Cryptography-Digest Digest #819, Volume #12 Mon, 2 Oct 00 22:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: is NIST just nuts? (Tom St Denis)
Re: It's Rijndael (John Savard)
problem with MyFish Cipher (Tom St Denis)
Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ? (Jim Gillogly)
Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael (jungle)
Re: is NIST just nuts? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Problem question (Ernest Dumenigo)
Re: It's Rijndael (John Savard)
Re: It's Rijndael (John Savard)
Re: CPU's aimed at cryptography ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: It's Rijndael (David Hopwood)
Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish? ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish? ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: It's Rijndael ("Joseph Ashwood")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: is NIST just nuts?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:48:27 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Albert Yang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> : [Twofish] wasn't the most secure or had the most security margain
> : (Serpent wins that)
>
> I think this is true if you assume that additional rounds beyond the
best
> known attack result in more strength. More rounds certainly help
prevent
> some attacks - but can make little difference to other ones.
>
> We probably can't say with very much confidence which out of Serpent,
> Twofish, Rijndael has the "most security margin" until there are
better
> attacks on two of them.
Yeah but the idea is that known attacks are used as a metric in the
absense of supreme enlightenment. Serpent and Twofish are secure
against linear, differential, truncated differential, etc.. attacks
whereas Rijndael is quasi-pseudo-weak to a known attack.
Of course diff/linear attacks may be applied in a new way and break 32
rounds of Serpent (or Twofish), but that's very unlikely. In many
cases additional rounds make attacks harder, unless that attack is
independent of the number of rounds (see Slide Attack). So I would
disagree and say that 18 round Rijndael is stronger then 10 rounds
Rijndael regardless of the lack of knowledge.
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:55:32 GMT
On Mon, 2 Oct 2000 18:16:58 +0200, Serge Paccalin
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Just a question: since they chose a Belgian algorithm, will they
>have the nerve to forbid its export?
The export of the algorithm from Belgium is OK. Export of products
*made in the US* _using_ that algorithm will, indeed, be restricted as
per usual. Although the US restrictions are now not what they were.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: problem with MyFish Cipher
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:59:41 GMT
I accidently used b[3] and b[4] to access the third and fourth words of
the block. The corrected source is on my website at:
http://www.geocities.com/tomstdenis/files/myfish.c
BTW I would seriously appreciate any constructive scientific comments.
Maybe have a stimulating conversation in sci.crypt?
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 01:14:28 +0000
Martin Miller wrote:
> I'm really not an expert, but this paper describe a cryptanalysis of Rijndael
> for 6,7,8 and a key attack that can break 9 round rijndael...
Is that the attack on 256-bit Rijndael, where the recommended number of
rounds is 14? If so, it's mentioned in the NIST report in Sec. 3.2.1.3.
> http://www.counterpane.com/rijndael.ps.zip
For some reason Ghostscript fails for me on this (when unzipped)
with /undefinedfilename. Does it work for everybody else? I'm
running Linux, FWIW.
--
Jim Gillogly
Hevensday, 12 Winterfilth S.R. 2000, 01:08
12.19.7.10.16, 12 Cib 19 Chen, Ninth Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk
Subject: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 21:17:17 -0400
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Oct. 2, 2000
Contact: Philip Bulman (301) 975-5661 G 2000-176
A worldwide competition to develop a new encryption technique that can be used
to protect computerized information ended today when Secretary of Commerce
Norman Y. Mineta announced the nation's proposed new Advanced Encryption
Standard.
Mineta named the Rijndael (pronounced Rhine-doll) data encryption formula as
the winner of a three-year competition involving some of the world's leading
cryptographers.
"Once final, this standard will serve as a critical computer security tool
supporting the rapid growth of electronic commerce," Mineta said. "This is a
very significant step toward creating a more secure digital economy. It will
allow e-commerce and e-government to flourish safely, creating new
opportunities for all Americans," he said.
Computer scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, an
agency of the Commerce Department's Technology Administration, organized the
international competition in a drive to develop a strong information encryption
formula to protect sensitive information in federal computer systems. Many
businesses are expected to use the AES as well.
