Cryptography-Digest Digest #167, Volume #13 Thu, 16 Nov 00 13:13:00 EST
Contents:
Re: Q: fast block ciphers (Tom St Denis)
Re: Randomness from key presses and other user interaction (Tim Tyler)
Re: New record SNFS factorization (Chris Thompson)
My new book "Exploring RANDOMNESS" ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: New record SNFS factorization (Bob Silverman)
Re: vote buying... ("Frog2000")
Re: vote buying... ("Frog2000")
Re: Big-block cipher, perhaps a new cipher family? (Manuel Pancorbo)
Re: Comments on this book (Bob Silverman)
Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ?? (John Savard)
Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ?? (John Savard)
Re: Big-block cipher, perhaps a new cipher family? (Tom St Denis)
Re: vote buying... ("Paul Pires")
Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ?? (Richard Heathfield)
Re: Anyone has read / poses / is found of book by M.Schroeder(not the ("John A.
Malley")
Re: vote buying... (zapzing)
Re: vote buying... (Dan Oetting)
Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ?? ("Paul Pires")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: fast block ciphers
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 12:22:17 GMT
In article <8uvh3t$lgt$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Brian Wong" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:8uvbod$7l6$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> >
> > I once designed a block cipher that uses decorrelation modules for
> > security. The idea was to precompute multiplication in GF(2)^32 as
a
> > series of four 8x32 sboxes. With six rounds I achieved a rate of
about
> > 13 cycles/byte on my AMD K6-II machine which is the fastest speed
for a
> > block cipher I ever heard of.
> >
>
> It's GF(2^32), something you should remember after being corrected
for this
> so many times. If you can't get this simple statement right, how do
you
> expect to have any credibility at all?
Then why is GF(p) modulo a prime modulus, such as in IDEA?
That's why I get confused. I am working with a 32-degree polynomial,
not a 32-bit scalar.
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Randomness from key presses and other user interaction
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 12:44:31 GMT
Steve Roberts <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Aargh, the user will just hold a key down so that all the key strokes
: will have the same spacing in time!! Don't forget that humans will
: usually find the easiest possible way of doing something. The same
: thing for human-chosen random typing - there will be a lot of repeated
: a's out there.
You can detect this easily. Insisting on a number of key releases
is one counter-measure to having the user hold down a key.
--
__________ http://alife.co.uk/ http://mandala.co.uk/
|im |yler [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hex.org.uk/ http://atoms.org.uk/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chris Thompson)
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: New record SNFS factorization
Date: 16 Nov 2000 14:47:15 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On 15 Nov 2000 19:58:23 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh) wrote,
>in part:
>>In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Herman J.J. te Riele" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>>]``The Cabal'' announces the completion, on November 14, 2000,
>>]of the factorization with the Special Number Field Sieve (SNFS)
>>]of the 233-digit Cunningham number 2,773+ = 2^773 + 1 into the product
>>]of 3, 533371 and three primes of 55, 71, and 102 digits, respectively.
>>]This establishes a new record for the Special Number Field Sieve SNFS.
>
>>Well, I would not call this factoring a 233 digit number, maybe a 227
>>digit number. Those factors of 3 and 533371 are trivial.
>
>Because the particular 233-digit number being factored was chosen for
>its mathematical interest, you have been criticized for going as far
>as saying that the announcement was "overplaying" the achievement.
>
>This, of course, doesn't contradict the specific motivation behind
>your concern: as far as the direct applicability of this to attacks on
>RSA, one might even consider only the largest two factors, and note
>this implies that a 173-digit modulus is insecure.
But this again misses the point that this is an SNFS record, not a GNFS
one. The moduli used for RSA encryption, for example, are not going to be
subject to an SNFS attack in the first place, unless your key-choosing
method is very strange indeed. The fact that SNFS has done a 233-digit
number which happens to have a 173-digit composite factor, says nothing
about the ability of GNFS to tackle a general 173-digit number (it's
still way short of that target, I think).
BTW, yes, congratulations to The Cabal are in order!
