Cryptography-Digest Digest #820, Volume #12 Tue, 3 Oct 00 01:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ? (John Savard)
Re: is NIST just nuts? (John Savard)
Re: It's Rijndael (John Savard)
Re: It's Rijndael (David Schwartz)
Re: NIST Statistical Test Suite ("bubba")
Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael (David Schwartz)
Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ? (Mark Carroll)
Mr. Zimmermann, Mr. Price when can we expect this feature ? (pgp651)
Hardware Implementation of DES ("Carpe Diem")
Re: It's Rijndael (David Schwartz)
Re: Adobe Acrobat -- How Secure? ("David Thompson")
Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael (jungle)
Re: Idea for Twofish and Serpent Teams (Andru Luvisi)
Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael (jungle)
Re: Question on biases in random numbers & decompression (David Schwartz)
Re: Choice of public exponent in RSA signatures ("John A.Malley")
Tysoizbyjoxs! Can you solve these extremely difficult cryptograms? (daniel mcgrath)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk
Subject: Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael
Date: 3 Oct 2000 01:42:04 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (jungle) wrote in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Oct. 2, 2000
>
> Contact: Philip Bulman (301) 975-5661 G 2000-176
>
> A worldwide competition to develop a new encryption technique that can
> be used
>to protect computerized information ended today when Secretary of
>Commerce Norman Y. Mineta announced the nation's proposed new Advanced
>Encryption Standard.
>
> Mineta named the Rijndael (pronounced Rhine-doll) data encryption
> formula as
>the winner of a three-year competition involving some of the world's
>leading cryptographers.
>
Fist of all the competions was not a world wide effort. The
judging was done soley in the United States and other countries
should take that fact into account before any real secrets are
encrypted with it. Also the US does not consider it secure encough
for classed information. That fact alone should make one wonder
how secure of a method the NSA would allow the public to use.
> "Once final, this standard will serve as a critical computer security
> tool
>supporting the rapid growth of electronic commerce," Mineta said. "This
>is a very significant step toward creating a more secure digital
>economy. It will allow e-commerce and e-government to flourish safely,
>creating new opportunities for all Americans," he said.
>
Actually by putting the eggs all in one basket is a big mistake
Just like using vicegrips as a do all tool.
> Computer scientists at the National Institute of Standards and
> Technology, an
>agency of the Commerce Department's Technology Administration, organized
>the international competition in a drive to develop a strong information
>encryption formula to protect sensitive information in federal computer
>systems. Many businesses are expected to use the AES as well.
>
***Note sensitve not classifed that is a big difference***
> The proposed selection of Rijndael as the AES will be formally
> announced in
>the Federal Register in several months, and NIST then will receive
>public comments on the draft Federal Information Processing Standard for
>90 days.
>
> Researchers from 12 different countries worked on developing advanced
> encoding
>methods during the global competition.
>
> NIST invited the worldwide cryptographic community to "attack" the
> encryption
>formulas in an effort to break the codes.
>
Not really. If they want a real contest. Make a 10k doucument
encrypted with a secret key. And offer someone 10 million dollars state
and federal government tax fee if they can decrypt it
it in a years time. Will they do that. Hell no someone might
break it. And they don't want anyone to break it.
....
>from cryptographers at computer security companies and universities
>around the world. Good security was the primary quality required of the
>winning formula, but factors such as speed and versatility across a
>variety of computer platforms also were considered. In other words, the
>algorithms must be able to run securely and efficiently on large
>computers, desktop computers and even small devices such as smart cards.
>
IN short since security can not be proved. It really means use what is
fast and effiecent and appears secure to the public. scott19u is more
secure for most messages. Its about a thousand times slower but its
secure. The proof of that is the last cash contest I ran. It can not
be duplicated with any of the AES ciphers becasue they lack the kind
of security in my code.
However that being said. It may well be a very good cipher for many
but not all applications.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Why is TwoFish better than Blowfish?
