The only problem with it is that it's saying that :
"Message has been sent" but not that "Message has been delivered".
The difference is not big but it could be significant.
Thanks for your try.
On 13 Sep 2000, Farout Admin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In alt.privacy.anon-server, pgp651 <Use-Author-Address-Header@[127.1]>
>wrote:
>>
>>I tested, it doesn't work. I don't know why.
>>
>>It works with my ISP at ISP account, but not with remailer nym.alias.net
>>email
>>server.
>>
>>I added this directive to JBN in Extra tab window. Email has been delivered
>>but
>>receive notification has not been created.
>>
>>The JBN doc's are saying that almost any directives can be add to the final
>>remailer [ in the case of email from my NYM account it is the nym.alias.net
>>server ]. I did follow the standard format. The syntax is correct.
>>
>>Disposition-Notification-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the 1 char space after
>>:
>>
>
>
>You're right, it doesn't work. I sent a few tests. The acksend received
>back from nan show that the directive is in the headers of the outgoing
>messages.
>
>It would be good if I knew how it is supposed to work, but I don't.
>
>Sorry I couldn't be more help.
>
~~~
This PGP signature only certifies the sender and date of the message.
It implies no approval from the administrators of nym.alias.net.
Date: Thu Sep 14 03:21:06 2000 GMT
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE=====
Version: 2.6.2
iQEVAwUBOcBEJE5NDhYLYPHNAQE5cwf+LS7wPzRxlwx/kXl36ZPqv+yjvE7O/qT0
HaIe3Mhu/sILAlq2N2+nk6oCZU+4dIKmIl1RgwkO5n/NvqjQOpgtOzg83nepXt8A
P54LfAu4TJ7bOTWop8hIsULQBsxV9wWWGDl3o1sbIC8hIuwLXUfQtaGnmJvUJO7c
q++XFPX15vmPmsXNyxBbEFxycsy2HUne8BQsmSMqSNcB8QAcusdpSLE7KRz/cFQm
3WgG11UsnUQ29cCH6TiGo1wgbAs+j2VU1P3QnSmqtgSHfjXzIcs2ftrvUxX/V5W8
7FmVv5fAc+CXsh19vnxMNsdG5NHOWv78uIhNWix5CqC6RLUx+FprpA==
=TKZD
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: Dan Kegel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy,uk.legal
Subject: Re: Disappearing Email redux
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000 20:52:21 -0700
Tommy the Terrorist wrote:
> I don't trust this scheme. Sorry, but it sounds like yet another variant
> on "key escrow", ...
> In short: "Trusted third parties" AREN'T.
If you're worried about them holding keys for you, Disappearing Inc
will cheerfully sell you a keyserver appliance you can run at your
company. (The appliance can run without sending any data to outside
servers, and you should be able to run it on an isolated network if
you're paranoid.) That should take care of any worries about key
escrow and trusting third parties, shouldn't it?
> I see no clear GUARANTEE on the
> site that every last copy of the key will really BE deleted. To the
> contrary, [their privacy policy appears to allow release of keys...]
> In other words, they can give away your key whenever they feel like it,
> right up until the moment they "destroy" it.
The Disappearing Inc. service currently doesn't offer access control.
Anyone who receives an email can read it.
That's a feature, not a bug. We wanted to make it easy to use.
All they guarantee is that the key is deleted from the servers
and the plugins securely, and that no software from Disappearing Inc.
makes plaintext copies of the key or the message.
Disappearing Inc's service is for use between parties that agree not
to archive mail. If you don't trust someone to not archive mail,
the Disappearing Inc. tool won't help you.
If you don't want a third party to archive your email, don't let them
get their hands on it.
> P.S. There's also an issue with anonymity.
That's right - Disappearing Inc. doesn't support anonymous email.
That's not its target market.
If anonymous email is one of your main requirements, you are so
different from the average business customer that I suggest the
rest of your concerns might also not apply to business customers.
> If you want secure,
> unrecoverable E-mail for yourself or your company, you can run PGP 2.3a
> and regularly subject your keys to unrecoverable erasure. I am very
> skeptical that this really works (there are too many back doors built
> into the operating systems, mail programs, and word processors,
> especially Microsoft's) but it has to be better than this.
What Disappearing Inc. offers is ease of use -- if both sides are using
the Disappearing plugin, the messages are erased unrecoverably
automatically. I do believe it's a fair bit easier to install and
use than PGP.
