Cryptography-Digest Digest #977, Volume #12 Sun, 22 Oct 00 13:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: B,U.I-L,D. -Y,O.U- ,C.A-B,L.E- ,B.O-X,
.D-E`S`C`R`A`M`B`L`E`R,`,,,,,,,....,.,.....,........ 2653 ("Edward Taylor")
Re: Rijndael in Perl (Rob Warnock)
Re: xor algorithm ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Rijndael in Perl (Martien Verbruggen)
another problem question (Ernest Dumenigo)
Re: Actually I want FBI and INS deport me from the U.S.A. to Europe so that I can
have more fun .... ("Edward Taylor")
Re: How to post absolutely anything on the Internet anonymously ("Edward Taylor")
another problem question (Ernest Dumenigo)
Re: Huffman stream cipher. (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Help ,Does anybody know ??? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: My comments on AES (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: idea for spam free email (Sundial Services)
Re: xor algorithm (Sundial Services)
Re: My comments on AES (Sundial Services)
Re: Dense feedback polynomials for LFSR ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: ---- As I study Rinjdael... (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Visual Basic (Guy Macon)
Re: Rijndael in Perl (Logan Shaw)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Edward Taylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.cryonics
Subject: Re: B,U.I-L,D. -Y,O.U- ,C.A-B,L.E- ,B.O-X,
.D-E`S`C`R`A`M`B`L`E`R,`,,,,,,,....,.,.....,........ 2653
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 12:41:19 +0100
shut up
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Rob Warnock)
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.perl.misc
Subject: Re: Rijndael in Perl
Date: 22 Oct 2000 11:41:48 GMT
Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
+---------------
| Rob Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
| >Most Unixes -- e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, SGI's Irix, many others -- have
| >"mlock(2)" or "mpin(2)" or "plock(2) ...
|
| Yes, but do those functions guarantee that memory will never be
| written to some kind of backing store?
+---------------
Good point. However, if it's a system based on good general design
principles in mind (oh, well, maybe that leaves out Windwow), one
would hope that writing a pinned page to backing store would be
considered "inefficient" and "uneccessary", and never be done.
Then there's the issue of trusting that the "pin" function actually
even works at all! E.g., it might be hard from a user program to tell
the difference between a true "pin" and an implementation that merely
assigns a very high priority for the page remaining in memory (but
still allows swapping under certain overload conditions).
I suppose one would have to check on a system-by-system basis.
The sources for {Free,Net,Open}BSD & Linux are readily available,
but for Irix, Solaris, Windows...?
-Rob
p.s. Of course, if so you'd still have to wipe each such page before
unpinning it (even by accident, as with a program crash!) to be sure
that it wasn't swapped in the brief interval between unpinning and
program exit.
=====
Rob Warnock, 31-2-510 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Network Engineering http://reality.sgi.com/rpw3/
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Phone: 650-933-1673
1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy. PP-ASEL-IA
Mountain View, CA 94043
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: xor algorithm
Date: 22 Oct 2000 11:45:19 GMT
In article <wWwE5.11560$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Pires) wrote:
> Don't mean to argue but.... A PRNG for crypto needs to be irreversible
> and unpredictable.
RC4 can be run backwards - does this make it weaker or stronger?
Is it valid to run it backwards?
Keith
http://www.cix.co.uk/~klockstone
------------------------
'Unwise a grave for Arthur'
-- The Black Book of Carmarthen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Martien Verbruggen)
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.perl.misc
Subject: Re: Rijndael in Perl
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2000 00:20:30 +1100
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 22 Oct 2000 11:41:48 GMT,
Rob Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> +---------------
> | Rob Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> | >Most Unixes -- e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, SGI's Irix, many others -- have
> | >"mlock(2)" or "mpin(2)" or "plock(2) ...
> |
> | Yes, but do those functions guarantee that memory will never be
> | written to some kind of backing store?
> +---------------
> Then there's the issue of trusting that the "pin" function actually
> even works at all! E.g., it might be hard from a user program to tell
> the difference between a true "pin" and an implementation that merely
> assigns a very high priority for the page remaining in memory (but
> still allows swapping under certain overload conditions).