Date: 3 Oct 2000 01:53:31 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Joseph Ashwood) wrote in <#sxuZRNLAHA.66@cpmsnbbsa09>:
>
>"Runu Knips" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>I think we had a misunderstanding. I would NEVER claim, hint at, or
>otherwise indicate that I believed that Schneier or any other reasonable
>human being on this group was involved with the NSA in anyway except the
>obvious. My statements were an abnormally personal affront to DS (please
>note that I refuse to give him the honor of using his name, while I use
>the name of others). If however someone of the caliber of Schneier is
>influenced by agency influence, it is probably so that they can have
>some say in the direction of public cryptography, and trawl for new
>talent, otherwise I would certainly hope that Schneier is goof enough to
>be hired outright.
>
Sounds like a frudeian slip. In here you not only say make excuses
for your crypto god. Saying he may do what he does to try to influence
the NSA, You really belive he could do anything to change there mind.
I am not sure if they are laughing more about that comment or about
your innner mind caller him a "goof". I speel bad cause i suck at
spelling whats your excuse. And I take the reference DS as an honor
just don't "goof" and but a B there.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 02:31:19 GMT
On 02 Oct 2000 17:53:39 -0700, Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>That's *related* key attack. Generally, ciphers are deemed secure if
>there's no known- or chosen- plaintext or ciphertext attacks. Nobody
>really cares about related key attacks.
Essentially, this is because it is easy to avoid being vulnerable to
them, and it is known they exist. Once, IBM designed a cryptographic
facility using DES which derived various keys from the master key by
XORing 01010101... and 11001100... or other fixed values with it, so
these attacks can conceivably be useful.
But the same could be said of differential cryptanalysis! Just use
your block cipher in ECB mode, but combined with some simple stream
cipher both before and after.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: is NIST just nuts?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 02:35:17 GMT
On Mon, 02 Oct 2000 19:34:36 -0400, Cornelius Sybrandy
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>You are assuming, of course, they had the computing power back then to
>break a 56-bit key.
It may well be that the computing power to break a 56-bit key did not
exist in 1977. But even then it was apparent that computers were
improving with each passing year.
So, just because DES was not breakable *right away*, that doesn't mean
that 56 bits was a good design decision.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 02:38:32 GMT
On Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:19:38 +0100, David Hopwood
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Yes; assuming Rijndael behaves similarly to a random cipher, there are
>expected to be 2^64 192-bit keys, and 2^128 256-bit keys that would
>satisfy this. However, it would require on the order of 2^128 encryptions
>to find such a key.
And, of course, being able to find it is equivalent to being able to
crack Rijndael, so finding it would *not* be happy news.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 19:50:12 -0700
John Savard wrote:
> given that all the algorithms were of satisfactory security.
Yes, but the lesson of DES is that "satisfactory" security is not good
enough.
DS
------------------------------
From: "bubba" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.crypt.random-numbers
Subject: Re: NIST Statistical Test Suite
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 02:55:29 GMT
Well that reminds me of Microsoft. Through VC5, I found the Microsoft
compiler would not warn about obvious mistakes that my 15 year old
Borland compiler caught. Watcom did just as well, as does Intel. With
VC6, Microsoft no longer lags Borland by 15 years. No wonder Microsoft
code was always so buggy.
"David Rush" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> "bubba" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > I built it last night using Microsoft VC6.0 for x86.
>
> > I got plenty of warnings. Some suggest SUN's
> > compiler missing questionable code.
>
> Don't even get me started. Sun used to have one of the best commercial
> development platforms. This past year I have been finding out that it
> just sucks. What a waste...
>
> david rush
> --
> Java is a WORA language! (Write Once, Run Away)
> -- James Vandenberg (on [EMAIL PROTECTED])
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk
Subject: Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 19:53:25 -0700
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> Also the US does not consider it secure encough
> for classed information.
Do you have a reference for this claim?
DS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Carroll)
Subject: Re: AES Rijndael 9 Round not secure ?