The proposed selection of Rijndael as the AES will be formally announced in
the Federal Register in several months, and NIST then will receive public
comments on the draft Federal Information Processing Standard for 90 days.
Researchers from 12 different countries worked on developing advanced encoding
methods during the global competition.
NIST invited the worldwide cryptographic community to "attack" the encryption
formulas in an effort to break the codes.
After narrowing the field down from 15 formulas to five, NIST invited
cryptographers to intensify their attacks on the finalists. The agency and the
world cryptographic community also evaluated the encoding formulas for factors
such as security, speed and versatility.
The Rijndael developers are Belgian cryptographers Joan Daemen (pronounced
Yo'-ahn Dah'-mun) of Proton World International and Vincent Rijmen (pronounced
Rye'-mun) of Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Both are highly regarded experts
within the international cryptographic community.
NIST organized and managed the competition with considerable private-sector
cooperation.
The competing AES candidates were sophisticated mathematical formulas called
algorithms. Algorithms are at the heart of computerized encryption systems,
which encode everything from electronic mail to the secret personal
identification numbers, or PINs, that people use with bank teller machines.
When approved, the AES will be a public algorithm designed to protect
sensitive government information well into the 21st century. It will replace
the aging Data Encryption Standard, which NIST adopted in 1977 as a Federal
Information Processing Standard used by federal agencies to protect sensitive,
unclassified information.
DES and a variant called Triple DES are used widely in the private sector as
well, especially in the financial services industry.
The effort to establish the AES reflects the dramatic transformation that
cryptography has undergone in recent years.
Just a few decades ago the science of cryptography was an esoteric endeavor
employed primarily by governments to protect state and military secrets. Today,
millions of Americans use cryptography, often without knowing it. Most people
who use automated teller machines have used cryptography because the secret
PINs required by the machines are encrypted before being sent to a computer
that makes sure the number matches the card.
Others use information encryption when they make a purchase over the Internet.
Their credit card numbers are encrypted when they place an order.
Hundreds of encryption products currently employ DES or Triple DES, and such
systems have become almost ubiquitous in the financial services industry.
Consequently, the selection of the AES may affect millions of consumers and
businesses.
NIST requested proposals for the AES on Sept. 12, 1997, and a variety of
organizations around the world responded with enthusiasm. Each of the candidate
algorithms was required to support key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits. For a
128-bit key size, there are approximately
340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, 000,000 (340 followed by 36 zeros)
possible keys.
NIST evaluated the candidate algorithms and received invaluable assistance
from cryptographers at computer security companies and universities around the
world. Good security was the primary quality required of the winning formula,
but factors such as speed and versatility across a variety of computer
platforms also were considered. In other words, the algorithms must be able to
run securely and efficiently on large computers, desktop computers and even
small devices such as smart cards.
NIST and leading cryptographers from around the world found that all five
finalist algorithms had a very high degree of security. Rijndael was selected
because it had the best combination of security, performance, efficiency,
implementability and flexibility.
The AES competition was organized by computer scientists in NIST's Information
Technology Laboratory. A lengthy technical analysis of the AES candidates is
being posted on NIST's web site today at www.nist.gov/aes.
After the public comment period, NIST will revise the proposed standard�if
appropriate�and submit it to the Secretary of Commerce for adoption as an
official federal standard. This process is expected to be complete by the
spring of 2001.
Press contacts for the Rijndael team:
Joan Daemen Tel: +32 2 724 55 08, Fax: +32 2 727 62 50 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Vincent Rijmen Tel: +32 16 32 18 62, Fax: +32 16 32 19 86
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
read all at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/g00-176.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: is NIST just nuts?
Date: 3 Oct 2000 01:16:43 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Cornelius Sybrandy) wrote in <39D91B8C.D76BB99A@my-
deja.com>:
>> They may have cleaned come some things up. But are your forgetting the
>> key size was lowered to be 56 bits. That alone made it easy for
>> them to break.