I don't know about the other ones, but the behaviour of mlock is defined
in the POSIX Realtime Extension (1003.1b-1993/1003.1i-1995). Part of its
reason for existence was to provide something slightly safer for
security reasons. The other part was to stop applications with real-time
needs from being swapped out.
I'd say that every system that implements mlock, and claims POSIX
compliance has no other choice but to behave correctly on this.
But we're now getting so far offtopic from clp.misc, and probably for
sci.crypt as well, that the discussion maybe should be shifted to an OS
group or standards group that can give some more authoritative opinions
on these functions.
Martien
--
Martien Verbruggen |
Interactive Media Division | We are born naked, wet and hungry.
Commercial Dynamics Pty. Ltd. | Then things get worse.
NSW, Australia |
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ernest Dumenigo)
Subject: another problem question
Date: 22 Oct 2000 13:20:29 GMT
Thanks guys for all your hints, I appriciate the little push :-)
--
=====
Ernest
------------------------------
From: "Edward Taylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Actually I want FBI and INS deport me from the U.S.A. to Europe so that I
can have more fun ....
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 12:52:57 +0100
You want more fun in Europe? Hell - here in britain we used to be freee. But
now we have the regultary of investigatiory powers bill. In America you
can't encrypt beyond a certain level right? Well, we can, but we have to
tell the police when they want to read our mail. Suppose that's allright if
you're not doing anything illegal ... however ...
------------------------------
From: "Edward Taylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.freespeech
Subject: Re: How to post absolutely anything on the Internet anonymously
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 13:03:35 +0100
I agree - But how can anyone even think for a moment that they can truly
post something and not get tracked down. (assuming that you had two or three
major world powers working on the case) If you post something that they want
to stop, then they WILL find you - even if you take boat to England,
followed by a short hop accross the channel to a private airstrip in france,
then hitch hike to Germany, before sliding into Russia, and stealing someone
else's laptop and mobile phone, and using that to post a message under an
assumed name. Hmmm - might be worth trying one day.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ernest Dumenigo)
Subject: another problem question
Date: 22 Oct 2000 13:59:24 GMT
Hey I just solved it!!!!!
"Reference your message number three eight seven dated one six December.
Instructions have been issued to all subordinate commands to initiate
unit training programs under the provisions of paragraph two of special
orders number six."
Gives you such a feeling of accomplishment when you solve it. Thanks for
all your help, I did what you all said and just looked at it, and I
decided to rewrite it so I can focus better on the specific parts (the
other paper had a bunch of scratch marks and lines), and just out of no
where two words popped up and BAM it all falls in place.
Thanks again for the hints they really helped me see the missing parts.
--
=====
Ernest
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Huffman stream cipher.
Date: 22 Oct 2000 14:38:35 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Richard Heathfield) wrote in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>>
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Benjamin Goldberg) wrote in
>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>
>> >SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY wrote:
>> >[snip]
>> >> As for the fact a stream is not a file in one sense of the word
>> >> you seemed to use it in other senses like in the case in adding
>> >> an integer to a stream. In reading that problem I took it as a file
>> >> and you did not object. Also I give you an example for that other
>> >> thread. WHere you capaple of following it or what?
>> >
>> >I have not, and do not plan to, look at your DSC program. If you can
>> >explain the algorithm in clear english, I would be happy, but I am not
>> >going to look at your shitty source code.
>>
>> You sound like the kind of Jerk that is never happy so why
>> pretend that if I did a little more FREE work for your lazy
>> ass that you would be happy. I can see by your comment you
>> obviously lacked the ability to even follow the simple example I
>> did for you.
>>
>> ... rest of his nonsense dropped.
>
>I had a quick look at your source code. He's right. It's hard to read,
>it's non-portable (I'd guess it's for DJGPP, but that's just a guess)
>and in at least one place it's incorrect. I couldn't look at it for long
>because it was so tiring.
>
Thats rude of you. Are you another one of Toms's idenites.