Chris Thompson
Email: cet1 [at] cam.ac.uk
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: sci.math,sci.logic
Subject: My new book "Exploring RANDOMNESS"
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 14:41:33 GMT
Hi, in December Springer-Verlag London will publish
my new book "Exploring RANDOMNESS" and it will be
available first in the UK and three months later
world wide. Amazon.co.uk is already accepting orders.
For more information, including the cover of the book,
its table of contents, and the software for the book,
see http://www.cs.umaine.edu/~chaitin/ait
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/ait
Regards,
Greg Chaitin
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: New record SNFS factorization
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 15:35:28 GMT
In article <8v0s1j$8mt$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chris Thompson) wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
<snip>
>The fact that SNFS has done a 233-digit
> number which happens to have a 173-digit composite factor, says
nothing
> about the ability of GNFS to tackle a general 173-digit number (it's
> still way short of that target, I think).
RSA-512 was 155 digits. A 173-digit number is about 10 times harder.
(and requires 3.5 times the space)
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Frog2000" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 11:21:31 -0500
"David Schwartz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> Paul Rubin wrote:
>
> > That traceability is bad even if the election officials are honest and
> > the election is fair. Years later, Sheriff Bubba has worked his way
> > up to being Supreme Dictator Bubba, has the election officials
> > executed and gets the archived code numbers and uses the ballot data
> > to locate everyone who voted against him.
>
> Won't work. It'll just give him the code numbers of everyone who voted
> against him. Remember, we were talking about a case where a citizen
> presents his electronic voting receipt to an official.
OK, but I don't think they hold on to the votes for that long after being
verified.
--
http://welcome.to/speechsystemsfortheblind
> DS
------------------------------
From: "Frog2000" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 11:25:14 -0500
"Eric Smith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> "Kristopher Johnson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > "Your vote" is not something you own; it is a privilege granted to you
by
> > the government,
>
> In the United States, voting is not a privilege granted by the
> government. It is a right held by the people. The Federal government
> has no power to restrict it, and the States have only a small amount of
> power to restrict it. The states had more power in this regard before
> the ratifications of the 14th, 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments.
Hmmm....mincing words, I think. Anyway, am I to assume you aren't from US?
>
> In general in the United States the government does not have the
> power to grant privileges. Any time you hear about them doing so,
> you should immediately be suspicious that they're exceeding their
> authority.
I wouldn't put you on Gore's or Bush's legal team. We are testing these
very notions as we speak.
------------------------------
From: Manuel Pancorbo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Big-block cipher, perhaps a new cipher family?
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 16:34:54 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> It is not clear in your description how the 'diffusion' is
> achieved through stream encryption. A stream cipher encrpyts
> each 'unit' independent of the other. The 'state' of the
> cipher changes with each unit, but this is generally
> independent of the content of the plaintext unit being
> processed. So there is no 'interaction' between the units.
Should I name it "stream cipher with feedback"? In my design, state
depends on the input. Anyway, let me explain how it works.
As I said the chosen unit length is 32 bits. The key (K) can be 128 to
256 bit long (in 32 bit steps); let's take 128 bits i.e. 4 units. The
state vector (S) is also 4 units long.
At the beginning the state vector is filled up with the key:
S <- K
In the forward encryption each plaintext unit is ciphered this way:
P'[0] = F(P[0], S[0], S[1])
S[1] = G(P[0], P'[0])
.
P'[1] = F(P[1], S[1], S[2])
S[2] = G(P[1], P'[1])
.
And so on. The state cycles over itself (S[0], S[1], S[2], S[3], S
[0],...). F and G are two 32-bit nonlinear functions. Both propagate
any single bit change of the P[0] input to 16 bits on the output P'[0]
and to 24 bits on the new state unit S[1]; in the next step S[1]
carries the (imperfect) diffusion of P[0] again to F and G which
amplify it to 32 bits in P'[1] (and S[2]).
You can see how avalanche works forward. At the end a new encryption
pass is performed backwards:
S <- K
.
C[N-1] = F(P'[N-1], S[0], S[1])
S[1] = G(P'[N-1], C[N-1])
.