>>
>
>You are assuming, of course, they had the computing power back then to
>break a 56-bit key. I doubt that they did and if so they only used it to
>break messages that were designated as being very important. I doubt the
>CRAY's back then were anything like the combined effort of distributed.net
>and a specialized compter by IBM that took just over 22 hours to crack a
>DES key.
>
I gues you never dealt with logic gates using ECL it was childs play
to make the hardware for the break using discrete components.
>>
>>
>> I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
>
>Nice thought! I always know that Hilary was the one really running the
>show :-)
>
>csybrandy
>
>
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ernest Dumenigo)
Subject: Re: Problem question
Date: 3 Oct 2000 01:11:19 GMT
Jim Gillogly ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: Ernest Dumenigo wrote:
: >
: > I've been working on some of the problems given in Military
: > Cryptanalytics, while reading it, and I am completely stuck on one of the
: > problems, and have not been able to solve it!!
: >
: > The Plain text has been broken up into five letter groups, and each
: > letter put in alphabetical order in each group:
: >
: > ORSUU ABIMR AEHNS ENSUV ADKOR ADEGM EEINN EMNVY EELSS S
: >
: > What I have come up with (and don't know if its right or wrong) is:
: > Our submarine has ENSUV ADKOR ADEGM nine enemy vessels
: >
: > Can anyone make sense of that middle part? Or am I completely off track?
: Looks good to me, except for your "has". I make it:
: Our submarines have sunk or damaged nine enemy vessels.
Oh why thank you for your help. I would never have figured out to change
has for have!! Just never "clicked" like the other parts did.
Thanks again for your help!!
: Interesting kind of puzzle.
: --
: Jim Gillogly
: Trewesday, 11 Winterfilth S.R. 2000, 23:52
: 12.19.7.10.15, 11 Men 18 Chen, Eighth Lord of Night
--
=====
Ernest
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 01:05:36 GMT
On 02 Oct 2000 16:53:03 -0700, Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) writes:
>> No, as D. A. Gwyn has pointed out, *that* was only the name of the
>> algorithm that preceded DES; the one with a 128-bit block and a
>> 128-bit key, with only two teensy S-boxes, and which was not
>> particularly resistant to differential cryptanalysis.
>Lucifer had a *32* bit block and a 128-bit key. Coppersmith more or
>less chuckled about Lucifer's block size at his Crypto 2000 talk.
I'm thinking of the algorithm described in Cryptologia by Arthur
Sorkin in 1994: *that* algorithm was also the one described partially
in James Martin's 1973 book, Security, Accuracy, and Privacy in
Computer Systems.
It had a 128-bit block, and is described in detail on my web site.
The Scientific American article, I believe, only displayed a
*conceptual* design to illustrate how an electronic cipher could
incorporate Shannon's diffusion and confusion concepts. Pesky details
like Feistel rounds were merely left out. I don't think it's correct
to even view that as an alternate form of Lucifer.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 01:26:39 GMT
On Mon, 02 Oct 2000 23:26:37 +0000, Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote,
in part:
>If a cipher has an "adequate" security margin against all known
>attacks, then it is as good from a security standpoint as any
>other cipher.
I'm not sure if I can fully agree iwth that.
>Obviously at any moment someone could come up with another attack
>against any of the candidates. Perhaps the Rump Session observation
>will lead to a real break, for example. But this argument applies
>equally to any of the candidates. Nobody's safe from the unknown
>attack.
This is a good point. If an attack is *unknown*, we don't know
anything about it. So, how can we worry about it?
Well, not very well.
However, presumably 32-round Rijndael would be more likely to be safe
against an unknown attack than 10-round Rijndael. Outside of that,
there is no way to be _certain_ which cipher, from among ciphers of
different basic designs, will be next to fall to an unknown attack.
However, although I don't quarrel with the selection of Rijndael,
based on the fact that speed is critical in many applications, and
provided that it really is significantly faster than Twofish, which is
claimed to be possibly more secure.