Date: 3 Oct 2000 03:04:58 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Martin Miller wrote:
(snip)
>> http://www.counterpane.com/rijndael.ps.zip
>
>For some reason Ghostscript fails for me on this (when unzipped)
>with /undefinedfilename. Does it work for everybody else? I'm
>running Linux, FWIW.
>From Linux Ghostview 1.5 displays it okay for me, as does gv 3.5.8, a
somewhat related product. I could try running it through ps2pdf and
mailing you the result if you like.
-- Mark
------------------------------
Date: 3 Oct 2000 03:09:21 -0000
From: pgp651 <Use-Author-Address-Header@[127.1]>
Subject: Mr. Zimmermann, Mr. Price when can we expect this feature ?
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,alt.security.scramdisk
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Mr. Zimmermann, Mr. Price when can we expect this feature ?
After RSA patent hoopla is over, isn't now the time to implement 4k RSA keys
into PGP v262 ? The maximum size of 2k is little bit lower than corresponding
128 bits key strength from symmetric cipher.
The introduction of 4k RSA will be in line with Twofish introduction.
We need 3k RSA keys to create balance between symmetric & asymmetric ciphers.
When can we expect this feature ?
~~~
This PGP signature only certifies the sender and date of the message.
It implies no approval from the administrators of nym.alias.net.
Date: Tue Oct 3 03:09:16 2000 GMT
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE=====
Version: 2.6.2
iQEVAwUBOdlN4E5NDhYLYPHNAQHD4gf6A3PRRMHATw3nRzVpOJ/mfX1G16f65V1E
jRUfuYy7e4W33a27edHARXey+150327zqWYf9R6ALIL7aynG0H5YFSg/8YlWqZxg
+kGOJqG/a6r+eY5F3mumodjMfaT+Vswi8y6QNZcvB0AGzu4cmV8fept/nQeNcCL/
uvr/AUbwLR4F2Y6lo5xOx5w8OXJUaSxZahdwtVZzQsLPe9AT9STQ5cLO+lJfMfML
gm6S98nAa9Cd/8/xc0o9Oi3r5xQKN+en5KVkIdPVR4gXp8ztVh21JRWIbjbwatoS
cRfmfC85zEUDdMZWIP5G/R8zWpUXzG4Qv7XEEDxJJly3+byo3aRgDg==
=0gec
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: "Carpe Diem" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Hardware Implementation of DES
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 22:24:43 -0500
Hi
I have to design a chip for a project and I was thinking to implement the
DES encryption algorithm. Does anybody have any references for me to read?
Thanks.
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: It's Rijndael
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 20:29:32 -0700
John Savard wrote:
>
> On Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:19:38 +0100, David Hopwood
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
> >Yes; assuming Rijndael behaves similarly to a random cipher, there are
> >expected to be 2^64 192-bit keys, and 2^128 256-bit keys that would
> >satisfy this. However, it would require on the order of 2^128 encryptions
> >to find such a key.
>
> And, of course, being able to find it is equivalent to being able to
> crack Rijndael, so finding it would *not* be happy news.
How do you figure?
As an imperfect analogy to show why this is not so, think of a one time
pad. If you know the first X bytes of plaintext and the first X bytes of
ciphertext, you can produce a key that would produce that ciphertext for
that plaintext. However, that key is no more likely than any other to
correctly decrypt the next byte.
DS
------------------------------
From: "David Thompson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Adobe Acrobat -- How Secure?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 03:36:36 GMT
Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote :
...
> A successful example would be the C++ standard document. You can buy (cheaply)
> a pdf file but can't extract parts of it.
>
Aside from the generic cracks (aka technical workarounds)
already mentioned, this particular case was cleanly solved
by enough people complaining to ANSI that they switched
to a non-restricted version. (Not restricted technically,
that is; the license terms still apply legally. Or at least
claim to; IANAL and this is not the group for that.)