If you found a mistake at least be honest and say what it is
so we can tell if your full of shit or not. Just becasue you
don't like the form tough shit. Many people say there are mistakes
but most are wrong. LIke I am not god but you contrubute nothing
by prestending you found something in the code. Even h2com.exe
had a few sneaky mistakes that people found after years of use
with no failings.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Help ,Does anybody know ???
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 14:51:27 GMT
Does anybody know where i can find the program or " C " component
about use the RSA to encrypt the "file" directly.
Please help me ,thanks so much.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: My comments on AES
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 18:31:45 +0200
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Elsewhere I have suggested a more quantitative methodology for
> measuring the strength of ciphers: analyze them at fewer rounds where
> attacks are known and compare how fast their resistance to these
> attacks grows if more rounds are added. This methodology would have
> allowed NIST to compute a ranking of security for the finalists, even
> if all are as yet resistant to attacks on their full version.
But, even now that Rijndael has been chosen as the unique
winner, it is not too late to study the benefit of having
more rounds. I have suggested having variable rounds, either
arbitrary above a specified minimum or else a set of fixed
number of rounds.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 09:18:34 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: idea for spam free email
There are products out there that do similar things, and some
enlightened ISP's simply run them on their servers all the time, perhaps
giving you the option to individually opt-in or opt-out on that
service. The problem is, though, that like the post-office it's
sometimes best to deliver the junk and let the customer throw it away.
Keeps recyclers in business.
Locally, I could not live without Internet Junkbuster and e-mail
filters.
Richard Heathfield wrote:
>
> "G. Orme" wrote:
> >
> > > Graceful Twerp wrote:
> > > > In my opinion, filters installed on the receiver's e-mail software are
> > > > still the best way to eliminate spam. Your sistem seems to be designed
> > > > so that you will receive e-mail only from a list of sources you have
> > > > hand-picked. You can obtain the same result by writing a filter that
> > > > lets in only e-mail originating from a list of approved addresses.
> >
> > G. Your idea is very good. The system I am proposing is designed to
> > automatically do a similar thing so people using it don't need the hmmm
> > folder.
>
> I would not trust a system which automagically deleted emails based on
> address or subject wildcards, without giving me the chance to yay or nay
> them if I so chose.
==================================================================
Sundial Services :: Scottsdale, AZ (USA) :: (480) 946-8259
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] (PGP public key available.)
> Fast(!), automatic table-repair with two clicks of the mouse!
> ChimneySweep(R): "Click click, it's fixed!" {tm}
> http://www.sundialservices.com/products/chimneysweep
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 09:23:27 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: xor algorithm
Cryptology doesn't run by the rules of cricket and fair play.
Absolutely any trick that will allow a cipher to be compromised is and
can be used.
Reversibility can be a desirable characteristic because it means that in
the event of a garble, the ciphered data might be recovered .. although
by now I think most ciphers simply rely upon TCP/IP to do its job.
Certainly any stream-cipher worth its salt must be tested to be sure
that, if it -is- run backward, it will not be more vulnerable to
analysis than when it is run "the right way."
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Don't mean to argue but.... A PRNG for crypto needs to be irreversible
> > and unpredictable.
>
> RC4 can be run backwards - does this make it weaker or stronger?
>
> Is it valid to run it backwards?
==================================================================
Sundial Services :: Scottsdale, AZ (USA) :: (480) 946-8259
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] (PGP public key available.)
> Fast(!), automatic table-repair with two clicks of the mouse!
> ChimneySweep(R): "Click click, it's fixed!" {tm}
> http://www.sundialservices.com/products/chimneysweep
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 09:28:09 -0700
From: Sundial Services <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: My comments on AES
A lock is strong enough if it keeps -you- out long enough that you give
up trying, or until the building is torn down.
EVERY ONE of the AES finalists is strong enough to be used for nearly
any purpose you can think of -- but ONLY ONE of them can be the
finalist. The factors used in the decision were not only security, but
various implementation requirements such as the need to be able to do a
reliable and low-power silicon chip, to put it onto (heaven help us) a
smart-card processor, and so on. {Personally, I think smart cards will
only take off when someone figures out how to put a video game in one,
but that's another story.}
Rob Warnock wrote:
> What he *really* said:
>
> There is a significant difference between an academic break
> of a cipher and a break that will allow someone to read
> encrypted traffic. (Imagine an attack against Rijndael that
> requires 2^100 steps. That is an academic break of the cipher,
> even though it is a completely useless result to anyone trying
> to read encrypted traffic.) I believe that within the next five
> years someone will discover an academic attack against Rijndael.
