Cryptography-Digest Digest #365, Volume #13      Tue, 19 Dec 00 16:13:00 EST

Contents:
  Re: use of position of characters for encryption (Simon Johnson)
  Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence bosses are using shortwaves and 
the Morse code to communicate with their intelligence agents in Miami .... interesting 
.. when I was in California (I think) I got some strange messages to my head .. 
(Juergen Nieveler)
  Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence  bosses are using shortwaves and 
the Morse code to communicate with their  intelligence agents in Miami .... 
interesting .. when I was in  California (I think) I got some strange messages to my 
head .. (Kirby Urner)
  Re: Why primes? ("Jesper Stocholm")
  Steganography using text as carrier ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
  Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers ("Jeffrey W. Baker")
  Re: does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding ? (Mok-Kong Shen)
  Re: In today paper I read how Cuban intelligence  (Keith)
  Re: Steganography using text as carrier (Mok-Kong Shen)
  Re: In =?iso-8859-1?Q?today=B4s?= paper I read how Cuban intelligence   (Chumkil)
  Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers (Steve Portly)
  Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers 
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
  SMS security over various networks? (Chris Kantarjiev)
  Re: Why primes? (Richard Heathfield)
  Re: Q: Result of an old thread? (Bryan Olson)
  Re: Why primes? (Jerry Coffin)
  Re: Possibly another Encryption method - any thoughts ? (Simon Johnson)
  Re: Q: Result of an old thread? (Mok-Kong Shen)
  Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers ("Jeffrey W. 
Baker")
  Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence   bosses are using shortwaves and 
the Morse code to communicate with their  intelligence agents in Miami .... 
interesting .. when I was in   California (I think) I got some strange messages to my 
head .. (Kirby Urner)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Simon Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: use of position of characters for encryption
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 15:57:35 GMT

In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Would it be better or worse to use a system in
> which the ciphertext is created based on the
> location of a particular character?

This isn't a bad idea, the only negative effect would be it would
increase the complexity of implementation, and the end cipher would run
slower. Though, if your cautious with what your doing, then the
resultant cipher should be more secure.

> For example:
> f(x) = (position(x) + x) * key
> position(x) = x'th character in plaintext.
> x = character
>
> I think that implementing this would
> destroy  the ability to use a type of trans-
> position, but which one is better?
>
Well, this algorithm here isn't very clever. F(x) size is partly
determined by position(x), it is clear this would result in cipher-text
expantion. Not only this, but if this where used to directly encipher
it would be very weak indeed. It would require only two cipher-text's
to break:
x0= first plain-text, f(x0) = First cipher-text
x1 = sencond plain-text, f(x0) = Second cipher-text

we know the key's are equal:

F(x0) = (position(x0) + x0) * key
F(x1) = (position(x1) + x1) * key

:. F(x1)/(position(x2) + x1) = F(x0)/(position(x0) + x0)

By resubstitution you can find the key.

This doesn't mean your original idea is incorrect, you just don't do it
that way.

Simon.
--
Hi, i'm the signuture virus,
help me spread by copying me into Signiture File


Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Juergen Nieveler)
Crossposted-To: alt.2600,alt.security,comp.security
Subject: Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence bosses are using 
shortwaves and the Morse code to communicate with their intelligence agents in Miami 
.... interesting .. when I was in California (I think) I got some strange messages to 
my head ..
Date: 19 Dec 2000 16:10:21 GMT

Markku J. Saarelainen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>It was the Morse code for "SOS" ... and I understood it, but did not
>really know what was going on, but it was very very strange, because I
>had not had similar experiences before .. but in the next news that I
>read, I read about the accident of the nuclear submarine Kursk. So I
>realized something ...

Uh... you did notice that the Kursk was 100m deep UNDER water when it had 
the accident?

And that you cannot transmit radio signals from that depth?

F'up to alt.security, because it would be way off-topic for the other 
groups...