--
- David.Thompson 1 now at worldnet.att.net
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk
Subject: Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 23:59:44 -0400
read again my press note, it is there ...
additionally it is in Published in the January 2, 1997 issue of the Federal
Register: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology
[Docket No. 960924272-6272-01] RIN 0693-ZA13 document ...
"It is intended that the AES ... algorithm capable of protecting sensitive
government information ..."
David Schwartz wrote:
>
> "SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>
> > Also the US does not consider it secure encough
> > for classed information.
>
> Do you have a reference for this claim?
------------------------------
From: Andru Luvisi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Idea for Twofish and Serpent Teams
Date: 02 Oct 2000 20:49:09 -0700
Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
[snip]
> Try saying that to Mr Schneier or Dr. Biham....
[snip]
Mr. Schneier said "It would be really cool to win, but mostly it's
just been a *lot* of FUN!"
*You* seem to be the one who is sore about the whole thing...
Andru
--
Andru Luvisi, Programmer/Analyst
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk
Subject: Re: Advanced Encryption Standard - winner is Rijndael
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 00:07:20 -0400
what cash contest you are running ?
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jungle) wrote in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Oct. 2, 2000
> >
> > Contact: Philip Bulman (301) 975-5661 G 2000-176
> >
> > A worldwide competition to develop a new encryption technique that can
> > be used
> >to protect computerized information ended today when Secretary of
> >Commerce Norman Y. Mineta announced the nation's proposed new Advanced
> >Encryption Standard.
> >
> > Mineta named the Rijndael (pronounced Rhine-doll) data encryption
> > formula as
> >the winner of a three-year competition involving some of the world's
> >leading cryptographers.
===
> IN short since security can not be proved. It really means use what is
> fast and effiecent and appears secure to the public. scott19u is more
> secure for most messages. Its about a thousand times slower but its
> secure. The proof of that is the last cash contest I ran.
what cash contest you are running ?
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: com.compression
Subject: Re: Question on biases in random numbers & decompression
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 21:02:54 -0700
Benjamin Goldberg wrote:
> Hmm:
> Method a: use 2 bits at a time, discard 25% of bitstream.
> 3 trits uses 3*2 bits minimum, 4*2 bits on average.
> Method b: use 4 bits at a time, discard 6.25% of bitstream.
> 3 trits uses 3*4 bits minimum, more on average (but I'm not going to
> bother to calculate how much more).
>
> Since I want to discard as little of the stream as possible, why the
> HELL would I want to use method b?
Because it discards very little of the bitstream, only 6.25%
DS
------------------------------
From: "John A.Malley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Choice of public exponent in RSA signatures
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2000 21:18:19 -0700
David Wagner wrote:
>
> John A. Malley wrote:
> >The number e = 2^16 + 1 = 65537 is a reasonable choice for a small
> >encryption exponent that minimizes the number of possible unconcealed
> >messages when encrypting with RSA and SIMULTANEOUSLY allows the same
> >message (or variations of that message) to be sent to a large number of
> >different recipients while minimizing the threat of a specific attack
> >(from Coppersmith) that relies on the same message (or a variation of
> >that message) sent to a number of different recipients.
>
> I must admit I don't understand this motivation too well.
>
> In practice, real implementations of RSA encryption use a large
> amount of random padding (see, e.g., OAEP). So long as you implement
> it correctly, the Hastad and Coppersmith attacks are not a threat.
Dan Boneh's paper "Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem"
http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf
discusses both Hastad's Broadcast Attack and Coppersmith's Short Pad
Attack.
In Hastad's Broadcast Attack, Bob sends the same message M to multiple
recipients encrypting it with the RSA public key for the ith recipient
as modulus and exponent < N[i], e[i] > . If everyone uses a small
encryption exponent e[i] = 3 then Eve can determine M with three or more
ciphertexts using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
In general Eve needs at least k ciphertexts, where e[i] = k, for the
Hastad Broadcast Attack to succeed. The attack grows less feasible as k
grows larger. Besides 3 the next favorite "small" encryption exponent is
e = 2^16 + 1 for reasons previously listed in this thread. The attack is
judged infeasible for e = 65537 provided Bob knows there's no chance
65,537 or more recipients of the same broadcast message use the e =
65537 encryption exponent.
