Cryptography-Digest Digest #922, Volume #12 Sat, 14 Oct 00 05:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Cryptography FAQ (10/10: References) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Why trust root CAs ? ("Lyalc")
Re: More on the SDMI challenge (Scott Craver)
Re: Why trust root CAs ? ("Lyalc")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,sci.answers,news.answers,talk.answers
Subject: Cryptography FAQ (10/10: References)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: 14 Oct 2000 08:37:56 GMT
Archive-name: cryptography-faq/part10
Last-modified: 94/06/13
This is the tenth of ten parts of the sci.crypt FAQ. The parts are
mostly independent, but you should read the first part before the rest.
We don't have the time to send out missing parts by mail, so don't ask.
Notes such as ``[KAH67]'' refer to the reference list in this part.
The sections of this FAQ are available via anonymous FTP to rtfm.mit.edu
as /pub/usenet/news.answers/cryptography-faq/part[xx]. The Cryptography
FAQ is posted to the newsgroups sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto,
sci.answers, and news.answers every 21 days.
Contents
10.1. Books on history and classical methods
10.2. Books on modern methods
10.3. Survey articles
10.4. Reference articles
10.5. Journals, conference proceedings
10.6. Other
10.7. How may one obtain copies of FIPS and ANSI standards cited herein?
10.8. Electronic sources
10.9. RFCs (available from [FTPRF])
10.10. Related newsgroups
10.1. Books on history and classical methods
[FRIE1] Lambros D. Callimahos, William F. Friedman, Military Cryptanalytics.
Aegean Park Press, ?.
[DEA85] Cipher A. Deavours & Louis Kruh, Machine Cryptography and
Modern Cryptanalysis. Artech House, 610 Washington St.,
Dedham, MA 02026, 1985.
[FRIE2] William F. Friedman, Solving German Codes in World War I.
Aegean Park Press, ?.
[GAI44] H. Gaines, Cryptanalysis, a study of ciphers and their
solution. Dover Publications, 1944.
[HIN00] F.H.Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second
World War. Cambridge University Press. (vol's 1, 2, 3a, 3b
& 4, so far). XXX Years and authors, fix XXX
[HOD83] Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. Burnett Books
Ltd., 1983
[KAH91] David Kahn, Seizing the Enigma. Houghton Mifflin, 1991.
[KAH67] D. Kahn, The Codebreakers. Macmillan Publishing, 1967.
[history] [The abridged paperback edition left out most
technical details; the original hardcover edition is
recommended.]
[KOZ84] W. Kozaczuk, Enigma. University Publications of America, 1984
[KUL76] S. Kullback, Statistical Methods in Cryptanalysis. Aegean
Park Press, 1976.
[SIN66] A. Sinkov, Elementary Cryptanalysis. Math. Assoc. Am. 1966.
[WEL82] Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story. McGraw-Hill, 1982.
[YARDL] Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber. Aegean Park
Press, ?.
10.2. Books on modern methods
[BEK82] H. Beker, F. Piper, Cipher Systems. Wiley, 1982.
[BRA88] G. Brassard, Modern Cryptology: a tutorial.
Spinger-Verlag, 1988.
[DEN82] D. Denning, Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1982.
[KOB89] N. Koblitz, A course in number theory and cryptography.
Springer-Verlag, 1987.
[KON81] A. Konheim, Cryptography: a primer. Wiley, 1981.
[MEY82] C. Meyer and S. Matyas, Cryptography: A new dimension in
computer security. Wiley, 1982.
[PAT87] Wayne Patterson, Mathematical Cryptology for Computer
Scientists and Mathematicians. Rowman & Littlefield, 1987.
[PFL89] C. Pfleeger, Security in Computing. Prentice-Hall, 1989.
[PRI84] W. Price, D. Davies, Security for computer networks. Wiley, 1984.
[RUE86] R. Rueppel, Design and Analysis of Stream Ciphers.
Springer-Verlag, 1986.
[SAL90] A. Saloma, Public-key cryptography. Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[SCH94] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
[errata avbl from [EMAIL PROTECTED]]
[WEL88] D. Welsh, Codes and Cryptography. Claredon Press, 1988.
