Cryptography-Digest Digest #751, Volume #12 Sat, 23 Sep 00 05:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: t (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Tying Up Loose Ends - Correction (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Big CRC polynomials? (Terry Ritter)
Re: CDMA tracking (was Re: GSM tracking) ("Lyalc")
Re: WHAT IS ANEC ENCRYPTION? (John Savard)
Re: How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have? (John Savard)
Re: IBM analysis secret. ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: State-of-the-art in integer factorization ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Software patents are evil. (Jerry Coffin)
Re: WHAT IS ANEC ENCRYPTION? ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: t
Date: 23 Sep 2000 03:24:33 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Hopwood) wrote in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
.......
>- --
>David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
>RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15
>01 Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I
>revoke a public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private
>key has been seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act;
>see www.fipr.org/rip
>
David isn't this last few lines breaking the law. My impression
was that under the RIP act. You are not allowed to communicate to
your friends that you are under investigation. You have just told
us how you plan to violate that provision, by telling us what to look
for or could you clarify what the law means.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Tying Up Loose Ends - Correction
Date: 23 Sep 2000 03:16:49 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Hopwood) wrote in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
......
>You can in practice always reject keys, if you loop over each possible
>key, because plaintext messages are almost always automatically
>recognisable. In particular, whether they are recognisable is not
>changed by compression, including "1-to-1 compression".
>
The point is your making the assumption that some particular
form of file was compressed and encrypted. What I have been looking
at is how much can be rejected without some knowledge of the file
being sought. I often use the example that "ANY FILE" can in theory
be found if a poor compression used with some encryption. Yes if
it is ASCII text one can just do what you say. But what if you don't
know what form the data is in. Many it has some specail GIF with the
headers off. Why use compression that can help an attacker. Why
do you say don't worry about it.
And your point as to whether they are recognisable is not changed
by compression. Ture! but if you use my 1-1 huffman compression your
going to have to check evey file to see if it is recognizeable. If
you use a non one-one compression there may only be one file that could
be decompressed from the compression encryption scheme for the cipher
text your looking at and if there is only one you may look harder at
it to determince what kind of file it is, Since it will be the one
that was encrypted.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: Big CRC polynomials?
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 05:11:58 GMT
On Fri, 22 Sep 2000 22:46:34 GMT, in
<ejRy5.2094$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, in
sci.crypt "bubba" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>May I suggest an XOR checksum. A CRC is advantageous only when you
>are trying to detect burst errors (aligned, contiguous differences in
>otherwise
>identical files in your case) of less that 128 or 256 bits in length (for
>the
>polynomials you mentioned).
While both a 256-bit CRC and a 256-bit XOR would detect a single bit
difference, in general, a CRC is *vastly* more likely to catch
arbitrary differences than XOR. For example, if the same wrong block
repeats any even number of times, XOR will not find it, no matter how
many differences that block contains. In contrast, CRC is insensitive
only to patterns which are factors of the CRC polynomial.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: "Lyalc" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: CDMA tracking (was Re: GSM tracking)
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 16:20:11 +1000
Unless the safe's case forms an integral, seamlessly conductive surface and
is grounded, the safe's skin can act as a coupled antenna to an internal
transmitter in some circumstances.
Needing the safe's skin to be electrically seamless and of low impedance at
the particular frequencies is the first major challenge.
Even is the safe offers say 30db of attenuation, the 1 watt power ouput of
the phone (ie 30 dbm) means the signal outside the safe would be around
0dbm. Many receivers will detect signals as low as -80db - so there plenty
of power bandwidth left to address the distance between phone and mobile
phone tower. Of course, signal attentuation is reciprocal (ie in and out
attenuation are the same), so a similar power level would be inside the safe
from an external signal from the tower.
Was the safe's surface oxidised?
Was it paintend with a metallic paint that may not have been electrically
bonded to the case (eg. by an undercoat)?
try wrapping the closed safe in foil, preferably copper if you have it, and
see if the results change.
Highly effective RF attenuation is hard to do right, a bit like computer
security and cryptography.
lyal
Sagie wrote in message <8qfb62$clf$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>You can try to send an urgent SMS to the phone while off. Urgent
>messages seem to turn on most CDMA phones.
>
>Your tests seem to have a bit odd results to me... Are you sure the
>substance the safe is made from is conductive? Is there a sufficient
>contact between the safe's sides? Did you close the safe's door? Does
>the door have sufficient contact with the rest of the safe?
>I have no doubt that if the safe was a sufficient Faraday's cage, the
>pager would not have received messages -- ground or no ground.
>
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack) wrote:
>> >I believe the aluminum briefcase is more than enough for a CDMA
>cellphone,
>> >due to the following reasons:
>> > 1. While off, the cellphone does not transmit -- it only
>receives. It
>> >will only transmit when told to do so, which requires the phone to
>receive
>> >that message from the network. The briefcase is enough to block phone
>> >reception from any cellular system.
>> > 2. Keep in mind that CDMA is based on spread-spectrum. This
>makes the
>> >actual power-per-frequency rating much lower than any other cellular
>system,
>> >and therefore the briefcase should not have any problem defeating the
>> >phone's transmission. The signal-to-noise level outside the
>briefcase would
>> >be so low that the original signal could never be reconstructed (or
>sensed,
>> >for that matter).