C[N-2] = F(P'[N-2], S[1], S[2])
S[2] = G(P'[N-2], C[N-2])
The result is that any single bit change in the plaintext packet
propagates to the full ciphertext packet (except perhaps if the change
occurs in the last units).
The point is that it doesn't really matter how F and G are built,
provided a minimum diffusion, unlinearity and operations economy (I
think). Anyway I can give details in a further post.
>
> You can also use any common block cipher to do chaining
> in the forward direction and, after having processed the
> whole file, do a second encryption pass in the backward
> direction. (This is a known method of forcing the opponent
> to process the whole file, as also mentioned previously in
> several threads of the group.) In fact, the block cipher
> is doing 'stream' encryption here if you look on the block
> as a single 'unit' of the 'stream'.
My goal is to avoid the repetitive rounds and the key scheduling of
block ciphers, but giving the same diffusion power and disorder. If
possible, giving the same strength ;-)
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Bob Silverman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comments on this book
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 16:39:48 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
JCA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I've come across the following reference:
>
> Finite Fields: Theory and Computation: The Meeting Point of
> Number Theory, Computer Science, Coding Theory, and Cryptography
> (Mathematics and Its Applications), June 1999.
> I. E. Shparlinski
>
> Its title, if overlong, is very suggestive. However, taking into
> account that incunabula aside this is the most expensive book I
> have ever seen (its very hefty $237 tag is very off-putting)
The author does not set the price and most authors want to see
the prices on their books lowered. I agree that $237 is outrageous.
I have not seen this book, but I know the author. His knowledge
of this subject is superb. My guess would be that the book is excellent.
A book on Finite Fields that I have read is Lidl & Neidereiter's.
It is excellent for theory, but somewhat lacking in algorithms.
--
Bob Silverman
"You can lead a horse's ass to knowledge, but you can't make him think"
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ??
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 16:46:10 GMT
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 08:42:04 +0100, "kihdip"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>With IBM, RSA and Counterpane as the direct 'inventors', how could Hitachi
>come up with this foolish patent idea ??
One step in these algorithms, a rotation of bits _which is controlled
by a key-dependent variable_, was first claimed by itself in the
patent for a Hitachi block cipher, just as the patent for the IDEA
block cipher specifically claims the technique of using operations
from different groups to obtain cipher strength, not just the specific
algorithm for IDEA itself.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ??
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 16:47:53 GMT
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 12:37:45 +0100, Mok-Kong Shen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>I wonder why the other candidates of AES are deemed
>to violate the patent, while Rijndael's ShiftRow, where a
>cyclic shift is done, does not. Could someone explain that?
The extent of the shift is fixed, not variable. Thus, not only is it
not a manifestation of the innovation claimed by Hitachi, but the
"swap halves" step in DES would be prior art.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Big-block cipher, perhaps a new cipher family?
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 17:00:25 GMT
In article <8v12bd$ib5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Manuel Pancorbo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >
> > It is not clear in your description how the 'diffusion' is
> > achieved through stream encryption. A stream cipher encrpyts
> > each 'unit' independent of the other. The 'state' of the
> > cipher changes with each unit, but this is generally
> > independent of the content of the plaintext unit being
> > processed. So there is no 'interaction' between the units.
>
> Should I name it "stream cipher with feedback"? In my design, state
> depends on the input. Anyway, let me explain how it works.
>
> As I said the chosen unit length is 32 bits. The key (K) can be 128 to
> 256 bit long (in 32 bit steps); let's take 128 bits i.e. 4 units. The
> state vector (S) is also 4 units long.
>
> At the beginning the state vector is filled up with the key:
> S <- K
> In the forward encryption each plaintext unit is ciphered this way:
>
> P'[0] = F(P[0], S[0], S[1])
> S[1] = G(P[0], P'[0])
> .
> P'[1] = F(P[1], S[1], S[2])
> S[2] = G(P[1], P'[1])
> .
>
> And so on. The state cycles over itself (S[0], S[1], S[2], S[3], S
> [0],...). F and G are two 32-bit nonlinear functions. Both propagate
> any single bit change of the P[0] input to 16 bits on the output P'[0]
> and to 24 bits on the new state unit S[1]; in the next step S[1]
> carries the (imperfect) diffusion of P[0] again to F and G which
> amplify it to 32 bits in P'[1] (and S[2]).