10.3. Survey articles
[ANG83] D. Angluin, D. Lichtenstein, Provable Security in Crypto-
systems: a survey. Yale University, Department of Computer
Science, #288, 1983.
[BET90] T. Beth, Algorithm engineering for public key algorithms.
IEEE Selected Areas of Communication, 1(4), 458--466,
1990.
[DAV83] M. Davio, J. Goethals, Elements of cryptology. in Secure
Digital Communications, G. Longo ed., 1--57, 1983.
[DIF79] W. Diffie, M. Hellman, Privacy and Authentication: An
introduction to cryptography. IEEE proceedings, 67(3),
397--427, 1979.
[DIF88] W. Diffie, The first ten years of public key cryptography.
IEEE proceedings, 76(5), 560--577, 1988.
[FEI73] H. Feistel, Cryptography and Computer Privacy. Scientific
American, 228(5), 15--23, 1973.
[FEI75] H. Feistel, H, W. Notz, J. Lynn Smith. Some cryptographic
techniques for machine-to-machine data communications,
IEEE IEEE proceedings, 63(11), 1545--1554, 1975.
[HEL79] M. Hellman, The mathematics of public key cryptography.
Scientific American, 130--139, 1979.
[LAK83] S. Lakshmivarahan, Algorithms for public key
cryptosystems. In Advances in Computers, M. Yovtis ed.,
22, Academic Press, 45--108, 1983.
[LEM79] A. Lempel, Cryptology in transition, Computing Surveys,
11(4), 285--304, 1979.
[MAS88] J. Massey, An introduction to contemporary cryptology, IEEE
proceedings, 76(5), 533--549, 1988.
[SIM91] G. Simmons (ed.), Contemporary Cryptology: the Science of
Information Integrity. IEEE press, 1991.
10.4. Reference articles
[AND83] D. Andelman, J. Reeds, On the cryptanalysis of rotor and
substitution-permutation networks. IEEE Trans. on Inform.
Theory, 28(4), 578--584, 1982.
[BEN87] John Bennett, Analysis of the Encryption Algorithm Used in
the WordPerfect Word Processing Program. Cryptologia 11(4),
206--210, 1987.
[BER91] H. A. Bergen and W. J. Caelli, File Security in WordPerfect
5.0. Cryptologia 15(1), 57--66, January 1991.
[BIH91] E. Biham and A. Shamir, Differential cryptanalysis of
DES-like cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 4, #1,
3--72, 1991.
[BI91a] E. Biham, A. Shamir, Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru,
Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and LUCIFER. In Proceedings of CRYPTO
'91, ed. by J. Feigenbaum, 156--171, 1992.
[BOY89] J. Boyar, Inferring Sequences Produced by Pseudo-Random
Number Generators. Journal of the ACM, 1989.
[BRI86] E. Brickell, J. Moore, M. Purtill, Structure in the
S-boxes of DES. In Proceedings of CRYPTO '86, A. M. Odlyzko
ed., 3--8, 1987.
[BRO89] L. Brown, A proposed design for an extended DES, Computer
Security in the Computer Age. Elsevier Science Publishers
B.V. (North Holland), IFIP, W. J. Caelli ed., 9--22, 1989.
[BRO90] L. Brown, J. Pieprzyk, J. Seberry, LOKI - a cryptographic
primitive for authentication and secrecy applications.
In Proceedings of AUSTCRYPT 90, 229--236, 1990.
[CAE90] H. Gustafson, E. Dawson, W. Caelli, Comparison of block
ciphers. In Proceedings of AUSCRYPT '90, J. Seberry and J.
Piepryzk eds., 208--220, 1990.
[CAM93] K. W. Campbell, M. J. Wiener, Proof the DES is Not a Group.
In Proceedings of CRYPTO '92, 1993.
[CAR86] John Carrol and Steve Martin, The Automated Cryptanalysis
of Substitution Ciphers. Cryptologia 10(4), 193--209, 1986.
[CAR87] John Carrol and Lynda Robbins, Automated Cryptanalysis of
Polyalphabetic Ciphers. Cryptologia 11(4), 193--205, 1987.
[ELL88] Carl M. Ellison, A Solution of the Hebern Messages. Cryptologia,
vol. XII, #3, 144-158, Jul 1988.
