Cryptography-Digest Digest #158, Volume #13 Tue, 14 Nov 00 17:13:01 EST
Contents:
When Nokia run ads in radio stations (99X) to give away two round trip tickets to
Finland in Atlanta in the summer 1998 .. Jimmy from 99X called me .. this was very
unexpected because I was very private person .... never had had any contact with Jimmy
(Markku J. Saarelainen)
Re: vote buying... (Paul Rubin)
Re: Anyone done/doing Schneier's self-study cryptanalysis course? ("Martin Bealby")
Re: XORred zipfile chunks = random? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: NSA quote on AES (Shawn Willden)
Re: The ultimate cipher (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: On an idea of John Savard (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: On an idea of John Savard (Mok-Kong Shen)
Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest (Paul Crowley)
Re: vote buying... (David Schwartz)
Re: On an idea of John Savard (David Schwartz)
Re: hardware RNG's ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: vote buying... (Paul Rubin)
Re: On an idea of John Savard (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest (Quisquater)
Re: hardware RNG's (David Schwartz)
Re: vote buying... (David Schwartz)
Re: On an idea of John Savard (David Schwartz)
Re: vote buying... (zapzing)
Re: voting through pgp (zapzing)
Secret sharing in practice ("Matt Timmermans")
Re: Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest ("Paul Pires")
Re: Black Market Internet Information - my visits and tradeshows (nemo outis)
Re: Secret sharing in practice (Paul Rubin)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Markku J. Saarelainen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.politics.org.nsa,alt.politics.org.fbi,alt.2600
Subject: When Nokia run ads in radio stations (99X) to give away two round trip
tickets to Finland in Atlanta in the summer 1998 .. Jimmy from 99X called me .. this
was very unexpected because I was very private person .... never had had any contact
with Jimmy
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 19:57:29 GMT
Basically he left the voicemail messaging indicating something about a
prize .. actually he tried to call twice, but being private I almost
never answered my phone ... so he had to leave a message ...
http://www.99x.com/
Just wondering .. Finland - Nokia - Jimmy the Jew - Prize and other
links .. and how hell did he knew I was at my home at that precise
moment ...
his web site is here
http://www.99x.com/new_morningx/jimmy/index.html
.......
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: 14 Nov 2000 12:08:20 -0800
David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> For example, suppose I have a code number that's displayed on the
> screen when I register to vote. If that number is '7' then a '5' means I
> voted for Gore. If that number is '6' than a '5' means I voted for Bush.
> So while I can retrieve my vote, I'm the only one who can decode it. If
> I want to convince Bubba that I voted for Gore instead of Bush, I tell
> him my code number is '6' instead of '7', and there's no way Bubba can
> tell one way or the other. I think human beings are samrt enough to
> memorize a one-digit number.
This is kind of an interesting idea, but...
> On the other hand, when I go to confirm my vote, if it comes back the
> wrong way, I can go complain to election officials. They can look up my
> code number, and then make sense out of my voting receipt.
Um, if the election officials can look up your code number, can't they
tell who you voted for? That undermines the secret ballot. I guess
the machine could encrypt your code number so that only you can
decrypt it, but that means you need a secret key that's much longer
than a one-digit number.
> Every technical problem you can imagine has a technical solution.
I'm not convinced of this. I'm especially not convinced that there
are technical solutions that are -practical-.
> The problem is, solving enough of these problems while still having
> a practical system that normal people can understand and use. After
> all, normal people can't seem to figure out a punch card ballot. ;)
The punch card ballot problems seem to go much deeper than people not
being able to figure them out. I don't know how this election will come
out, but I do hope those punch card systems are banned afterwards.
------------------------------
From: "Martin Bealby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Anyone done/doing Schneier's self-study cryptanalysis course?
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 20:05:28 -0000
Reply-To: "Martin Bealby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
So am I
Martin
James Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I would be interested in this as well.
>
>
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: XORred zipfile chunks = random?
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 20:21:20 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Jim wrote:
[snipped up one side and down the other]
I'm just going to address your rather glaring errors here.
1st error: That 2 compressed XORd CDs are suitable as a OTP
The truth is that a OTP requires _absolute_ randomness,
there is no such measurement as "good enough" Even worse using PKZIP is
probably one of the worst possibilities, if you really want to use a
method like that what you need to do is grab something that generates
good random numbers, ARCFOUR, Yarrow, Octillo, CTR mode encryption
pads, etc. Use those, the PKZIP encryption is rather easily broken.
