Cryptography-Digest Digest #927, Volume #12 Sat, 14 Oct 00 19:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Rijndael implementations ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Rijndael implementations ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Why trust root CAs ? (David Schwartz)
Re: Rijndael implementations (Roger Schlafly)
Re: Optimisation of SHA-256 (lcs Mixmaster Remailer)
Re: Rijndael implementations ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Rijndael implementations ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: block-cipher silly question? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: SDMI - Answers to Major Questions (Scott Craver)
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? (Sundial Services)
Re: Public Key Algorithms and Analysis (David A Molnar)
Re: block-cipher silly question? (David Wagner)
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? (David Wagner)
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? ("Stephen M. Gardner")
Re: block-cipher silly question? (John Savard)
2 of 5 code, 3 of 7 code... (John Savard)
Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers? (John Savard)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Rijndael implementations
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:19:49 GMT
Robert Harley wrote:
> Welcome to the year 2000, Doug.
Where literacy has reached such a nadir that people turn to
Webster (a common-usage based dictionary) as authority for
technical terminology?
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Rijndael implementations
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:26:08 GMT
Tim Tyler wrote:
> Consider the term "gender". This is a linguistic term relating to
> the classification of nouns and pronouns in languages such as French.
> However, it has widely been used as a term to refer to the sex of
> individuals, without use of the broader term, "sex". A few (e.g.
> Richard Dawkins) lament this theft - but it is now by far the more
> common usage.
It is true that ignorance spreads, especially with the influence
of modern media and modern philosophy. That doesn't make it right.
There are distinctions (apparently, overly subtle according to
modern lack of standards), and dropping the distinctions merely
makes language *less expressive* and more confusing. That is wrong,
wrong, wrong.
When *I* mean "sex" I say "sex", not "gender". I also don't use
the nonword "he/she". And having *worked* with bytes of various
widths I don't misuse the term "byte" to imply necessarily 8 bits.
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why trust root CAs ?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 14:24:22 -0700
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> If the key is associated with your chosen id at each bank or whatever,
> then there is no need for a central repository.
Then how will the bank know that your id is associated with you? It
must store that information somewhere -- and the logical format to store
it in is a certificate.
DS
------------------------------
From: Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Rijndael implementations
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 14:33:16 -0700
Richard Heathfield wrote:
> In Knuth's TAOCP I (the most obvious example of "books about computers
> from the days..." and the only such book I had immediately to hand), the
> body of the text disagrees with you, but the footnote contradicts it,
> saying that "byte" was "standardized" to 8 bits in approximately 1975.
> So I find myself in the uncomfortable position of disagreeing with
> Knuth's footnote (whilst agreeing with his more flexible definition in
> the body of the text). You would appear to take the opposite (but
> equally uncomfortable) position.
So if you are referring to a "byte" in the context of a
pre-1975 computer, then it might be something other than 8 bits.
But to about 99.99% of the world out there, byte is 8 bits.
------------------------------
Date: 14 Oct 2000 21:40:09 -0000
From: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Optimisation of SHA-256
Try something like this, a modification of the PGP SHA implementation:
/* Key expansion
* The expandx() version doesn't write the result back, which can be
* used for the last two rounds since those outputs are never used.