[EVE83] S. Even, O. Goldreich, DES-like functions can generate the
alternating group. IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory, vol. 29,
#6, 863--865, 1983.
[GAR91] G. Garon, R. Outerbridge, DES watch: an examination of the
sufficiency of the Data Encryption Standard for financial
institutions in the 1990's. Cryptologia, vol. XV, #3,
177--193, 1991.
[GIL80] Gillogly, ?. Cryptologia 4(2), 1980.
[GM82] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, Probabilistic Encryption and
How To Play Mental Poker Keeping Secret All Partial Information.
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, 1982.
[HUM83] D. G. N. Hunter and A. R. McKenzie, Experiments with
Relaxation Algorithms for Breaking Simple Substitution
Ciphers. Computer Journal 26(1), 1983.
[KAM78] J. Kam, G. Davida, A structured design of substitution-
permutation encryption networks. IEEE Trans. Information
Theory, 28(10), 747--753, 1978.
[KIN78] P. Kinnucan, Data encryption gurus: Tuchman and Meyer.
Cryptologia, vol. II #4, 371--XXX, 1978.
[KIN92] King and Bahler, Probabilistic Relaxation in the
Cryptanalysis of Simple Substitution Ciphers. Cryptologia
16(3), 215--225, 1992.
[KIN93] King and Bahler, An Algorithmic Solution of Sequential
Homophonic Ciphers. Cryptologia 17(2), in press.
[KOC87] Martin Kochanski, A Survey of Data Insecurity Packages.
Cryptologia 11(1), 1--15, 1987.
[KOC88] Martin Kochanski, Another Data Insecurity Package.
Cryptologia 12(3), 165--177, 1988.
[KRU88] Kruh, ?. Cryptologia 12(4), 1988.
[LAI90] X. Lai, J. Massey, A proposal for a new block encryption
standard. EUROCRYPT 90, 389--404, 1990.
[LUB88] C. Rackoff, M. Luby, How to construct psuedorandom
permutations from psuedorandom functions. SIAM Journal of
Computing, vol. 17, #2, 373--386, 1988.
[LUC88] Michael Lucks, A Constraint Satisfaction Algorithm for the
Automated Decryption of Simple Substitution Ciphers. In
CRYPTO '88.
[MAS88] J. Massey, An introduction to contemporary cryptology.
IEEE proceedings, 76(5), 533--549, 1988.
[ME91a] R. Merkle, Fast software encryption functions. In Proceedings
of CRYPTO '90, Menezes and Vanstone ed., 476--501, 1991.
[MEY78] C. Meyer, Ciphertext/plaintext and ciphertext/key
dependence vs. number of rounds for the Data Encryption
Standard. AFIPS Conference proceedings, 47, 1119--1126,
1978.
[NBS77] Data Encryption Standard. National Bureau of Standards,
FIPS PUB 46, Washington, DC, January 1977.
[PEL79] S. Peleg and A. Rosenfeld, Breaking Substitution Ciphers
Using a Relaxation Algorithm. CACM 22(11), 598--605, 1979.
[REE77] J. Reeds, `Cracking' a Random Number Generator.
Cryptologia 1(1), 20--26, 1977.
[REE84] J. A. Reeds and P. J. Weinberger, File Security and the UNIX
Crypt Command. AT&T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal,
Vol. 63 #8, part 2, 1673--1684, October, 1984.
[SHA49] C. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems. Bell
System Technical Journal 28(4), 656--715, 1949.
[SHE88] B. Kaliski, R. Rivest, A. Sherman, Is the Data Encryption
Standard a Group. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, #1,
1--36, 1988.
[SHI88] A. Shimizu, S. Miyaguchi, Fast data encipherment algorithm
FEAL. EUROCRYPT '87, 267--278, 1988.
[SHI92] K. Shirriff, C. Welch, A. Kinsman, Decoding a VCR Controller
Code. Cryptologia 16(3), 227--234, 1992.
[SOR84] A. Sorkin, LUCIFER: a cryptographic algorithm.
Cryptologia, 8(1), 22--35, 1984.
[SPI93] R. Spillman et al., Use of Genetic Algorithms in
Cryptanalysis of Simple Substitution Ciphers. Cryptologia
17(1), 31--44, 1993.