Hastad further showed that if all e[i] equal the same exponent e and Bob
broadcasts linearly related messages then Eve can recover the plaintext
with k > e ciphertexts.
Alternatively Bob can append random padding to the messages.
>
> Perhaps it is a robustness issue -- you are worried that you
> misimplemented the padding? -- but if so, it seems not as strong
> a justification as what you mentioned in your post. Maybe it is
> better to devote your effort to getting the padding right in the
> first place; I don't know.
Coppersmith's Short Pad Attack on messages with appended random strings
can always be mounted for e = 3 whenever the random pad length is less
than 1/9th the message length. A large amount of random padding would
put the random pad length greater than 1/9th the message length and
offer protection against this attack. Alternatively, Coppersmith's
Short Pad Attack is judged useless against standard moduli sizes when a
value of e = 65537 is used - and the random padding need not be as
"large."
So in summary, the encryption exponent value e = 65537 provides a
reasonable choice for a small
encryption exponent that minimizes the number of possible unconcealed
messages when encrypting with RSA and simultaneously helps protect
against Hastad's Broadcast Attack if no random padding is applied to the
message or helps protect against both Hastad's Broadcast Attack and
Coppersmith's Short Pad Attack if random padding is applied to the
message (and the random paddings can be shorter than the padding size
needed for e = 3.)
John A. Malley
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (daniel mcgrath)
Crossposted-To: rec.puzzles
Subject: Tysoizbyjoxs! Can you solve these extremely difficult cryptograms?
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2000 04:33:51 GMT
The following cryptograms use a system that I've never seen -- I just
thought it up myself. So they may be hard. But maybe some expert
cryptologist will have ideas???
If you need hints, you may want to try this Deja.com-archive link
http://x71.deja.com/viewthread.xp?AN=670236531
and clicking on each successive "Msg".
Here are the cryptograms:
(A)
19055 13058 27195 06095 25106 20605 19506 09528 23322 05502
51306 23006 62330 63311 34096 10551 66944 59241 36792 14330
95670 76105 20216 19291 30532 91304 81059 24139 04603 94218
08644 04655 04086 04037 59165 64604 84686 14457 54488 87766
15275 43155 22490 12472 82332 20550 29101 28231 92525 46564
45764 55714 60894 55222 02161 92913 05329 13048 10558 42654
45589 45869 41592 10064 66945 57510 04558 75249 01247 32256
30572 31956 46192 41126 16122 03466 94557 54579 51483 05563
05723 19506 09514 81023 20605 19506 09521 11922 35597 06012
47210 97473 00502 06152 56092 90961 05516 06291 30533 10524
91381 92411 26161 22034 66945 57545 79514 82049 01247 14802
49012 47300 97272 41759 42966 77441 25046 37089 44520 40250
46081 44356 14020 46080 41375 76100 94651 45750 40250 44081
46092 44076 10072 89475 50445 71443 56410 20224 03673 72010
05066 77510 05240 36720 46875 89460 76100 91656 46576 44520
44593 44352 76455 91550 42667 20241 83678 79555 02416 94486
54266 78945 08042 65110 08041 37576 45767 20100 52403 67204
21514 10204 43694 55761 00714 45751 00864 48757 61007 64718
09115 14575 04215 61008 04035 51009 46758 94607 61025 01005