*/
#define expandx(W,i) (W[i&15] + sig0(W[(i-15)&15]) + \
W[(i-7)&15] + sig1(W[(i-2)&15]))
#define expand(W,i) (W[i&15] = expandx(W,i))
/* Round updating */
#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, k, data) \
( t1 = h + SIG1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + k + data, d += t1, \
h = t1 + SIG0(a) + Maj(a,b,c) )
/* Excerpt from SHA-256 compression function */
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[ 0], key[ 0] );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[ 1], key[ 1] );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[ 2], key[ 2] );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[ 3], key[ 3] );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[ 4], key[ 4] );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[ 5], key[ 5] );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[ 6], key[ 6] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[ 7], key[ 7] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[ 8], key[ 8] );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[ 9], key[ 9] );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[10], key[10] );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[11], key[11] );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[12], key[12] );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[13], key[13] );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[14], key[14] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[15], key[15] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[16], expand(key, 16) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[17], expand(key, 17) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[18], expand(key, 18) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[19], expand(key, 19) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[20], expand(key, 20) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[21], expand(key, 21) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[22], expand(key, 22) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[23], expand(key, 23) );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[24], expand(key, 24) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[25], expand(key, 25) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[26], expand(key, 26) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[27], expand(key, 27) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[28], expand(key, 28) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[29], expand(key, 29) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[30], expand(key, 30) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[31], expand(key, 31) );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[32], expand(key, 32) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[33], expand(key, 33) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[34], expand(key, 34) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[35], expand(key, 35) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[36], expand(key, 36) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[37], expand(key, 37) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[38], expand(key, 38) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[39], expand(key, 39) );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[40], expand(key, 40) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[41], expand(key, 41) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[42], expand(key, 42) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[43], expand(key, 43) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[44], expand(key, 44) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[45], expand(key, 45) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[46], expand(key, 46) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[47], expand(key, 47) );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[48], expand(key, 48) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[49], expand(key, 49) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[50], expand(key, 50) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[51], expand(key, 51) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[52], expand(key, 52) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[53], expand(key, 53) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[54], expand(key, 54) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[55], expand(key, 55) );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K[56], expand(key, 56) );
subRound( H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, K[57], expand(key, 57) );
subRound( G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, K[58], expand(key, 58) );
subRound( F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, K[59], expand(key, 59) );
subRound( E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, K[60], expand(key, 60) );
subRound( D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, K[61], expand(key, 61) );
subRound( C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, K[62], expandx(key, 62) );
subRound( B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, K[63], expandx(key, 63) );
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Rijndael implementations
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:41:03 GMT
John Savard wrote:
> A unit of storage typically used to contain a character, whether it is
> eight bits or six, always had been called a 'character' in the books
> about computers from the days when computers with character cells
> other than eight bits in size existed.
But that has little to do with the meaning of "byte", which is a
contiguous set of bits within a machine word. It happens that to
encode a limited character set such as ASCII on a machine with
wide words (e.g. 36 bits) it is more economical to pack the
characters into bytes than just one per word. That is how "byte"
first became associated with storage used for character
representations, but they weren't and aren't synonymous.
The way that "byte" got associated with 8-bit storage was that
the common ASCII character code readily fit within 8 bits (which
as a power of 2 became quite common for technical reasons having
to do with binary addressing), and the kinds of computer that the
masses of new computer users encountered (Apple II, IBM PC, etc.)
originally had an ASCIIcentric, power-of-two orientation, with
8-bit byte addressability built into the instruction set
architecture in order to facilitate character manipulation. Disk
drives and RAM modules in particular had their capacities commonly
designated in multiples of 8-bit bytes as a side effect of what
the addressable units were on the systems to which these would be
attached, and since the mass market excludes all other architectures
there is no confusion about what "byte" means when shopping for
disk drives or RAM (although there *is* confusion about what a
"Megabyte" means). But when talking about computer architectures
in general, not just the couple at top of the best-seller list,
it is important to understand that other designs can and do exist.
We used to warn that "not all the world's a VAX" back when C
progrmmers for the most part learned using DEC VAX computers.
If you don't understand the importance of terminology, suppose the
general public started using "novel" to mean only Stephen King
thrillers. That ignorance would have to be resisted or else we
who know better would lose an important descriptive word from our
vocabulary.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Rijndael implementations
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:42:44 GMT
John Savard wrote:
> The use of 'gender' instead of 'sex' to denote whether an individual
> is male or female was introduced for a specific political purpose: to
> categorize the identification of humans as male or female as a social
> construction as opposed to a biological reality.
Yes, that's a fair summation, and it should be clear what is wrong
with trying to "rewrite" reality.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: block-cipher silly question?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:46:37 GMT
John Savard wrote:
> A true block cipher with an 8-bit block would be a monalphabetic
> substitution on a 256-character alphabet. That could not be secure.
In ECB mode, sure, but there are reasons why ECB is not much used
even with large block sizes.
I'd say that 8-bit blocks are at the boundary between block and
stream (with character rather than bit as the encrypted unit);
what category to put it in would depend on the purpose of the
categorization.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:54:53 GMT
CiPHER wrote:
> I have no doubts in my mind that every (applicable) cipher out there
> has already been easily broken by the top intelligence agencies.
That's another notion, in the opposite direction, without supporting
evidence.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:56:09 GMT
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> Is it a political statement to say that if these ciphers aren't
> good enough for NSA, they're not good enough for me?
No, but it is rather pointless, since you don't have access to
ciphers that are known to be "good enough for NSA".
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Craver)
Subject: Re: SDMI - Answers to Major Questions
Date: 14 Oct 2000 21:53:38 GMT
Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> stl/*This_is_a_comment*[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Stephan T. Lavavej) wrote:
>>
>> MP3 compression is NOT transparent at 128kbps. In fact, it's quite
>> bad. Anyone who doesn't hate 128kbps doesn't care about quality.