>> > 3. The aluminium briefcase is much bigger than the phone, and is
>> >therefore a sufficient ground space (compared to the phone's tiny
>ground
>> >space).
>> >
>> >
>> >Sagie.
>> >
>>
>> I will test this ... since I don't have a small metal briefcase I
>will use a
>> small
>> safe and let you know how it turns out.
>>
>> Tested with pager and cell phone. Both receive when in an ungrounded
>> metal safe. The pager recieved beeps. The cell phone maintained
>signal.
>> Since I don't have a way of testing the response when it is off I
>can't
>> judge that.
>>
>> For a faraday cage to work properly it should be grounded
>> in one of the reference frames. ie. with respect to either the phone
>or the
>> cell tower but now that I think about it the charging plug would
>provide
>> an adequate ground with respect to the phone.
>>
>> Now to figure out how to do that without shorting the phone out ....
>> Which one of those connectors is supposed to be ground?
>>
>> >
>> >"H. Ellenberger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>> >news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>> >> Mack wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > >If you are concerned about your phone being
>> >> > >trackable when it is off, why not just put
>> >> > >it in an aluminum briefcase ?
>> >>
>> >> > Not terribly effective at attenuating signals.
>> >> > It must be properly grounded. The 50 foot of ground
>> >> > cable limits the effective range of the phone.
>> >>
>> >> Completely wrong, no ground cable is required.
>> >> If the metal briefcase should leak too much rf power,
>> >> just put it into a small and tight metallic box.
>> >>
>> >> HE
>> >>
>> >>
>>
>> Mack
>> Remove njunk123 from name to reply by e-mail
>>
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: WHAT IS ANEC ENCRYPTION?
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 05:27:02 GMT
On Fri, 22 Sep 2000 21:49:25 GMT, "Melinda Harris"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Anyone know anything about ANEC encryption?
Nope. Still nobody but you.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have?
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 05:49:28 GMT
On Sat, 23 Sep 2000 02:57:31 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alex) wrote,
in part:
>How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have?
25! , or more if the letter to omit can be varied as well.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: IBM analysis secret.
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 02:26:48 -0400
Roger Schlafly wrote:
> There were others at IBM on the project who had clearances. It
> seems likely that NSA gave them classified info on how to choose
> S-boxes. If Don was making the S-boxes, then he had to be told
> somehow. Don implied that the leak was unauthorized, but it seems
> just as likely to me that the leak was authorized.
If Coppersmith had to do the work, the officially correct procedure
would have been to get him cleared and read into the program, but I
suspect time constraints caused the IBM staff to cut corners here.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: State-of-the-art in integer factorization
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 02:48:22 -0400
Dann Corbit wrote:
> For that matter, what remarkable new algorithm has the NSA invented?
> Are there *any*?
Yes, there have been several, many of them now wired into custom ICs.
A small percentage of them have since been reinvented by others,
although usually without evidence of an understanding of the best
ways to exploit them in cryptology. Sometimes the internal
algorithms have been approved for external publication using examples
from other fields; examples include Good's interaction algorithm,
Berlekamp-Massey, and Baum-Eagon. Many other comparable examples
have never been released to the public.
> Do you know many mathematicians who would rather work at the NSA
> than at a university or in private industry?
Yes, I do.
One thing you have missed is that continuity of corporate memory
and working in a team environment provides a synergistic environment
that cannot be obtained in any other way. And the importance of
solving problems that have real life-and-death consequences on a
historic scale can be a powerful motivator.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have?
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 02:56:37 -0400
John Savard wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alex) wrote, in part:
> >How many possible keys does a Playfair cipher have?
> 25! , or more if the letter to omit can be varied as well.
However, many of those keys are equivalent (in the sense that they
will produce the same encipherment). So the answer is 24!, unless
somebody can find some more equivalences.
------------------------------
From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Software patents are evil.
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 01:03:46 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
> Jerry Coffin wrote:
> > Keep in mind that if something is
> > currently protected by a valid patent, then nobody did it more than
> > 20 years ago.
>
> Nonsense. One company I worked for had to license a patent that was applied
> for three years after we'd been selling what they described as a commercial
> service. I think if all the patents were valid, there would be much less
> complaining.
Please actually READ what I say before you call it nonsense. Take
particular note of the fact that I said "valid patent." Technically
speaking, that should really be "21 years" instead of 20. It's also
technically possible for one person to do it and keep it a secret,
and somebody else to patent it years later, but IMO this is a small
enough effect to ignore. In particular, the effect on society as a
whole is essentially nil: if somebody hasn't published it, hasn't
sold a product that uses it, etc., from the viewpoint of the rest of
society it's essentially the same as if it didn't exist at all.
--
Later,
Jerry.
The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 04:09:38 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: WHAT IS ANEC ENCRYPTION?
Melinda Harris wrote:
> Anyone know anything about ANEC encryption?
> EIA
Anyone know what's wrong with Melinda Harris? She appears not to be
able to read the language in which she writes.
------------------------------
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