2nd error: the implication that scramdisk is superior to OTP
The truth is that OTP is absolutely secure, Scramdisk only
uses the best available, these are entirely different realms of
strength. Basically if you want to hide something from God (or Allah or
the Goddes or the Universe, pick whatever you prefer) you use a OTP,
because he/she/it/they can break anything else
3rd error: DIEHARD is good enough to certify a pRNG
The truth is that DIEHARD will only tell you if your xRNG is
bad, it can't tell you if it's good. The only way to prove that a
source is good is to prove the source good, a post mortem examination
can only tell you if it's bad.
Those are the 3 most glaring errors I saw.
Joe
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Shawn Willden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA quote on AES
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2000 15:48:42 -0700
Tim Tyler wrote:
> As always, information flows into the NSA, but not much is seen to
> emerge from it.
Were it otherwise, we'd blast them for incompetence.
Shawn.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The ultimate cipher
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:33:36 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [snip "new" cipher idea]
> Congratulations it's a Frog. In all honesty while it is more difficult
> to analyze a system like that as a whole, finding the parts in such a
> way that they always create a strong cipher is extremely difficult.
> Frog is probably the best example of this kind of cipher. It was a
> fairly well thought out, apparently capable, unfortunately fragile
> entry to the AES competition. On order to make a system like this work
> is excessively difficult.
>
> However don't let this discourage you from exploring the opportunities
> it provides. If you can determine the requirements for it, similar to
> the way it has been determined what the requirements are for a Feistel
> cipher to be secure, then you may spawn as many ciphers as a Frog does
> polywogs (pre-adult frogs), of course in the mean time the mortality
> rate for the polywogs will be extremely high.
I don't understand how did you have the association
with Frog. In my scheme one of the undetermined number
of components could be AES or what strong cipher you
care to choose. And the system is much more complicated
than one single component, in fact as complicated as
you want to formulate in generic terms.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On an idea of John Savard
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:39:52 +0100
David Schwartz wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> > It is my view that each cycle of a well-designed cipher
> > contributes to some diffusion effect. These cycles are
> > equivalent. Cycles of different ciphers do the same,
> > though maybe in different measure. The avalanche effect
> > gets enlarged when there are more rounds both in the
> > original cipher and in the compound cipher. Since the
> > ciphers are different, there is unlikely to be appreciable
> > 'cancelling' effect, if any, in my view. Certainly, this
> > is no 'proof' at all. If you really don't like the idea,
> > you can still do multiple encryption in the commonly known
> > way via concatenation but permute the round keys in each
> > individual cipher, which should be very safe in general.
>
> Why not just pick a cipher with the desired strength in the first
> place?
In fact you can. One of my often made proposal is to
have more (user choosable) rounds in the standard ciphers.
But you have to derive more round keys. Here I am
just following the idea of John savard which doesn't
require one to enlarge the keyscheduling of the original
ciphers.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On an idea of John Savard
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:44:45 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
[snip]
> However I would be inclined to agree that it is at least as secure if,
> instead of arbitrary interleaving, the interleaving was done at full
> round boundaries. In a balanced Feistel cipher, this point of interest
> is easily found, and the result is (using the notation above):
[snip]
Do you mean two rounds? If yes, I thought that I have
indicated that with the term 'cycle', which for DES-like
cipher is two rounds, i.e. a point where both halves get
processed once.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 20:56:29 GMT
I wasn't around for the sci.crypt cipher contest when it was announced:
http://www.wizard.net/~echo/crypto-contest.html
but I've enjoyed looking at the entrants. Unfortunately it seems very
hard to come up with something both new and good in the
very-well-explored region of 64-bit block ciphers. It would be
interesting to try and pose a challenge that's seen less attention in
the crypto community, something a bit more like a great egg race for
amateur cryptographers. I'd like to hear some ideas on what that
challenge should be.
One candidate would be the design of a large block cipher suitable for
disk sector encryption, but that's my personal hobbyhorse :-). Another
that appeals to me is the design of a stream cipher for the AES. In
other words, what if NIST had called for a stream cipher instead?
Again, the thing that makes this difficult is that it has to perform
reasonably everywhere: on Intel-based PCs, Alpha-based machines,
smartcards with very limited RAM (under 100 bytes is desirable here,
including the key) and in hardware. Extra credit for a PANAMA-like
"push-pull" design that can do double duty as a hash function or MAC -
that's much harder though I think!
Anyway, I'm sure other people have contest ideas and I'd be interested
to hear them...