-- 
Juergen Nieveler
Support the ban of Dihydrogen Monoxide: http://www.dhmo.org/
"The people united can never be ignited!"- Sgt. Colon, Ankh-Morpork Watch
PGP-Key available under www.netcologne.de/~nc-nievelju/

------------------------------

From: Kirby Urner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.2600,alt.security,comp.security
Subject: Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence  bosses are using 
shortwaves and the Morse code to communicate with their  intelligence agents in Miami 
.... interesting .. when I was in  California (I think) I got some strange messages to 
my head ..
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 08:39:31 -0800

Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>"Markku J. Saarelainen" wrote:
>> 

This guy, writing under the above pseudonym, floods newsgroups
with crap.  Check the deja.com archives for alt.politics.cia.org
to see what it's like to drown in a sea of garbage.  I've got 
my filters on of course, but he keeps posting from places.

Kirby


------------------------------

From: "Jesper Stocholm" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why primes?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 18:34:03 +0100


"digiboy | marcus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:91npd0$pks$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>   [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > The replies has given me something with
> > substance to work with. I will have to
> > use a pen and paper for a while, trying
> > to see, for myself, what you're explaining.
>
> My response is somewhat pointless, but if anyone sifting through didn't
> understand the rest :
>
> In simple terms, factoring a number made up of primes is harder.
>

Harder than what ? ... do you know of any (integers) numbers, that are not
made up of primes ? ... :o)


/Jesper



------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Steganography using text as carrier
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 18:12:19 GMT

found an interesting site that wants to steganographically hide text
messages within spam messages:

http://www.spammimic.com

the site admits that the encryption is weak, and relies on the natural
aversion to spam and reflex deletion of the spam message

is there a way to hide already encrypted messages (ciphertext block)
within a *text* carrier,(not within the whitespace) and if so, what are
the size constraints of ciphertext to carrier text?

as redundancy would not be particularly surprising in spam messages,
this might be a promising new avenue for effective steganography.

thanks in advance for any information or references

vedaal



Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/

------------------------------

From: "Jeffrey W. Baker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 10:53:45 -0800

Hi,

I have recently been examining BEA Weblogic Server for security
vulnerabilities.  Of course it is full to the brim with them :)  I have
decompiled their random number generator using a patched version of Mocha.
This random number generator is used to produce session IDs for SSL, and  
to produce session IDs for cookie authentication.

Their scheme works by spinning on the CPU briefly and counting the number
of times the increment operator can be executed in a tight loop.  They
start the tight loop in a thread, sleep a bit, then check how many times
the tight loop has run.  This is done ten times, or until the tight loop
proceeds 255 times, whichever comes first.  Each time through the test,   
the testing thread sleeps a bit longer (10ms, 20, 40, 80, ... 5120ms).
If the loop runs fewer than 255 times, the number of milliseconds since
the epoch is added and the lower eight bits are returned (which is a
really stupid algorithm and a waste of a syscall IMHO).  This number is
then fed into an MD5 digest, and the digest is used as the random number.

This scheme seems very poor to me.  It seems that on a fast machine, the
counter will run for 5ms and be done.  It doesn't seem like there would be
8 bits of random data gained just from doing that.  Meanwhile, on a slow
machine, the implementor is specifically admitting that all eight bits are
not random, as he has to pad it with the time of day.

IMHO it would have been a better idea to use the system's random
capabilities, since some Unix systems now have very decent entropy
gathering algorithms.  Is there some value to this algorithm that I am not
seeing?

-jwb

------------------------------

From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding ?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 19:56:56 +0100



[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
[snip]
>   However verisign offers #Digital ID for Microsoft Outlook '98 without
> getting any 'proof of acceptance for the key binding' except sending
> some information to the applicant's email. But we know that the email
> is insecure without encryption. The attacker may impersonate someone by
> creating an email to be claimed as someone's email, then applies a
> digital ID for that email from Verisign.

I happened to have today a very short conversation with
a person who apparently knows quite a lot about SET. She
said that a bank has no absolute assurance that a claimed 
public key of its customer is indeed genuine (for there
is no verification of identity). So the initial character 
of SET appears rather questionable to me. Maybe experts of 
the group would like to comment on this. Thanks.

M. K. Shen

------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Keith)
Crossposted-To: alt.2600,alt.security,comp.security
Subject: Re: In today paper I read how Cuban intelligence 
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 19:01:28 GMT

On Tue, 19 Dec 2000 14:51:34 GMT, Markku J. Saarelainen 
 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> It was the Morse code for "SOS" ... and I understood it, but did not
> really know what was going on, but it was very very strange, because I
> had not had similar experiences before .. but in the next news that I
> read, I read about the accident of the nuclear submarine Kursk. So I
> realized something ...
> 
 
 Why did you write most of your post in the Subject? Sheesh...