10.5. Journals, conference proceedings
CRYPTO
Eurocrypt
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Cryptologia: a cryptology journal, quarterly since Jan 1977.
Cryptologia; Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology; Terre Haute
Indiana 47803 [general: systems, analysis, history, ...]
Journal of Cryptology; International Association for Cryptologic
Research; published by Springer Verlag (quarterly since
1988).
The Cryptogram (Journal of the American Cryptogram Association);
18789 West Hickory Street; Mundelein, IL 60060; [primarily
puzzle cryptograms of various sorts]
Cryptosystems Journal, Published by Tony Patti, P.O. Box 188,
Newtown PA, USA 18940-0188 or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Publisher's comment: Includes complete cryptosystems with
source and executable programs on diskettes. Tutorial. The
typical cryptosystems supports multi-megabit keys and Galois
Field arithmetic. Inexpensive hardware random number
generator details.
Computer and Communication Security Reviews, published by Ross Anderson.
Sample issue available from various ftp sites, including
black.ox.ac.uk. Editorial c/o [EMAIL PROTECTED] Publisher's
comment: We review all the conference proceedings in this field,
including not just Crypto and Eurocrypt, but regional gatherings
like Auscrypt and Chinacrypt. We also abstract over 50 journals,
and cover computer security as well as cryptology, so readers can
see the research trends in applications as well as theory.
Infosecurity News, MIS Training Institute Press, Inc. 498 Concord Street
Framingham MA 01701-2357. This trade journal is oriented toward
administrators and covers viruses, physical security, hackers,
and so on more than cryptology. Furthermore, most of the articles
are written by vendors and hence are biased. Nevertheless, there
are occasionally some rather good cryptography articles.
10.6. Other
Address of note: Aegean Park Press, P.O. Box 2837, Laguna Hills, CA
92654-0837. Answering machine at 714-586-8811. Toll Free at 800 736-
3587, and FAX at 714 586-8269.
The ``Orange Book'' is DOD 5200.28-STD, published December 1985 as
part of the ``rainbow book'' series. Write to Department of Defense,
National Security Agency, ATTN: S332, 9800 Savage Road, Fort Meade, MD
20755-6000, and ask for the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria. Or call 301-766-8729.
The ``Orange Book'' will eventually be replaced by the U.S. Federal
Criteria for Information Technology Security (FC) online at the NIST
site [FTPNS], which also contains information on other various proposed
and active federal standards.
[BAMFD] Bamford, The Puzzle Palace. Penguin Books, 1982.
[GOO83] I. J. Good, Good Thinking: the foundations of probability and
its applications. University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
[KNU81] D. E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, volume 2:
Seminumerical Algorithms. Addison-Wesley, 1981.
[KUL68] Soloman Kullback, Information Theory and Statistics.
Dover, 1968.
[YAO88] A. Yao, Computational Information Theory. In Complexity in
Information Theory, ed. by Abu-Mostafa, 1988.
10.7. How may one obtain copies of FIPS and ANSI standards cited herein?
Many textbooks on cryptography contain complete reprints of the FIPS
standards, which are not copyrighted.
The following standards may be ordered from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, VA 22161.
FIPS PUB 46-1 Data Encryption Standard (this is DES)
FIPS PUB 74 Guidelines for Implementing as Using the NBS DES
FIPS PUB 81 DES Modes of Operation
FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication (using DES)
[Note: The address below has been reported as invalid.]
The following standards may be ordered from the
American National Standards Institute Sales Office,
1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.
Phone 212.642.4900
ANSI X3.92-1981 Data Encryption Algorithm (identical to FIPS 46-1)
ANSI X3.106-1983 DEA Modes of Operation (identical to FIPS 113)
Notes: Figure 3 in FIPS PUB 46-1 is in error, but figure 3 in X3.92-1981
is correct. The text is correct in both publications.
10.8. Electronic sources
Anonymous ftp:
[FTPAL] kampi.hut.fi:alo/des-dist.tar.Z
[FTPBK] ftp.uu.net:bsd-sources/usr.bin/des/
[FTPCB] ftp.uu.net:usenet/comp.sources.unix/volume10/cbw/
[FTPCP] soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks
[FTPDF] ftp.funet.fi:pub/unix/security/destoo.tar.Z
[FTPDQ] rsa.com:pub/faq/
[FTPEY] ftp.psy.uq.oz.au:pub/DES/
[FTPMD] rsa.com:?