But I did very much like the fact that MARS mixed two different round
structures, even though it did so very timidly, by making one of them
unkeyed. This does *seem* to make it, in a sense, less likely to fall
to an unknown attack, since it's hard to see how such an attack could
be effective against two different types of round.
In my view, if they're going to call it "A Cryptographic Algorithm for
the 21st Century" then it ought to remain adequate, during the whole
term of the 21st Century (that is, up until December 31st, 2100) for
all purposes - which implies, to my mind, that anything encrypted with
it should remain unbreakable for at least another 150 years (barring
significant advances in human longevity).
Hence, my inclination towards such baroque monstrosities as my own
latest design, Quadibloc VIII,
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto/co040712.htm
which, in its own way, doubtless embodies as much wretched excess as
that of our famed tireless poster whose block cipher uses a
key-dependent S-box with 524,288 entries.
Of course, trying to imagine the capabilities of computers *250 years
from now* is, as Bruce Schneier pointed out, "an exercise in
insanity".
Besides MARS, I liked the multiple layers of the f-function in
LOKI-97, the high nonlinearity of FROG, and the deep logical mesh of
MAGENTA: those three ciphers may have been flawed, but the ideas they
contained, with a little work, had promise. Thus, my attitude is
simply one of "try harder"; but that doesn't apply specifically to
Rijndael compared to the other finalists.
DES, after all, was "adequate" at the time it was brought in. But it
wound up being used beyond its lifetime. Since inertia - failing to
realize one's cipher messages could be being read - is one of the
major causes of damage through cryptanalysis or other factors (i.e.,
from the failure of Nazi Germany to improve Enigma in other than
piecemeal fashion to the lack of suspicion, as highlighted in the
opening chapter of "Breaking the Ring", of the possibilities of key
compromise in the Walker spy scandal), I think a large safety factor
is a good idea to help mitigate the consequence of overuse and misuse,
which must be expected.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: CPU's aimed at cryptography
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2000 12:12:49 -0700
Does anyone know the kind of signature verification performance these things
have. I'm particularly interested in the verification of RSA and ECC. And
also does any one know what format they expect to recieve the public keys
for the same.
Joe
"kihdip" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8r1ru9$c18$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> CPU especially designed for cryptography are available.
> This is probably old news, but here are the links:
>
> Motorola's CPU, MPC180 at:
> http://mot-sps.com/news_center/press_releases/PR000926A.html
> Analog Device's CPU, ADSP-2141 at:
> http://products.analog.com/products/info.asp?product=ADSP-2141L
>
> Kim
>
>
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:19:38 +0100
From: David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Will Janoschka wrote:
> Not a flame
> Does someone know if the Rijndael key to encript
> ****RIJNDAEL**** to *AES*WINNER*AES*
> does exist?
Yes; assuming Rijndael behaves similarly to a random cipher, there are
expected to be 2^64 192-bit keys, and 2^128 256-bit keys that would
satisfy this. However, it would require on the order of 2^128 encryptions
to find such a key.
- --
David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has been
seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see www.fipr.org/rip
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------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish?
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2000 16:25:25 -0700
"Runu Knips" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
I think we had a misunderstanding. I would NEVER claim, hint at, or
otherwise indicate that I believed that Schneier or any other reasonable
human being on this group was involved with the NSA in anyway except the
obvious. My statements were an abnormally personal affront to DS (please
note that I refuse to give him the honor of using his name, while I use the
name of others). If however someone of the caliber of Schneier is influenced
by agency influence, it is probably so that they can have some say in the
direction of public cryptography, and trawl for new talent, otherwise I
would certainly hope that Schneier is goof enough to be hired outright.
However your statements may be worth responding to anyway.
> The NSA exists to assert the security of the US, not the security of
> the rest of the world.
Actually the NSA exists for the security of the US government, and it's
interests. It also exists to eliminate the security where the US interests
require such. It's questionably beneficial stand towards non-government
security, I think is best viewed as us protecting our primary interest,
money.
>
> But on the other hand it seems that they have actually helped IBM
> with DES, and until today nobody found any intentional weakness in
> DES, did anyone ?