By replacing the keys the period of this "cipher" would probably be
much lower then you would think. Also attacks such as chosen-plaintext
could be damaging.
What exactly are these F/G functions anyways? The security of this
scheme will have to take those into account.
Tom
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 09:08:02 -0800
Frog2000 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> "Eric Smith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > "Kristopher Johnson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > > "Your vote" is not something you own; it is a privilege granted to you
> by
> > > the government,
> >
> > In the United States, voting is not a privilege granted by the
> > government. It is a right held by the people. The Federal government
> > has no power to restrict it, and the States have only a small amount of
> > power to restrict it. The states had more power in this regard before
> > the ratifications of the 14th, 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments.
>
> Hmmm....mincing words, I think. Anyway, am I to assume you aren't from US?
Why assume that? Because there is an indication that he was taught history?
Paul
>
> >
> > In general in the United States the government does not have the
> > power to grant privileges. Any time you hear about them doing so,
> > you should immediately be suspicious that they're exceeding their
> > authority.
>
> I wouldn't put you on Gore's or Bush's legal team. We are testing these
> very notions as we speak.
>
>
>
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 17:15:17 +0000
From: Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ??
John Savard wrote:
>
> On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 08:42:04 +0100, "kihdip"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>
> >With IBM, RSA and Counterpane as the direct 'inventors', how could Hitachi
> >come up with this foolish patent idea ??
>
> One step in these algorithms, a rotation of bits _which is controlled
> by a key-dependent variable_, was first claimed by itself in the
> patent for a Hitachi block cipher, just as the patent for the IDEA
> block cipher specifically claims the technique of using operations
> from different groups to obtain cipher strength, not just the specific
> algorithm for IDEA itself.
I independently developed key-dependent rotations about a year ago.
Since I'm not even a cryptographer, just a rather amateurish hobbyist,
and since I developed this without reference to any texts or materials,
I would argue that the technique is obvious. So obvious, in fact, that
even I could invent it! And patents have to be for non-obvious stuff,
don't they?
Hitachi need to get some reality pills.
--
Richard Heathfield
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R answers, C books, etc: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton
------------------------------
From: "John A. Malley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Anyone has read / poses / is found of book by M.Schroeder(not the
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 09:32:01 -0800
Ariel Burbaickij wrote:
>
[snip]
> The only question left is motivation for substituting a with
> 1 - 1/p^i is it just "another name" for a or were deeper reasons
> present for changing a with 1 - 1/p^i ?
This is a standard formula for the expansion of the natural logarithm of
any value "a" between -1 < a < 1 such that the summation of terms is
guaranteed to converge to the value ln(a) on the left hand side of the
following equation:
ln(a) = (a - 1) - 1/2( a - 1)^2 + 1/3( a - 1)^3 - 1/4( a - 1)^4 + ....
Looking at Equation 4.2 in Mr. Schroeder's book,
___
ln( W(x) ) approx = \ ln( 1 - 1/p^i )
/__
p^i < x
we can also view it as
___
ln( W(x) ) approx = \ ln( a ) where a = ( 1 - 1/p^i )
/__
p^i < x
Now to use that standard series expansion for the natural logarithm of a
value "a" we need to show ourselves that ( 1 - 1/p^i) is always within
the bounds for a for any choice of p (i.e. for the ith prime p). Since
every prime (even and odd) is always positive and greater than 1, the
value of a = ( 1 - 1/p^i) is always positive and less than 1. So the
series expansion for the ln(a) does work here.
Many higher math textbooks include abbreviated tables of primes and
appendices of integrals, differentials, definite integrals and series.
Some publishers print handbooks of common math formulas and tables for
engineering, physics and mathematics (such as CRC.) If you don't have
one yet, consider picking one up (I found mine at a used book store) -
you'll find it's as important to engineers/physicts/mathematicians as a
dictionary or thesaurus is to a writer.
> hat is r.h.s.