>
>Are you mental? You really can't hear alot of noise (if any at all) at
>say 192kbps. Even at 128kbps it sounds decent.
I think you both have to recognize that different people have
different ears. There are audiophiles who are very sensitive
to quality degredation, and there is a grand majority of listeners
who only start complaining at a much greater level of hiss.
It also depends on the quality of one's sound system. If someone
is playing music from their computer, even with good headphones
or speakers you can get a bit of line noise just because of bad
components.
It's an important issue in watermarking, because artists
and audio engineers typically have a much, much greater standard
for quality, and run the risk of overestimating the quality
standards of the majority of their listeners. If a watermark
is robust to "distortion," that distortion had better be more
severe than even a lenient customer would allow.
Alas, I do research in the field of watermarking and watermarking
attacks, and my ears are pretty crummy. Plus I have to do most of
my work in a room with big loud fans.
>Tom
-S
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 15:09:34 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>
> lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> > Is it a political statement to say that if these ciphers aren't
> > good enough for NSA, they're not good enough for me?
>
> No, but it is rather pointless, since you don't have access to
> ciphers that are known to be "good enough for NSA".
To put Douglas' comments in another way ... the NSA's objectives and
purpose-in-life is to be able to decrypt messages, no matter what they
are, "if the President demands to know." That has nothing at all to do,
really, with -my- requirements for a cipher.
I want to be able to encrypt my messages [over the internet, say] in
such a way that I can be confident that Freddy Snot-Nosed Hacker or Joe
Scumbag My Competitor won't be able to make a fool of me in front of my
customers or my investors. I'm not a spy, and I'm not breaking the
law. I need a cipher that can meet that requirement (and, oh yes, I
send 3,400,000 messages per hour...) and "I don't really give a damn
what, if anything, the NSA does with my encrypted messages .. using,
umm, my own tax money."
[A different perspective on encryption, to be sure, but equally valid.]
==================================================================
Sundial Services :: Scottsdale, AZ (USA) :: (480) 946-8259
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] (PGP public key available.)
> Fast(!), automatic table-repair with two clicks of the mouse!
> ChimneySweep(R): "Click click, it's fixed!" {tm}
> http://www.sundialservices.com/products/chimneysweep
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Public Key Algorithms and Analysis
Date: 14 Oct 2000 22:15:48 GMT
Joseph Ashwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I've gotten to a point where I need at least some pointers to some papers.
> I'm examining alternative public key encryption and/or signature algorithms
> (alternative to RSA, DH, ECC, DSA, ECDSA). I am aware of a small handful
> (LUC, XTR, NTRU, RPK), but finding analysis of these is proving daunting,
Two other LUC sites are Wei Dai's page at http://wwww.eskimo.com/~weidai/
and Daniel Bleichenbacher's publications (google search).
There was a thread here in sci.crypt not that long ago about XTR, IIRC,
which saw some substantial discussion. or maybe coderpunks.
For NTRU, look at Helger Lipmaa's list of lattice links.
Not sure about RPK, unfortunately.
While you're looking at weird public key cryptosystems, you might as
well look into the Arithmetica system based on the word problem in
groups. There was a minor announcement about it here, but see also
http://www.arithmetica.com/
I'm not competent to analyse it, but may be worth looking at.
-David
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: block-cipher silly question?
Date: 14 Oct 2000 22:36:21 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>John Savard wrote:
>> A true block cipher with an 8-bit block would be a monalphabetic
>> substitution on a 256-character alphabet. That could not be secure.
>
>In ECB mode, sure, but there are reasons why ECB is not much used
>even with large block sizes.
The original poster stated that he was not interested in feedback modes,
so I do not see how stream ciphers are relevant.
In this case, I cannot see how a cipher with a 8-bit block can be secure.
(Perhaps this is just my lack of imagination; I'd be happy to be corrected!)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Date: 14 Oct 2000 22:39:51 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Stephen M. Gardner wrote:
> What could possibly make me think that a group of scientists working
>in secret, whose membership is restricted by security clearance (and
>therefore not optimized for exceptional ability) could accomplish more
>than a larger group of scientists working in the open and thus subject to
>wider peer review?
Focus? 50 years studying a single problem?
Knowledge that lives are on the line?
(how's that for a motivation section in your paper!)
Enormous resources?
Also, it depends on the size of the group of scientists. The point
is that there is a "fax effect" (would the economists call it a "network
externality"?) in science -- all else being equal, the increase in
productivity can be super-linear in the number of scientists working
on a problem, because of the fruits of collaboration. If the secret
group has many talented scientists, and the outside world has just a
few, then one would expect that the secret group might well take an
early lead.