- Dan
(one of the guys who wrote the key server for Disappearing Inc.
http://www.disappearing.com )
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Crypto Related Pangrams
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000 21:35:57 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mok-Kong Shen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> wtshaw wrote:
> >
> > Here are some the pangram bug has caused me to write. Anyone else want to
> [snip]
>
> What is a 'pangram'? Is it generated automatically through
> randomly choosing a grammatical structure and randomly
> filling the proper kind of words at the nodes of the tree?
>
> M. K. Shen
It's a sentence that uses all 26 letters, short as can be if you want. A
search will get lots of these on the web. My technique is just lots of
thinking, getting related words down and trying to tie them together.
--
Rats! (What Gov. Bush is apt to say the morning after the election)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Crypto Related Pangrams
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000 21:40:23 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Clifton T. Sharp Jr."
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Doug Kuhlman wrote:
> > wtshaw wrote:
> > > 42) *Vexed xenophobes fear crypto's jazzy, quaint, works.
> >
> > Loved these! Unfortunately, this one isn't a pangram, as it doesn't
> > contain the letter "l".
>
> This, of course, makes it the Christmas pangram.
Strangely I have a base translation program for base 50 called Noel, but
as I posted, I made a mistake in not removing that one. I have found 4 or
5 with errors in the long list that someone kindly posted, so that is part
of the game. New ones are checked and written using a function now.
--
Rats! (What Gov. Bush is apt to say the morning after the election)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: Crypto Related Pangrams
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000 21:32:24 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Doug Kuhlman
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> wtshaw wrote:
> >
> >
> > 42) *Vexed xenophobes fear crypto's jazzy, quaint, works.
>
> Loved these! Unfortunately, this one isn't a pangram, as it doesn't
> contain the letter "l".
The replacement is the one above it, forgot to remove the problem child.
--
Rats! (What Gov. Bush is apt to say the morning after the election)
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: www.curious.4ears (re-post)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 00:34:20 -0400
rosi wrote:
> Where did my e-mail messages to Andrew go?
> Whether there is something that prevents Andrew from telling me
> of the receipt of my messages? and
> Why?
You should ask those of [EMAIL PROTECTED] (or whatever domain
contains the intended recipient's address). But don't tell
him what the content was, just the address and that nobody
seems to be at home there (or whatever the exact symptom is).
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: question on the bible code
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 00:46:01 -0400
TaoenChristo wrote:
> I am basing my findings on rigorous research by others and myself and
> having proved the code, I need no longer defend anything. I suppose
> there will always be critics, and closed-minded people, who cannot
> understand, or are not willing to spend the time to research the thing
> for themselves.
If you would give us a pointer to a write-up of your rigorous
research, or better yet to your "proof" of the code, then we
could evaluate it.
> ... I am now quite positive, through over 5 years of research, that
> the code is genuine.
The same was said by the Baconians. If you don't know about them,
then you really don't know much in general about this kind of
hidden-message finding. If you do know about them, the parallels
should be obvious. The cited Moby-Dick page illustrates how easy
it is to find such messages when you look for them -- even when
they are clearly not intentionally embedded into the text by the
author (or by a "divine guiding hand").
Any claim that a text completely described in N bits can possibly
contain more than N bits of (predictive) information is simply wrong.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: For the Gurus
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2000 22:03:53 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "root@localhost <spamthis>"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> My goal is to design something that can encipher 200 letters of text
> with a high expectation of security without requiring a key change.
> I want the whole encryption worksheet to fit on one 9x11 page. One
> page per message, key changes with page.
>
>From a strictly simple but wasteful standpoint, my BLT cipher has promise,
only thing is that ciphertext is 3x plaintext. The good thing is that
words and some punctuation can be absorbed into it.
The key for BLT is a deranged 27 character alphabet, even derived from a
pangram if desired.
--
Rats! (What Gov. Bush is apt to say the morning after the election)
------------------------------
From: Dido Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Announcement
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 13:09:58 +0800
rosi wrote:
>
> ROSi has decided to venture past concept into implementation.
>
Does anyone know what the heck this person is talking about?
--
Rafael R. Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> +63 (2) 4342217
ICSM-F Development Team, UP Diliman +63 (917) 4458925
PGP Key available at http://home.pacific.net.ph/~dido/dido.pgp
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hash algorithms
Date: 14 Sep 2000 05:24:11 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Greetings,
> I have a project that requires me to look into 5 hash algorithms, I have
> been attempting to figure out what exactly is a hash algorithm. I know that
> MD2-5 are one-way hash algorithms, but what would the definition be of a
I don't think an MD3 was ever published - maybe someone will correct me.