> I do not believe that anyone will ever discover an attack that
> will allow someone to read Rijndael traffic. So while I have
> serious academic reservations about Rijndael, I do not have
> any engineering reservations about Rijndael.
>
> -Rob
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 12:43:43 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Dense feedback polynomials for LFSR
Joaquim Southby wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Trevor L. Jackson,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> >Perhaps I did miss something. I don't see a need to perform counting during setup
>of
> >a maximal-length or near-maximal-length LFSR. Any but a trivially small (1-2)
>number
> >of keys is a suitable key. So why does the RVW weakness hold for maxlen LFSRs?
> >
> In the case of sub-maximal length LFSR's, the init vector is no longer
> the key. It is part of the description of the device, much like the tap
> sequence. What becomes the key is the number of times the register is
> clocked before starting to use the output stream.
>
> The RVW weakness holds for the maximal length LFSR's for the reasons you
> cited -- it takes quite a bit of time to perform the count.
Then the RVW weakness does _not_ apply to maximal length LFSRs because one knows the
suitable key values by analysis rather than by exhaustive search.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ---- As I study Rinjdael...
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2000 19:08:10 +0200
Greggy wrote:
>
> As I study Rijndael, I am constantly haunted by the question I hope
> someone can answer:
>
> If Rijndael is so strong, why does the US government choose NOT to use
> it for ANY (not all) classified information?
I am not aware that the US government 'chooses' not to use
Rijndael for any classified information. Why should it tell
you what it uses to encrypt classified information? By
definition, classified information doesn't concern you
as normal citizen at all. (You are not supposed to care
about it.)
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: Visual Basic
Date: 22 Oct 2000 16:55:49 GMT
Paul Schlyter wrote:
>VB is compiled too; however VB as a language is indeed unsuitable
>for bit-twiddling.
PowerBASIC, on the other had, is ideal for bit-twiddling.
[ http://www.powerbasic.com ]. On the same subject, everyone
who twiddles bits should know about [ http://www.basicx.com ].
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Logan Shaw)
Crossposted-To: comp.lang.perl.misc
Subject: Re: Rijndael in Perl
Date: 22 Oct 2000 11:56:05 -0500
In article <8sujps$op7r$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Rob Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Good point. However, if it's a system based on good general design
>principles in mind (oh, well, maybe that leaves out Windwow), one
>would hope that writing a pinned page to backing store would be
>considered "inefficient" and "uneccessary", and never be done.
Well, it's conceivable that it might not. What if you do I/O to your
swap space in blocks of 64k (to reduce overhead) and your MMU maps
things in blocks of 8k and you have a chunk of memory like this:
0k non-pinned block
8k non-pinned block
16k non-pinned block
24k non-pinned block
32k non-pinned block
40k pinned block
48k non-pinned block
56k non-pinned block
In this case, if you want to swap out the 7 blcoks which
aren't pinned in memory, it would probably be a little more
efficient to write out the whole 64k at once. Plus, if that
8k block later becomes swappable, then you've already reserved
space for in swap and this might make the mapping between the
process's address space and swap space easier to manage.
I don't know that there actually is such an
implementation, but there could be, and as long as you
don't know, you kind of have to assume the worst.
Getting back to Perl issues, even if you do manage by some
gymnastics to lock the appropriate pages in memory so that a Perl
scalar isn't swappable, what if you make the scalar larger? Perl
might reallocate it somewhere else in memory that isn't locked.
So, there are Perl issues even if you can get a given scalar
locked in memory. You probably could get around these issues by
(1) pre-loading the scalar with enough garbage bytes so that it
will not have to be expanded to store its actual data, and then
(2) using syscall() to lock the pages in memory, and then (3)
never assigning anything to that scalar that's larger than it
already is. But, I'm not even sure that's exactly right.
- Logan
------------------------------
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