Hey, intelligence Agencies have been using Shortwave radio for
75 years to transmit signals to agents. The reason is because 
it is untraceable as to whom the message is for. Check out
http://www.wunclub.com

 "We are the ones that watch the watchman."




-- 

Best Regards,

Keith         (Use Reply-to for email) 

Where do you discover free software for Windows? Strongsignals DOT COM is a 
great place to start: http://Strongsignals.com  "Where would Christianity be
if Jesus got eight to fifteen years with time off for good behavior?" NY 
State Senator James Donovan, speaking in support of capital punishment.



------------------------------

From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Steganography using text as carrier
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 20:13:49 +0100



[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
[snip]
> 
> is there a way to hide already encrypted messages (ciphertext block)
> within a *text* carrier,(not within the whitespace) and if so, what are
> the size constraints of ciphertext to carrier text?
> 
> as redundancy would not be particularly surprising in spam messages,
> this might be a promising new avenue for effective steganography.

Steganography is very much an art in my humble view. I
don't think that there is any algorithm (automatic means)
of doing the job you described, though there are methods
of hiding bits in pixels etc. (A number of proceedings
on information hiding have been published by Springer
Verlag from which more pointers could be obtained.)

M. K. Shen

------------------------------

From: Chumkil <"chumkil"@CANNED@[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.2600,alt.security,comp.security
Subject: Re: In =?iso-8859-1?Q?today=B4s?= paper I read how Cuban intelligence  
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 11:47:21 -0800

>From the tone of his message I would guess that he is a paranoic
schizophrenic.

Kirby Urner wrote:

> Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >"Markku J. Saarelainen" wrote:
> >>
>
> This guy, writing under the above pseudonym, floods newsgroups
> with crap.  Check the deja.com archives for alt.politics.cia.org
> to see what it's like to drown in a sea of garbage.  I've got
> my filters on of course, but he keeps posting from places.
>
> Kirby


------------------------------

From: Steve Portly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 15:05:03 -0500



"Jeffrey W. Baker" wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I have recently been examining BEA Weblogic Server for security
> vulnerabilities.  Of course it is full to the brim with them :)  I have
> decompiled their random number generator using a patched version of Mocha.
> This random number generator is used to produce session IDs for SSL, and
> to produce session IDs for cookie authentication.
>
> Their scheme works by spinning on the CPU briefly and counting the number
> of times the increment operator can be executed in a tight loop.  They
> start the tight loop in a thread, sleep a bit, then check how many times
> the tight loop has run.  This is done ten times, or until the tight loop
> proceeds 255 times, whichever comes first.  Each time through the test,
> the testing thread sleeps a bit longer (10ms, 20, 40, 80, ... 5120ms).
> If the loop runs fewer than 255 times, the number of milliseconds since
> the epoch is added and the lower eight bits are returned (which is a
> really stupid algorithm and a waste of a syscall IMHO).  This number is
> then fed into an MD5 digest, and the digest is used as the random number.
>
> This scheme seems very poor to me.  It seems that on a fast machine, the
> counter will run for 5ms and be done.  It doesn't seem like there would be
> 8 bits of random data gained just from doing that.  Meanwhile, on a slow
> machine, the implementor is specifically admitting that all eight bits are
> not random, as he has to pad it with the time of day.
>
> IMHO it would have been a better idea to use the system's random
> capabilities, since some Unix systems now have very decent entropy
> gathering algorithms.  Is there some value to this algorithm that I am not
> seeing?
>
> -jwb

The key here appears to be that they are timing with an accuracy of
milliseconds.  It is very unlikely that there is very much entropy in such a
scheme.  As you mentioned Linux uses nanosecond timing in one of their entropy
gathering schemes which would yield a far more unpredictable result.  I'm not
sure which hash function ships with what version, but in any event this would
be a much better solution IMHO.


------------------------------

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 20:11:48 GMT

Jeffrey W. Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> IMHO it would have been a better idea to use the system's random
> capabilities, since some Unix systems now have very decent entropy
> gathering algorithms.  Is there some value to this algorithm that I am not
> seeing?

Is Mocha a java runtime environment? The name would seem to imply so.