Actually for once I agree with DS, the 56-bit key was probably for that use,
outside of that all the evidence points towards it being strong.
>
> > I see very strong correlations between that and a person who posts large
> > quantities of information that is factually incorrect (see the DES
> > thread),
>
> Hu ? I can't find any such posting of Schneier in this NG ?
But if you look in the DES thread, there was quite a bit of factually
incorrect information spewed by DS.
Schneier does show up occassionally, almost unerringly with something quite
useful.
>
> > spreading information about his own ciphers (which are as far
> > as we know unanalyzed, and we know for a fact that they are consistently
> > presented in a form that makes analysis exceptionally difficult),
>
> Why is Blowfish hard to analyze ? It is a truely simple cipher, plus
> it has many rounds, 16 instead of 6 (which would AFAIK be enough as
> well). Every analysation of it just resulted in the conclusion that
> it is extremely secure.
I agree Blowfish is easy to analyze, but hard to break. DS's
whateverNamedSpew.zip however is written in an extremely convoluted way, and
he has habitually refused to write a paper on it, on the grounds that his
code is clearer.
>
> I would like to know where you see the slightest chance for a backdoor
> in Blowfish.
Quite simply, I don't. I do however see plenty of ways to write obfuscated
code like DS has written that contains backdoors.
>
> Twofish is complex, but on the other hand it is clear that they tried
> to design a Blowfish which meets the requirements of the AES contest.
Actually I find Twofish is surprisingly simple. I think most of that is the
ability of Schneier to write to computer nerds.
Joe
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish?
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2000 16:25:57 -0700
"Runu Knips" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> > Twofish: should be used wherever speed is necessary, the data blocks
match
> > into 128-bit blocks easily, and the security level needs to exceed
2^120,
> > with a margin of error that may eventually drop it below anything
> > acceptable. There must never be more than 2^128 unique blocks under the
same
> > key available.
>
> The later statement amuses me, because Twofish is a 128 bit block
> cipher,
> so there ARE only 2**128 possible unique blocks !! ;-)))
I guess it would have been clearer to state "individual" instead of
"unique", I'll try to do that next time.
>
> Statistics say that, in CBC mode, a n bit block cipher will have two
> equal
> blocks after 2**(n/2) blocks with a chance of 50% (birthday paradox). So
> one should actually try to (a) use substantly less blocks, and/or (b)
> make
> the XOR of two random blocks a useless information, for example by using
> compression, or by combining the block cipher with a stream cipher, etc.
>
> Changingthe key after 2**128 blocks is IMHO therefore a little bit very
> optimistic. I would suggest something like 2**40 blocks.
The point of the 2**128 blocks was that at that point language analysis is
gaurenteed to reveal large portions, like I said there are many more
considerations that I did not express, some of which could completely
destroy
the security, for example if you are only sending one of two messages, it is
necessary to change keys every message. That's one of the considerations I
hinted at, if there is high redundancy in the stream the key must be changed
more often. I often encourage changing the key at a few megabytes, because
it's a logical feeling location, and everyone likesthings that feel right,
and it won't decrease security.
Joe
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 10:59:22 -0700
"Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Serge Paccalin wrote:
> > Just a question: since they chose a Belgian algorithm, will they
> > have the nerve to forbid its export?
>
> Al Gore has been the big proponent of export restrictions.
> The election is next month. Not that many voters really
> care about crypto much, but the anti-crypto man may not be
> in office much longer.
I realize that this is beginning to go off topic, but if you'll permit the
infraction temporarily, I'll try to keep this from polluting us too much.
You also have to remember that just recently Bush's brat stated rather
plainly that the ok of RU-486 was "wrong", while Gore praised it (Source:San
Jose Mercury News), this is much more likely to be a catalizing point, and
considering that half of america is almost certainly pro-choice (the female
half), and most of the male half is also pro-choice, this could become a
major issue. So I wouldn't go about spending too much energy on the
anti-crypto man leaving office. All you can do is excercise your rights and
vote (void where prohibited).
Joe
------------------------------
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