84487 57610 09242 15144 52041 58146 57610 08793 44352 76455
91550 42151 41020 22403 67204 21514 10211 90393 00970 60953
00972 72417 59429 16946 75022 40367 20421 51410 20402 50443
69443 66475 50403 67751 00754 03554 10955 67201 00624 21564
75504 40894 65764 10204 21614 42504 65764 55955 65100 94156
45595 55044 38354 42050 46080 40367 20460 80412 50405 81417
50418 69448 55100 89415 20403 67202 31430 61009 01654 03914
13752 04608 04038 02042 15145 75046 09466 91009 24266 64137
75040 36546 85147 67750 46089 10072 76418 61445 35100 71457
50402 50443 69455 87814 45791 43678 94486 73640 35792 41375
87814 18604 60203 00675 81452 01005 56802 04267 75046 08144
35610 07789 45520 47669 46250 46089 10079 44750 40571 40864
46851 45575 45750 41591 16944 25040 25044 86776 14880 94669
14880 80455 76412 50408 69463 67924 03528 94638 02044 08946
57651 31644 86644 39110 07144 57510 05240 35541 09555 04408
94657 61008 04266 61452 01005 84487 57610 09242 15144 52041
36141 86046 09556 64158 14657 61007 94557 64136 72040 86944
08945 57641 02045 07644 87085 41250 42151 41020 44589 10079
41380 92426 67791 00764 71809 11511 00864 26788 07143 65645
79410 09242 15146 02040 37750 40365 46851 47677 50460 81443
56457 50426 67204 68694 55754 57504 05764 26677 91007 11007
94486 94102 04215 14557 51008 54488 58144 57910 07145 59116
94676 74714 82049 01247 30097 27241 75942 56802 04685 14575
04266 72046 09466 91008 64487 57610 09242 15144 52041 36141
86046 02042 15145 75041 38576 44520 40581 41750 41851 44356
45750 46089 10090 16540 39114 52010 05346 57645 59565 54039
11007 14457 51007 27641 86144 58781 44579 10092 44866 44875
91169 46765 10092 42151 46020 32421 51445 84458 59426 85814
45791 00814 57504 18694 48551 00778 94552 04608 04036 78441
59344 02041 09115 64036 64575 04485 72032 42151 44584 45859
42685 81445 79145 20100 57448 85761 00916 69100 86463 54420
50403 67751 00764 65764 55955 50421 51455 75100 72764 18614
45351 00714 57504 68604 03802 04108 94137 75028 40361 45076
45076 41392 76100 85448 85761 97951 48204 90124 73009 72724
17594 29169 40589 41095 55041 38576 45520 40851 44520 40365
46851 47677 66445 76465 76455 36458 69443 56460 81443 56457
50460 80403 67841 00956 69464 11175 76100 71445 20403 65468
51476 78614 45791 00804 03757 51009 01564 48708 54125 04485
72040 25040 57641 86144 52041 58945 52046 08041 25040 36545
08040 35276 46020 44857 20408 69410 76457 50403 67751 00864
26904 13551 00934 50204 68694 55754 57672 01006 24215 64755
04036 54402 04585 14602 04108 94686 72040 59555 02240 36787
95550 28408 09463 70901 56455 35100 92421 51445 20460 80413
91100 76465 76455 95550 40869 46365 41020 40365 46851 47677
50418 56460 20460 89100 85426 85761 00804 03709 01614 40955
50413 85764 55204 03579 24137 53747 14820 49012 47148 02596
05355 97060 95148 10322 82719 506
(B)
19055 13058 27195 06095 25106 20605 19506 09528 23322 05502
51306 23006 62330 63311 34096 10551 66944 59241 36792 14330
95670 76105 20216 19291 30532 91304 81059 24139 04603 94218
08644 04655 04086 04037 59165 64604 84686 14457 54488 87766
15275 43155 22490 12472 82332 20550 29101 28231 92525 46564
45764 55714 60894 55222 02161 92913 05329 13048 10558 42654
45589 45869 41592 10064 66945 57510 04558 75249 01247 32256
30572 31955 84755 02115 64109 24266 64125 03165 44216 94486