Anyway, the reason I ask is that the algorithm you describe sounds
suspiciously like the random number generator in the java.security
package. If that's the case, the problem is in the jdk itself, and not
products built on it.

-- 
Matt Gauthier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

------------------------------

From: Chris Kantarjiev <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: SMS security over various networks?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 12:12:56 -0800

I'm trying to put together a white paper on the relative merits of text
messaging security via SMS over the various cell networks: CDMA, GSM,
AT&T's TDMA.

I've found a number of links about voice security, but they're mostly
fluff, and they never really mention whether the same
algorithms/techniques apply to SMS when sent over the network.

I can find references, for example, to A5 for GSM, and A5 having been
broken, but no clear information about how A5 is or isn't used for SMS
(as opposed to voice). 

I found one message in Deja that indicates that SMS messages over CDMA
networks are "encrypted" with CAVE (which isn't very good, but does it
really need to be, since spread spectrum messages are hard to intercept
anyway?).

I've found basically nothing specific about AT&T's TDMA network.

Can anyone give me some pointers? Even for-pay reports would be welcome
at this point.

Thanks,
chris
--
                      Remove xxx. to reply ...

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 20:15:47 +0000
From: Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why primes?

Jesper Stocholm wrote:
> 
> "digiboy | marcus" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:91npd0$pks$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> >
> > In simple terms, factoring a number made up of primes is harder.
> >
> 
> Harder than what ? ... do you know of any (integers) numbers, that are not
> made up of primes ? ... :o)

0 and 1 spring to mind. ;-)


-- 
Richard Heathfield
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R Answers: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/kandr2/index.html

------------------------------

From: Bryan Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: Result of an old thread?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 20:24:01 GMT

Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> Bryan Olson wrote:
> > Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > > Bryan Olson wrote:
> > > > If AS is n by n with rank m < n, then you can express AS as
> > > > an n by m times an m by n.  Call then C and D respectively.
> > > > There exists some S' such that S = S'*D.  After the second
> > > > pass solve for D*B instead of B.  In the third pass we get
> > > > S'*D*B with D and D*B known and S = S'*D.
> > >
> > > I don't think that the above constitute a proof of either
> > > a one-shot getting of S or with only very few trials. We
> > > need a clear proof, don't we? (Same as we need a proof of the
> > > amount of work to crack a cipher or termination/non-termination
> > > of some process.) In particular I don't yet understand
> > > your first sentence.
> >
> > Then you'd have no idea whether "the above constitutes a
> > proof" or not would you?
> >
> > The nice thing about the previous solution is that it doesn't
> > require as much background.  You would have found that it
> > efficiently recovers the secret if you'd bothered to try.
> > "Rank" will probably be a few chapters into an introductory
> > linear algebra text.
>
> I was not explicit and did not say that what you wrote seems
> not to be concrete enough. You wrote [If AS is n by n with
> rank m < n, then you can express AS as an n by m times an
> m by n]. So AS is to be expressed as CD where C is n*m and
> D is m*n. Which method given in the common textbooks of
> linear algebra are you referring to? Are C and D unique or
> could I take any candidates?

A basis for the column space of AS looks like a good candidate
for the columns of C.

> I need some concrete
> instructions from you, for I like very much to see if I
> could actaully carry out the computation of a tiny example,
> for that would obviate the need of any further discussions.

How did your computation for the first solution come out?

Merely carrying out the computation when given specific steps
will resolve only the narrowest of issues; my computer can do
as much.  One who posts dozens of ideas for ciphers should not
be stumped by this linear toy.


--Bryan


Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/

------------------------------

From: Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why primes?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 13:32:46 -0700

In article <91o674$8sl$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] says...

[ ... ] 

> > In simple terms, factoring a number made up of primes is harder.
> >
> 
> Harder than what ? ... do you know of any (integers) numbers, that are not
> made up of primes ? ... :o)

Yes -- 1 for an obvious example (assuming by "not made up of primes" 
you mean "having no prime factors").

Getting back to the original question, I think he was trying to say 
that if you have two numbers similar in size, but one has a few large 
factors while the other has many small factors, the latter will 
generally be the easier one to factor.

-- 
    Later,
    Jerry.

The Universe is a figment of its own imagination.