[FTPMR] ripem.msu.edu:pub/crypt/newdes.tar.Z
[FTPNS] csrc.nist.gov:/bbs/nistpubs
[FTPOB] ftp.3com.com:Orange-Book
[FTPPF] prep.ai.mit.edu:pub/lpf/
[FTPPK] ucsd.edu:hamradio/packet/tcpip/crypto/des.tar.Z
[FTPPX] ripem.msu.edu:pub/crypt/other/tran-and-prngxor.shar
[FTPRF] nic.merit.edu:documents/rfc/
[FTPSF] beta.xerox.com:pub/hash/
[FTPSO] chalmers.se:pub/unix/des/des-2.2.tar.Z
[FTPTR] ripem.msu.edu:pub/crypt/other/tran-and-prngxor.shar
[FTPUF] ftp.uu.net:usenet/comp.sources.unix/volume28/ufc-crypt/
[FTPWP] garbo.uwasa.fi:pc/util/wppass2.zip
World Wide Web pages:
[WWWQC] http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Crypt.html
Quadralay Cryptography archive
[WWWVC] ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html
Vince Cate's Cypherpunk Page
10.9. RFCs (available from [FTPRF])
[1424] B. Kaliski, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services. RFC 1424,
February 1993.
[1423] D. Balenson, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. RFC 1423,
February 1993.
[1422] S. Kent, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management. RFC 1422, February
1993.
[1421] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures. RFC
1421, February 1993.
10.10. Related newsgroups
There are other newsgroups which a sci.crypt reader might want also to
read. Some have their own FAQs as well.
alt.privacy.clipper Clipper, Capstone, Skipjack, Key Escrow
alt.security general security discussions
alt.security.index index to alt.security
alt.security.pgp discussion of PGP
alt.security.ripem discussion of RIPEM
alt.society.civil-liberty general civil liberties, including privacy
comp.compression discussion of compression algorithms and code
comp.org.eff.news News reports from EFF
comp.org.eff.talk discussion of EFF related issues
comp.patents discussion of S/W patents, including RSA
comp.risks some mention of crypto and wiretapping
comp.society.privacy general privacy issues
comp.security.announce announcements of security holes
misc.legal.computing software patents, copyrights, computer laws
sci.math general math discussion
talk.politics.crypto politics of cryptography
------------------------------
From: "Lyalc" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why trust root CAs ?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 19:41:19 +1000
So who do you then exchange information with a mocodium of trust?
Only your bank, and that portion of the population who also trust your bank.
Result = 1 Island of Isolation.
The whole CA concept is fundamentally flawed.
Lyal
Greggy wrote in message <8s8ro8$66$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>
>> I don't think it was ever ment to prove anything. You have to begin
>> your root trust with something that YOU trust. You don't prove it,
>you
>> trust it. It proves the rest of the certificates for you. You don't
>> have to trust the others, but you do have to trust the root. To that
>I
>> say, Why should I trust anyone other than my bank?
>
>Hey, what an idea - make my bank my root certificate and get rid of all
>the rest. I go down to the branch office and get their certificate
>directly and install it as the only certificate on my machine. That
>would be the only way it could work for me. More work, yes, but real
>security because I know I have the right certificate. I don't have to
>trust anyone other than my bank.
>
>I'm going to try this on one of my machines I will set aside for online
>banking only. The others can browse away at other things as they
>desire. What an idea...
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Craver)
Subject: Re: More on the SDMI challenge
Date: 14 Oct 2000 08:32:06 GMT
Dido Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>Well it reassures me a little, knowing that what they want to do really is
>impossible, but I really think that these fools at the RIAA need to be
>taught a hard lesson. Let them adopt a standard, and let's see their
>faces WHEN it is cracked.
But if the technology is cracked in deployment, rather than
on the drawing board, everyone loses to some extent. The recording
industry obviously, device manufacturers most certainly,
but also pirates.
With SDMI broken after finding its way into devices people
may be able to download SDMI circumvention tools, but would
have to deal with the pain and inconvenience of doing so.