> hash algorithm so I can identify the other 4 that I require?
Do a web search for the _Handbook of Applied Cryptography_. It's available for
free download and will give you a better definition than you're likely to soon
get on a newsgroup (nothing against the competence of people here, just want to
avoid duplicating work) and some examples.
-David
------------------------------
From: Dido Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hash algorithms
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 13:41:39 +0800
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Greetings,
>
> I have a project that requires me to look into 5 hash algorithms, I have
> been attempting to figure out what exactly is a hash algorithm. I know that
> MD2-5 are one-way hash algorithms, but what would the definition be of a
> hash algorithm so I can identify the other 4 that I require?
>
Hash algorithms evolved as a method to perform searching for items in a
list in constant time. Someone came up with the brilliant idea that if
you had a table and keys you had to find in a table, then why not come
up with some function that would transform the searched keys into table
addresses? Trivially, if for example, the keys were integers from 0 to
N, we would just store the record with key i in table position i, thus
immediately accessing the record with the key. Hash functions are a way
of extending this idea to more general keys, such as strings. In
general, *any* function that maps search keys to addresses in a table
qualifies as a hash function, in our trivial example, the function was
the identity function. A simple function for text strings would be to
take the modulo-N sum of the ASCII characters that make up the string,
for a table with N elements. Obviously, it is possible for hashes
computed with this function to "collide", i.e. for two or more keys to
hash to the same value, in which case some sort of policy must be put in
place to deal with this condition. So clearly collision resistance is a
desirable property, so that your searching takes the near constant time
required for computing your hash function as much as possible and the
fallback plan for dealing with collisions is used as little as possible,
because that's almost always slower. A good general-purpose hash
function that tries to satisfy these requirements is Jenkins' hash
algorithm, described in Dr. Dobb's Journal, September 1997.
Now, *cryptographic* hash functions such as the MD family of functions
have additional requirements. Like the hash functions used in
searching, they also map long keys into shorter hash values, but they
take the collision resistance issue much more seriously. Cryptographic
hashes are usually used to ensure the integrity and to prevent malicious
modification of messages, so a collision would mean two messages hashed
to the same value, so the hash would then be no good for the purpose.
For a good cryptographic hash it would be infeasible to find a message
that collided with some other message. Cryptographic hashes are also
supposed one-way hashes, as you have pointed out, because they should
have the property that it is computationally infeasible to obtain the
original key given the hash value.
--
Rafael R. Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> +63 (2) 4342217
ICSM-F Development Team, UP Diliman +63 (917) 4458925
PGP Key available at http://home.pacific.net.ph/~dido/dido.pgp
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: cellular automata rng?
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 10:16:54 +0200
Being conservative, I suggest that you first do some statistical
tests before considering using such random sources.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy.anon-server
Subject: Re: When I will send message to e-mail address, how to know that message
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 10:16:47 +0200
pgp651 wrote:
>
> I know that +acksend works. The only problem with it is that it's saying that :
> "Message has been sent" but not that "Message has been delivered".
> The difference is not big but it could be significant.
> Thanks for your try.
There is an option for delivery acknowledgement that can be
set, though I have never used it since long long time.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Intel's 1.13 MHZ chip
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2000 10:17:02 +0200
Jerry Coffin wrote:
> Oh, there's no question about that -- the comment to which I was
> replying was something to the effect that although 1 GHz (or
> thereabouts) was relatively recent for Intel (and AMD, though that
> wasn't mentioned) that the military had undoubtedly had it for a
> decade or more. There's no question that the NSA, et al, have had
> Crays for a long time, but then again other than the clock speed
> there's not a lot really new or different about the 1.13 GHz PIII
> either. It's obviously faster than a 650 MHz PIII, but that's about
> it. The differences between other Crays of the time (E.g. a C90) and
> the Cray IV were really considerably larger.
That the PC-chips become very fast have two implications.
First, it is possible to use lots of them to obtain rather
cheap supercomputing power (for appropriate programs) that
was not possible previously. (Whether supercomputers are
to be superceded by clusters in the near future is debatable.
But that's not the point here.) Second, because of that, the
export bans of supercomputers to the unfriendly nations are
no longer very effective. (I read somewhere, though, that
the export bans as such were at no time absolutely effective
as a matter of fact.)
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
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