Cryptography-Digest Digest #474, Volume #13 Mon, 15 Jan 01 20:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: fun with solitaire ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Is this triple-DES variant secure? (Kenneth Almquist)
Re: fun with solitaire ("r.e.s.")
Re: multiple anagramming? (Quisquater)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (David Eppstein)
Re: Is this triple-DES variant secure? (David Wagner)
Re: A Small Challenge ("Michael Scott")
Re: multiple anagramming? (Benjamin Goldberg)
Re: Has anyone seen these men? (Bryan Mongeau)
Re: NSA and Linux Security (digiboy | marcus)
Any ideas on breaking this? ("slim to none")
Re: NSA and Linux Security (Greggy)
Re: NSA and Linux Security (digiboy | marcus)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (John Savard)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (Wei Dai)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (Benjamin Goldberg)
Re: Any ideas on breaking this? ("Matt Timmermans")
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (wtshaw)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (John Savard)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (John Savard)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: fun with solitaire
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 20:58:13 GMT
In article <93tj7h$oms$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"r.e.s." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The stream generator of the Solitaire encryption
> algorithm generates a stream of letters that are
> completely determined by the starting sequence
> of a deck of 54 cards.
>
> Is it possible to find a starting sequence that
> will cause the Solitaire letter stream to begin
> with "HELLOEARTHLINGS...", or perhaps
> "THISISTHENSA..."? ;o)
>
> --r.e.s.
>
Sort of unrelated -- I've heard that people using Solitaire usually mess
up within a few dozen steps. Wouldn't spies be better off using the
first 30 cards of a scrambled deck of cards as a one-time pad?
- Bob Jenkins
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kenneth Almquist)
Subject: Re: Is this triple-DES variant secure?
Date: 15 Jan 2001 21:20:12 GMT
"Jakob Jonsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Let's see if I interpreted your scheme correctly... You have initialization
> vectors F1[1] and F2[1] (public I assume), and to encrypt the kth block you
> compute
>
> F1[k+1] = F1[k] + E(M[k], Ki)
> F2[k+1] = D(F1[k+1], Kj)
> C[k] = E(F2[k] + F2[k+1], Ki)
>
> (+ = xor). For odd k, i=1 and j=2, and for even k, i=2 and j=1.
That's right, except that the decrypt operation should be an encrypt
operation. Your attack still works; just change D(0, K2) to E(0, K2)
below.
> Maybe I have misinterpreted your scheme, but I believe that the scheme I
> just described is vulnerable to a chosen plaintext attack. Guess K1 and put
> M = D(F1[1], K1). Encrypt M M M M M. This gives
>
> F1[2] = F1[1] + E(M, K1) = 0
>
> C[1] = E(F2[1] + D(0, K2), K1)
>
> F1[3] = E(M, K2)
> F1[4] = E(M, K2) + F1[1]
> F1[5] = F1[1]
> F1[6] = 0
>
> F2[5] = D(F1[1], K1) = M
> F2[6] = D(0, K2)
>
> C[5] = E(F2[5] + F2[6], K1) = E(M + D(0, K2), K1).
>
> You verify whether your guess of K1 is correct or not by applying D with K1
> to C[1] and C[5]; the xor sum should be
>
> M + D(0, K2) + F2[1] + D(0, K2) = M + F2[1].
Clever.
I suspect that any variant of my scheme in which F1[1] and F2[1] are
public is likely to be vulnerable to a similar sort of attack. One fix
that looks promising to compute F1[1] and F2[1] by using triple DES to
encrypt a public value which I will call IV:
F1[1] = E(E(E(IV, K1), K2), K1)
F2[1] = E(E(E(IV, K2), K1), K2)
This doesn't address your observation that F1[5] = F1[1]. This holds
true for for any input where every other block of plaintext is the same.
If we encrypt the plaintext A B A B A B, for any A and B, we get
F1[2] = F1[1] + E(A,K1)
F1[3] = F1[1] + E(A,K1) + E(B,K2)
F1[4] = F1[1] + E(B,K2)
F1[5] = F1[1]
F1[n] = F1[n-4] for all n >= 5
This generates the following sequence of cyphertext values.