Mr. Heathfield's response in this thread covered this well, so I'll just
reiterate the abbreviation is short hand for "right hand side"
John A. Malley
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 17:30:44 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Frog2000" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> "zapzing" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:8usakb$ne9$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > You can't stop it. That is why democracy
> > will collapse, as all systems eventually
> > must.
>
> That is an opinion based on pesimism, and not backed up by fact.
History shows that all past empires
have collapsed for pretty much the
same reasons. And this one is following
that trajectory quite well. Corruption
is increasing and the government is
turning against its own people.
This sort of behavior is predicted
by evolutionary biology, because
altruism is expected to evolve only
between people with a high degree of
relatedness, but the "freedom of the
empire" means that family and tribal
groups will be severely disrupted.
As to your other point, that I am
"pessimistic", that is an argument
ad hominem and is therefore invalid.
--
Void where prohibited by law.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Dan Oetting <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: vote buying...
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 10:47:49 -0700
Can anyone site a current public election with secret ballots where a
receipt of the vote is given to the elector?
I do not believe that a receipt is necessary or even usefull and as has
been shown, can be abused.
In the US, every step of the election process except how an individual
casts a vote is open to public inspection. It is not the individuals
responsibility to verify the election process. Each party that has a
stake in the outcome of an election is allowed to have a poll watcher
monitor the election process. If you don't trust any of the parties why
are you bothering to cast a vote?
Now with the idea of receipts out of the way, I'll present a remote
electronic voting protocol based on the current vote by mail systems.
A mail in vote typically consists of a ballot containing the cast votes
enclosed in a secrecy envelope enclosed in a sealed return mailing
envelope which identifies and is signed by the voter.
The first step in processing the returned votes is to verify the
electors signature on the unopened return mailing envelope against the
signature in the voter registration records.
After the polls close the return mailing envelopes are opened and the
secrecy envelopes are removed and shuffled.
The ballots are then removed from the secrecy envelopes and the votes
counted.
To make this procedure electronic use public key encryption for the
envelopes and a digital signature for the electors signature.
The envelopes can be opened and the ballots shuffled by a closed machine
to protect the secrecy of the ballots. The process can be verified by
repetition, testing with sample ballots and public inspection of the
hardware and software. Only one layer of envelope may be necessary.
The exposed ballots can now be viewed and the votes counted.
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Hitachi - on what grounds ??
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 09:56:17 -0800
Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> John Savard wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 08:42:04 +0100, "kihdip"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> >
> > >With IBM, RSA and Counterpane as the direct 'inventors', how could Hitachi
> > >come up with this foolish patent idea ??
> >
> > One step in these algorithms, a rotation of bits _which is controlled
> > by a key-dependent variable_, was first claimed by itself in the
> > patent for a Hitachi block cipher, just as the patent for the IDEA
> > block cipher specifically claims the technique of using operations
> > from different groups to obtain cipher strength, not just the specific
> > algorithm for IDEA itself.
>
>
> I independently developed key-dependent rotations about a year ago.
> Since I'm not even a cryptographer, just a rather amateurish hobbyist,
> and since I developed this without reference to any texts or materials,
> I would argue that the technique is obvious. So obvious, in fact, that
> even I could invent it! And patents have to be for non-obvious stuff,
> don't they?
Many "True* inventions are made by hobbyists without reference
to any texts or materials. This is not a test for obviousness. In
patents, like in most specialized areas of interest, obvious has a
special meaning.
Besides, you are going to drive yourself nuts doing that.
Someone said:
* Hitachi reads over x,y & z ciphers.
* The applicable part is key dependent rotations.
* This basically means a,b & c.
* Hey! I do a,b,c so this must be obvious.
There are a lot of assumptions and simplifications in the above
chain.
Hitachi may be full of PooPoo DeToro but you aren't going to find
that out from general posts to a news group. I pulled the patents
and am in the process of trying to get a good understanding of
the material. Pray for me.... I'm loosing it.
But, like crypto, if it were easy anyone could play.
Paul
> Hitachi need to get some reality pills.
>
>
> --
> Richard Heathfield
> "Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
> C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
> K&R answers, C books, etc: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton
>
------------------------------
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