--
__
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
/\__/ http://www.cluefactory.org.uk/paul/
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 12:58:26 -0800
Paul Rubin wrote:
> > On the other hand, when I go to confirm my vote, if it comes back the
> > wrong way, I can go complain to election officials. They can look up my
> > code number, and then make sense out of my voting receipt.
>
> Um, if the election officials can look up your code number, can't they
> tell who you voted for?
No, they can tell who _someone_ voted for. They don't know that someone
is me unless I tell them, say by presenting my receipt.
> That undermines the secret ballot. I guess
> the machine could encrypt your code number so that only you can
> decrypt it, but that means you need a secret key that's much longer
> than a one-digit number.
You are looking at a scheme specifically designed to provide X and
complaining that it doesn't provide Y. Of course not, it isn't designed
to. Unless you want to argue that no scheme can provide both X and Y,
your argument is pointless.
> > Every technical problem you can imagine has a technical solution.
>
> I'm not convinced of this. I'm especially not convinced that there
> are technical solutions that are -practical-.
Well the only way to resolve that is to produce candidate schemes and
evaluate them. But before we do that, we need to establish what our
goals are and prioritize them.
> > The problem is, solving enough of these problems while still having
> > a practical system that normal people can understand and use. After
> > all, normal people can't seem to figure out a punch card ballot. ;)
>
> The punch card ballot problems seem to go much deeper than people not
> being able to figure them out. I don't know how this election will come
> out, but I do hope those punch card systems are banned afterwards.
I'm not sure the fault lies in the punch card systems themselves. The
fault lies in the lack of confirmation.
DS
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On an idea of John Savard
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 12:59:59 -0800
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> In fact you can. One of my often made proposal is to
> have more (user choosable) rounds in the standard ciphers.
> But you have to derive more round keys. Here I am
> just following the idea of John savard which doesn't
> require one to enlarge the keyscheduling of the original
> ciphers.
It's a non-trivial exercise to design a scheme with a choosable number
of rounds that isn't vulnerable to leaking information from MITM
attacks. The round negotiation scheme has to protected.
DS
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: hardware RNG's
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 20:25:09 GMT
David Schwartz wrote:
> Tim Tyler wrote:
> > To my mind a sequence that is one 80% 2s hardly qualifies as "random" or
> > "unpredictable".
> Then what about a sequence that is 50% 1's?
If nobody defines his terms, then this degenerates to a lot of
uninformed opinion. Statisticians have a general agreement on
the meaning of a "random process" -- note, it is a process --
which certainly encompasses generation of biased distributions.
The usual cryppie term for a *uniform* random distribution is
"flat random", and that seems to be what Tim Tyler has in mind.
The sequence 10101010101010101010... is of course not likely to
be the result of a random process, although it has a better-
than-flat single-symbol distribution. Or take the sequence
001001000011111101101010100010..., which I did *not* generate
by a random process, although statistically it appears to be
random as you see more and more of the bit stream. (No prize
for figuring out the deterministic generation process.) The
attempt to characterize "randomness" of a hunk of data itself
is fruitless, Chaitin notwithstanding.
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: 14 Nov 2000 13:18:17 -0800
David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > Um, if the election officials can look up your code number, can't they
> > tell who you voted for?
>
> No, they can tell who _someone_ voted for. They don't know that someone
> is me unless I tell them, say by presenting my receipt.
OK. So when you present your receipt, election official Bubba can
look up your code number and know who you voted for. We don't want
that.
> You are looking at a scheme specifically designed to provide X and
> complaining that it doesn't provide Y. Of course not, it isn't designed
> to. Unless you want to argue that no scheme can provide both X and Y,
> your argument is pointless.
I may have missed something but I think I agree with this. Any scheme
that solves all problems must do both X and Y, where X and Y are in
conflict with each other.
> > > Every technical problem you can imagine has a technical solution.
> >
> > I'm not convinced of this. I'm especially not convinced that there
> > are technical solutions that are -practical-.
>
> Well the only way to resolve that is to produce candidate schemes and
> evaluate them. But before we do that, we need to establish what our
> goals are and prioritize them.
OK. Trouble is, the goals can be in conflict with each other.
> > The punch card ballot problems seem to go much deeper than people not
> > being able to figure them out. I don't know how this election will come
> > out, but I do hope those punch card systems are banned afterwards.
>
> I'm not sure the fault lies in the punch card systems themselves. The
> fault lies in the lack of confirmation.