The point is, none of this can be answered a priori, without knowledge
of any of the facts; it is likely to depend heavily on the circumstances.
------------------------------
From: "Stephen M. Gardner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 17:35:14 -0500
John Savard wrote:
> On Sat, 14 Oct 2000 13:42:06 -0500, "Stephen M. Gardner"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
> >could accomplish more
> >than a larger group of scientists working in the open
>
> Ah, but the number of mathematicians working in the open on
> cryptography is far smaller than the number working in the NSA.
How do we know that? How many scientists are there at NSA engaged in
cryptanalysis research?
> Also,
> the NSA has access to the open literature, like anyone else.
Yes, but they do not have access to the open give and take in
international forums. Much of the real creative work in science takes
place during conversations with colleagues from around the world.
--
Take a walk on the wild side: http://www.metronet.com/~gardner/
There is a road, no simple highway, between the dawn and the
dark of night. And if you go no one may follow. That path is
for your steps alone.
The Grateful Dead ("Ripple")
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: block-cipher silly question?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 22:18:02 GMT
On Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:46:37 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>John Savard wrote:
>> A true block cipher with an 8-bit block would be a monalphabetic
>> substitution on a 256-character alphabet. That could not be secure.
>In ECB mode, sure, but there are reasons why ECB is not much used
>even with large block sizes.
I suppose other modes could be characterized as forms of the autokey
cipher, although the modes initially offered with DES, as they do not
fundamentally increase security, would hardly do much for this.
>I'd say that 8-bit blocks are at the boundary between block and
>stream (with character rather than bit as the encrypted unit);
>what category to put it in would depend on the purpose of the
>categorization.
I certainly could see an 8-bit substitution used, say, in
fractionation. (But while I couldn't call a block cipher with a 32-bit
block a stream cipher, I'm not sure if I could call it secure either.)
I suppose someone could argue that Unicode might force us to move to
16 bits; however, Playfair is a sub-10-bit "block" cipher - it
certainly is _polygraphic_.
Actually, though, considering that while 676 is bigger than 512, one
can have alphabets of less than 26 letters, you probably have chosen
an excellent boundary. Thus, Porta's digraphic table, with 400
entries, becomes a sub-9-bit block cipher!
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: 2 of 5 code, 3 of 7 code...
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 22:11:23 GMT
Looking at the illustrations in "Battle of Wits", one thing possibly
not specifically noted in the text is apparent; in order to ensure
that the positive and negative films bearing Japanese code messages to
be kappa tested actually block the light between them _only_ for
identical groups, digits are represented by a 2 of 5 code.
Since every digit, therefore, is represented by a code with the same
number of active elements, no digit can have a code that is included
in the code for another digit.
If one were to do letters the same way, one would have to go up to a 3
of 7 code.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Is it trivial for NSA to crack these ciphers?
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 22:30:50 GMT
On Sat, 14 Oct 2000 21:56:09 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
>> Is it a political statement to say that if these ciphers aren't
>> good enough for NSA, they're not good enough for me?
>No, but it is rather pointless, since you don't have access to
>ciphers that are known to be "good enough for NSA".
True, he doesn't have access to ciphers the NSA actually uses.
His statement is only pointless if interpreted in the specific way you
are interpreting it; that the fact that the NSA is not going to scrap
its existing inventory of cryptographic equipment overnight in favor
of Rijndael is entirely tangential to the security of Rijndael.
While that is true: why bother if what the NSA is already using is
good enough for it - clearly he wouldn't be making a statement like
that if he didn't also believe something else.
Specifically, that the NSA uses ciphers which are not only secret, but
which are genuinely more secure than Rijndael. They might have longer
keys, for example.
If he finds Rijndael unsatisfying, he *does* have access to my web
page. He can look at the designs there, such as Quadibloc VIII,
Quadibloc III, or my "Large-Key Brainstorm". Then, he can form a
personal opinion - based, naturally, on guesswork and intuition, not
hard fact - as to whether the NSA is likely to be using ciphers which
are slower, more complex, and more elaborate than those. (Naturally,
though, their ciphers will be _vastly_ "better" - more optimal, more
carefully analyzed, with carefully-designed S-boxes, and so on.)
My intuition is that anyone who suggests anything like those at the
NSA - or even its successor a hundred years from now - will be under
suspicion of having succumbed to the mental strain of overwork. Or, if
that possibility can be safely discarded, merely the subject of
derision. But *of course* I could be wrong.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
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