51903 93225 63057 23195 06095 14810 23206 05195 06095 21119
22355 97060 12472 10974 73005 02061 52560 92909 61055 16062
91305 33105 24911 64755 02115 64109 24266 64125 03165 44216
94486 51903 93009 70609 51480 24901 24730 09727 24175 94291
69467 50415 81455 91680 20426 77502 11514 60801 45201 00646
56100 80403 85761 00650 50460 89410 71475 50448 67202 11514
60801 45201 00616 69100 92421 56445 20415 81455 91680 20468
51457 50458 67714 08645 13514 45751 00814 15204 68561 00804
03551 00916 67714 08641 00946 56100 80403 55100 92447 50418
69100 80448 66412 50403 67751 00924 21564 55761 00946 51457
50445 89100 84426 80744 21564 45372 01002 79068 36946 04663
07641 38080 10094 66945 58445 75044 88380 27906 83694 60465
65100 91651 42655 10056 16940 36787 87814 03678 77614 52010
06242 15644 52046 08041 25040 57146 08045 58944 86610 07144
57510 09566 94625 04366 78946 75046 86040 38020 46856 10075
42655 10087 89460 20410 89197 50100 64656 10075 42655 10087
89460 20418 56460 20410 91156 45878 56410 37471 48204 90124
73009 72724 17594 31669 10077 89455 20450 85403 91450 89460
92475 50565 20450 85403 91100 48100 92448 91100 89415 20405
76410 92426 66412 50403 54460 81465 81460 95550 46856 10080
40355 10090 16540 39142 66779 10095 65645 88076 45575 40391
14520 10065 66946 25042 15146 57610 07544 75044 58946 02041
86910 09244 75040 57641 03720 10061 66910 05240 36720 46856
44592 10080 44866 41250 40367 75100 94656 44592 10092 44750
40576 41046 05046 08910 09166 54135 64503 51009 24475 04608
04125 04057 14608 04558 94486 61402 04036 77510 05240 36720
46869 43656 10093 45020 40367 75100 80412 50468 56445 92100
92447 50460 80412 50405 76410 91169 44866 10081 44520 21156
41092 42666 41250 31654 42169 44865 14520 10061 66910 05240
36787 95550 46869 45584 41355 10094 66146 08010 05967 59016
94608 04509 55672 01005 24036 72042 16944 36944 52041 85644
58720 46861 46080 10094 65645 88089 46576 10079 45576 41367
20403 67751 00946 56445 92100 92447 50458 65413 56450 37201
00551 56100 94669 43656 10093 45037 20100 55680 20468 51457
50443 69455 87814 45791 45201 00279 06836 94604 66164 48758
78144 57914 52790 68369 46046 55010 05466 91008 14452 04057
64102 04686 14608 01005 24035 54109 55672 01005 55504 10814
10372 01005 55504 68514 45921 00901 51450 76455 20403 67755
13554 48886 72040 36775 51295 14820 49012 47300 97272 41759
42416 54488 85645 52046 08944 35645 58945 08042 65110 09244
75040 57641 02046 08041 39110 09465 64459 21009 24475 04585
44216 94486 54407 64026 44459 34436 94057 64185 94490 31903
93009 70609 53009 72724 17594 32421 56100 72764 10924 26664
12504 55894 63808 14457 61009 46564 45921 00924 47504 60804
12502 84486 64439 11005 91836 64057 64559 15672 01005 06677
51007 27146 08010 07144 57510 07944 75041 85646 02041 09115
64587 85641 03720 10027 90683 69460 46605 45576 45878 56410
37279 06836 94604 65501 00616 69100 81445 20224 03554 10956
65403 67751 00946 56100 94656 44592 10092 44750 41869 42667
79100 90165 40391 41593 44520 40367 75512 95148 20490 12471
48025 96053 55970 60951 48103 22827 19506
Anyone?
==================================================
daniel g. mcgrath
a subscriber to _word ways: the journal of recreational linguistics_
http://www.wordways.com/
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