It's worse than that. The punch card systems seem to systematically
undercount ballots by several percent. In elections where all the
polls use punch cards, the errors cancel each other out; but the
current FL mess revolves around punch cards being used mostly in
counties favoring one candidate, and optically scanned ballots (which
are more accurate) being used mostly in counties favoring the other
candidate.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On an idea of John Savard
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 22:25:01 +0100
David Schwartz wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> > In fact you can. One of my often made proposal is to
> > have more (user choosable) rounds in the standard ciphers.
> > But you have to derive more round keys. Here I am
> > just following the idea of John savard which doesn't
> > require one to enlarge the keyscheduling of the original
> > ciphers.
>
> It's a non-trivial exercise to design a scheme with a choosable number
> of rounds that isn't vulnerable to leaking information from MITM
> attacks. The round negotiation scheme has to protected.
If you increase a common block cipher from its standar
number of rounds to a higher number of rounds, do you
think that you would thereby weaken it?
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Quisquater <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 22:46:43 +0100
Did you see the project NESSIE
(New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption)
http://www.cryptonessie.org ?
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: hardware RNG's
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 13:21:36 -0800
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> David Schwartz wrote:
> > Tim Tyler wrote:
> > > To my mind a sequence that is one 80% 2s hardly qualifies as "random" or
> > > "unpredictable".
> > Then what about a sequence that is 50% 1's?
> If nobody defines his terms, then this degenerates to a lot of
> uninformed opinion. Statisticians have a general agreement on
> the meaning of a "random process" -- note, it is a process --
> which certainly encompasses generation of biased distributions.
> The usual cryppie term for a *uniform* random distribution is
> "flat random", and that seems to be what Tim Tyler has in mind.
I use "random" (in a cryptographic context) to mean unpredictable (by
an attacker with a specific presumed set of resources). How random
something is is the same question as to what extent a hypothetical
attacker could predict it.
DS
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 13:26:52 -0800
Paul Rubin wrote:
>
> David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > > Um, if the election officials can look up your code number, can't they
> > > tell who you voted for?
> >
> > No, they can tell who _someone_ voted for. They don't know that someone
> > is me unless I tell them, say by presenting my receipt.
>
> OK. So when you present your receipt, election official Bubba can
> look up your code number and know who you voted for. We don't want
> that.
Why? That kind of traceability is exactly what you do want. Otherwise,
there's no way to assure anyone that the results are accurate. In any
scheme, if election officials themselves are corrupt, some level of
compromise will have to be possible. Officials have to have the ability
to investigate and correct cases where there is abuse.
> > You are looking at a scheme specifically designed to provide X and
> > complaining that it doesn't provide Y. Of course not, it isn't designed
> > to. Unless you want to argue that no scheme can provide both X and Y,
> > your argument is pointless.
>
> I may have missed something but I think I agree with this. Any scheme
> that solves all problems must do both X and Y, where X and Y are in
> conflict with each other.
What goal is in conflict with what goal?
DS
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On an idea of John Savard
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 13:30:20 -0800
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> If you increase a common block cipher from its standar
> number of rounds to a higher number of rounds, do you
> think that you would thereby weaken it?
>
> M. K. Shen
Perhaps. If, for example, one side was doing X rounds and the other
side was doing X+1 rounds, there might be imaginable compromises.
DS
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:25:43 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Kristopher Johnson wrote:
>
> > "Your vote" is not something you own; it is a privilege granted to
you by
> > the government, and the government can enforce whatever restrictions
they
> > want upon it. The government wants people to vote based upon their
> > consciences, and not based upon the highest bid they've received.
>
> For many people, there is no difference. How do you plan to enforce
this. If
> a candidate promises to give money to a large group of people for
voting, how
> is this to be stopped? (Social Security, Medicare, for example.) How
are
> candidates promises any different from vote buying. How have they ever
been?
>
You can't stop it. That is why democracy
will collapse, as all systems eventually
must.
--
Void where prohibited by law.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: voting through pgp
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:29:38 GMT
In article <AdeQ5.8$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Kristopher Johnson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How is this different from the absentee ballots we have today? There
is
> nothing preventing coercion or other pressure in that case.
>
> I don't think that we have to make online voting 100% secure. But we
can
> easily make it as secure as the current system.
>
Unfortunately it is not any different.
Absentee ballots definitely have the problem that
someone might watch as another person votes.
Kind of makes you wonder about Oregon.
--
Void where prohibited by law.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Secret sharing in practice
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 16:06:47 -0500
Reply-To: "Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
The best way to do secret sharing seems to depend on the size of the secret
involved.