------------------------------

From: Simon Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Possibly another Encryption method - any thoughts ?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 20:31:20 GMT

The main problem with this cipher is that it looks hellishly complex.
We would like something simpler, so that it can be easily analysed such
that true security established.

Simon.
--
Hi, i'm the signuture virus,
help me spread by copying me into Signiture File


Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/

------------------------------

From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: Result of an old thread?
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 21:50:29 +0100



Bryan Olson wrote:
> 
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > Bryan Olson wrote:
> > > Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > > > Bryan Olson wrote:
> > > > > If AS is n by n with rank m < n, then you can express AS as
> > > > > an n by m times an m by n.  Call then C and D respectively.
> > > > > There exists some S' such that S = S'*D.  After the second
> > > > > pass solve for D*B instead of B.  In the third pass we get
> > > > > S'*D*B with D and D*B known and S = S'*D.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think that the above constitute a proof of either
> > > > a one-shot getting of S or with only very few trials. We
> > > > need a clear proof, don't we? (Same as we need a proof of the
> > > > amount of work to crack a cipher or termination/non-termination
> > > > of some process.) In particular I don't yet understand
> > > > your first sentence.
> > >
> > > Then you'd have no idea whether "the above constitutes a
> > > proof" or not would you?
> > >
> > > The nice thing about the previous solution is that it doesn't
> > > require as much background.  You would have found that it
> > > efficiently recovers the secret if you'd bothered to try.
> > > "Rank" will probably be a few chapters into an introductory
> > > linear algebra text.
> >
> > I was not explicit and did not say that what you wrote seems
> > not to be concrete enough. You wrote [If AS is n by n with
> > rank m < n, then you can express AS as an n by m times an
> > m by n]. So AS is to be expressed as CD where C is n*m and
> > D is m*n. Which method given in the common textbooks of
> > linear algebra are you referring to? Are C and D unique or
> > could I take any candidates?
> 
> A basis for the column space of AS looks like a good candidate
> for the columns of C.
> 
> > I need some concrete
> > instructions from you, for I like very much to see if I
> > could actaully carry out the computation of a tiny example,
> > for that would obviate the need of any further discussions.
> 
> How did your computation for the first solution come out?
> 
> Merely carrying out the computation when given specific steps
> will resolve only the narrowest of issues; my computer can do
> as much.  One who posts dozens of ideas for ciphers should not
> be stumped by this linear toy.

You misunderstood me. I have never done any real computation
of an example. I am waiting to know from you a (concrete)
systematic scheme of solving a tiny (specific) example. If 
that example could be solved without too much efforts (trials) 
then we can at least have some useful insight about the nature 
of the general problem, i.e. whether big examples could
be similarly solved within reasonable time.

M. K. Shen

------------------------------

From: "Jeffrey W. Baker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Vendor software using CPU spin rate to generate random numbers
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 12:51:42 -0800

In article <8iP%5.13023$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> Jeffrey W. Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> IMHO it would have been a better idea to use the system's random
>> capabilities, since some Unix systems now have very decent entropy
>> gathering algorithms.  Is there some value to this algorithm that I am
>> not seeing?
> 
> Is Mocha a java runtime environment? The name would seem to imply so.

Mocha is a Java class file decompiler.  It recovers the original Java
source code, with outstanding results.

> Anyway, the reason I ask is that the algorithm you describe sounds
> suspiciously like the random number generator in the java.security
> package. If that's the case, the problem is in the jdk itself, and not
> products built on it.

This code is in the weblogic.security package, class SpinnerThread,
SpinnerRandomBitsSource, and others in the same package.  In Weblogic
6.0, this class is zipped up in a jar file.

This is the algorithm used in the jdk java.security package?  Is it
considered to be good enough in that role?

-jwb

------------------------------

From: Kirby Urner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.2600,alt.security,comp.security
Subject: Re: In today´s paper I read how Cuban intelligence   bosses are using 
shortwaves and the Morse code to communicate with their  intelligence agents in Miami 
.... interesting .. when I was in   California (I think) I got some strange messages 
to my head ..
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2000 12:56:36 -0800

Chumkil <"chumkil"@CANNED@[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>From the tone of his message I would guess that he is a paranoic
>schizophrenic.
>

Naw, just yr garden variety idiot.  Truely crazy people
usually write more interesting stuff than this lamer.

Kirby


------------------------------


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