If it was broken before ever being deployed, this situation
would not occur. Not to condone piracy here, just pointing
out that a wait-til-later approach isn't good for anyone.
>digital watermarking technique, and persistence in doing what is likely
>impossible, they probably need to learn the hard way that the world no
>longer works the way they've always assumed.
Nobody needs to learn the hard way. If we're scientists
(and this is, after all, sci.crypt,) then we will not engage
in tactics such as tricking the industry into choosing a scheme
before performing analysis. Our goal is to analyze security
systems and share our results with the scientific community,
and therefore everyone else with a library card.
-S
------------------------------
From: "Lyalc" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why trust root CAs ?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 19:43:28 +1000
If you replace Public Key with Password, this models works just as well, and
works today, at zero incremental cost.
Lyal
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>On Sun, 08 Oct 2000 05:10:53 +0100, David Hopwood
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
>This model can be further generalised.
>
>Let's suppose you generate your own public key and register it with
>your bank at time of opening your account. Then whenever you sign a
>transaction with your private key, your bank knows it is you.
>
>But this could also apply to any other situation where a signature (or
>any other verification of identity) is currently required - simply
>register your public key and then use your private key to authenticate
>your identity in all transactions with that party from then on.
>
>This could extend to verifying your identity to hardware. Your car,
>your house locks, all these could be built to enable you to initially
>register a public key and only open/operate from that point on when a
>random session id is returned signed by the private key corresponding
>to your public key.
>
>It could also apply to software - replacing the need for all the
>myriad passwords one accumulates for different systems, as you could
>associate your public key with your various computer userids on each
>system and then return a signed random session ID to verify yourself
>at logon.
>
>Furthermore, for those concerned with privacy and the fact that the
>public key is a unique id across all applications, enabling traffic
>analysis of your movements, habits and usage, one could simply allow
>that any person can have as many public keys as they want. This could
>present problems for the user in remembering which key they'd
>registered with which entity/device, but then we manage to handle a
>number of different house keys, car keys passwords etc etc.
>
>But lets suppose that:
>. the method of carrying and issuing the public key and storing and
>using the private key is a PIN protected or bio-recognition smart card
>. they cost $9 apiece at your local newsagent;
>. come in a security sealed package from reputable suppliers;
>. there is common software/hardware to enable you to generate or
>load your own key;
>. they have a roughened front surface on which you can write Car,
>House, Third National Bank, HomePC, WorkID etc etc, and
>. a hole drilled in the top right to enable them to be kept on a key
>ring...
>
>I have neglected issues of card loss, key revocation etc etc, but I
>dont think these are insurmountable.
>
>As I understand it the major barrier to this approach is that there is
>no universal, simple, secure, portable thingy that can carry the keys,
>and do the processing required. The obvious candidate is a smart
>card, but I understand they simply do not (yet) have the processing
>power to handle digital signing using an assymetric key (eg RSA).
>Offloading the processing presumably creates security problems.
>
>PB
>
>
>>- --
>>David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>
>>Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
>>RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
>>Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
>>public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has
been
>>seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see
www.fipr.org/rip
>>
>>
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>Version: 2.6.3i
>>Charset: noconv
>>
>>iQEVAwUBOd+BhzkCAxeYt5gVAQEqEAf/RCjAXabrazj+oceIj+d8/WC/I+91mHwc
>>P5URHoux22bLAN8XOWBe0TK04UVwtR1d0Pt/mA1S1svTbrJ+JAFH3hR1hrr/88eU
>>Z1MwH+lbK96oYZbN6sSI3gmvyg/zPS4zXkgW6L9WJfP4Na6wrcjvAH1E9kpGlWcD
>>UtzO+ida9CsKo63FW9KZ+nCBvztt1iqZSZI7v/XSfXL35VuzvJq30JPKeyiSA7Lr
>>2TqH6v4mma6Scph641KnLWH1BNBavyq2jTvbix5aWkiFnTFvrsAQvpAeGPlsYB0W
>>+fOuDdEbmOIowjR/oMR0A+kZ7lDDhhgkwYvQ4mLvEKsCXr2Obq2DEw==
>>=+OuX
>>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>
>
------------------------------
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