Does anyone actually use secret sharing in the real world? If so, then what
are the "common" applications, and how big are these secrets, typically?
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Thoughts on the sci.crypt cipher contest
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 13:50:39 -0800
Paul Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I wasn't around for the sci.crypt cipher contest when it was announced:
>
> http://www.wizard.net/~echo/crypto-contest.html
>
> but I've enjoyed looking at the entrants. Unfortunately it seems very
> hard to come up with something both new and good in the
> very-well-explored region of 64-bit block ciphers. It would be
> interesting to try and pose a challenge that's seen less attention in
> the crypto community, something a bit more like a great egg race for
> amateur cryptographers. I'd like to hear some ideas on what that
> challenge should be.
>
> One candidate would be the design of a large block cipher suitable for
> disk sector encryption, but that's my personal hobbyhorse :-). Another
> that appeals to me is the design of a stream cipher for the AES. In
> other words, what if NIST had called for a stream cipher instead?
> Again, the thing that makes this difficult is that it has to perform
> reasonably everywhere: on Intel-based PCs, Alpha-based machines,
> smartcards with very limited RAM (under 100 bytes is desirable here,
> including the key) and in hardware. Extra credit for a PANAMA-like
> "push-pull" design that can do double duty as a hash function or MAC -
> that's much harder though I think!
>
> Anyway, I'm sure other people have contest ideas and I'd be interested
> to hear them...
This would be interesting to me. My "Egg hunt" so far hasn't
produced many chickens but it has drilled the egg collector
pretty well.
What would be interesting from a large block size standpoint?
Are we talking 8x (512bits) or x^2? Any interesting points
along the way? New stream cipher ideas would be worthwhile
but aren't they harder to analyze?
There doesn't seem to be an accepted methodology like there
is with block ciphers. You can't look at reduced round variants
in a meaningful way, check how diffusion propagates through
the rounds, yada yada yada... Another thorny point would be
the requirement for statistical testing and the lack of confidence
such testing would produce. Not to mention that this process can
be subverted.
There is a big difference between making the tests as sensitive
to your structure as possible and tweaking your structure until
it passes a set of static tests.
I don't want to be a downer here, I like were you're going with
this but I have been thinking along similar lines and stumped
myself. Coming up with some objective criteria would help. Any
demonstrated information retrieved with a certainty greater
than random chance, with less work than an exhaustive key
search might be one. Performance criteria might be others.
Uniqueness or cleverness, even if it is a useless toad of a cipher,
might be worthwhile to track.
I dunno but I'll join in.
Paul
------------------------------
Crossposted-To: alt.security,alt.2600,comp.security
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (nemo outis)
Subject: Re: Black Market Internet Information - my visits and tradeshows
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2000 21:57:17 GMT
I hold no brief for your anti-semitism. However, Mossad did off my old thesis
director at McGill Univeristy, Dr. Gerald Bull.
Regards,
In article <8urjnj$1lr$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Markku J. Saarelainen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>In many Internet tradeshows I have purposefully requests to purchase
>the customer and other traffic information from many backbone ISPs and
>domain name services / controllers. These requests have resulted in the
>following conclusion: In all cases people were willing to sell their
>customer and other traffic information. So if I can do it by myself
>alone, what can an intelligence agency such as the CIA, NSA, FBI,
>Mossad to do with their thousands of employees. My recommendation: The
>strongest possible encryption of all personal, official, business and
>other communications without implementing the NSA crackable AES
>(Advanced Encryption Standard). The reality: "Who wins the crypto war,
>wins the whole war."
>
>Markku
>
>P.S. Did you know that the CIA and Mossad have very close tie and share
>satellite and other intelligence information daily and very regularly.
>In addition, the Jewish communicaty in the U.S.A. operates as a
>facilitator to enable improved Mossad intelligence activities. Did you
>also know that Mossad actually kills people. In addition, when I made
>negative comments regarding to Jews in 1999 I was attacked by Jews and
>the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government seems to think that it has the
>greater responsibility to protect Jews than ordinary people.
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secret sharing in practice
Date: 14 Nov 2000 13:54:52 -0800
"Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> The best way to do secret sharing seems to depend on the size of the secret
> involved.
>
> Does anyone actually use secret sharing in the real world? If so, then what
> are the "common" applications, and how big are these secrets, typically?
The natural and obvious thing to share is a secret cryptography key
used for decrypting other stuff. This is typically around 168 bits
(3DES symmetric key) or 1024 bits (RSA secret key).
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