C[1] = E(E(F1[1] + E(A,K1), K2) + F2[1], K1)
C[2] = E(E(F1[1] + E(A,K1) + E(B,K2), K1) + E(F1[1] + E(A,K1), K2), K2)
C[3] = E(E(F1[1] + E(B,K2), K2) + E(F1[1] + E(A,K1) + E(B,K2), K1), K1)
C[4] = E(E(F1[1], K1) + E(F1[1] + E(B,K2), K2), K2)
C[5] = E(E(F1[1] + E(A,K1), K2) + E(F1[1], K1), K1)
C[6] = E(E(F1[1] + E(A,K1) + E(B,K2), K1) + E(F1[1] + E(A,K1), K2), K2)
C[n] = C[n-4] for all n >= 6
So the feedback, because it doesn't go through DES, doesn't do a very good
job of masking patterns in the input.
Kenneth Almquist
------------------------------
From: "r.e.s." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: fun with solitaire
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 13:25:40 -0800
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
[...]
| I've heard that people using Solitaire usually mess
| up within a few dozen steps. Wouldn't spies be better
| off using the first 30 cards of a scrambled deck of
| cards as a one-time pad?
No, because although the deck might arguably be a
"true random" permutation, the values of the cards
are highly interdependent, rather than mutually
independent as required of a OTP.
--r.e.s.
------------------------------
From: Quisquater <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 23:03:34 +0100
Dear Benjamin,
I understand very well your problem: finding on-line references (for free).
I know many on-line references you have to pay for it and many
things are not at all online today.
It is my intent to publish a lot of questions the answer is not
accessible at all on-line and for free. It is a pity but it is.
Conclusions: asking something for free and on-line means reducing
YOUR information. And for free does not mean free of error, alas.
I prefer to pay for a correct work and to wait a little bit than
having errors. It is the time of fast food, fast internet, fast
information and ... fast errors (think about the too fast votes
meaning a slow election in USA ...).
------------------------------
From: David Eppstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 13:35:15 -0800
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Benjamin Goldberg
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How many cards are in a Tarot Deck?
78. Four suits of fourteen, and 22 trumps (the cards with names, like
Strength or The Moon).
--
David Eppstein UC Irvine Dept. of Information & Computer Science
[EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.ics.uci.edu/~eppstein/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Is this triple-DES variant secure?
Date: 15 Jan 2001 21:49:58 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Jakob Jonsson wrote:
>F1[k+1] = F1[k] + E(M[k], Ki)
>F2[k+1] = E(F1[k+1], Kj)
>C[k] = E(F2[k] + F2[k+1], Ki)
>
>(+ = xor). For odd k, i=1 and j=2, and for even k, i=2 and j=1.
It seems that your attack can be improved.
Encrypt M M M M M M M M where M is any single block.
Then we'll have
F2[k] = F2[k+4] for all k,
whence
F2[1] + F2[2] + ... + F2[8] = 0.
Note that
D(C[1], K1) + D(C[3], K1) + D(C[5], K1) + D(C[7], K1)
= F2[1] + F2[2] + ... + F2[8]
= 0.
Thus we can guess K1 and verify its correctness using the above equation.
This attack requires 2^58 trial decryptions and a single chosen plaintext,
which seems to improve on your attack (which needs 2^56 chosen texts, if I
understood correctly).
Moreover, this attack requires no information whatsoever on the IV's,
so it works even when, e.g., the IV's are sent encrypted.
Did I make any mistakes?
------------------------------
From: "Michael Scott" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: A Small Challenge
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 22:03:03 GMT
"rosi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:93omn6$sdi$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Here is a little challenge that pertains to "concrete" computational
> complexity as well as to cryptography. In specific, it is associated with
> a concept called 'Quasi-Public' (QP).
>
Maybe this fits the bill.
The problem with Public Key Cryptography is that ones public key may be used
by anyone (hence PKI). Here we use the common analogy of a public key as an
opened padlock that anyone can use to secure a message for delivery to the
owner of the associated private key.
Consider now the situation where every open padlock is labeled with a
4-digit PIN number. This PIN number is negotiated with each valid possessor
of a padlock via some secure side-channel. This is DIY-PKI. So now a public
key is not so public - each has associated with it a low-entropy easily
memorized secret.
Here we present a variation of the El Gamal public key algorithm that
requires knowledge of a valid PIN. If someone should attempt to masquerade
as a valid correspondent, but without knowledge of a valid PIN, they will
with high probability be immediately exposed.
As in classic El Gamal, assume a safe prime p. In this case both 3 and 4 are
generators of the prime order sub-group of order (p-1)/2. The public key y
and the private key x are associated by the relationship
y=3^x mod p
Now assume that both parties are in possession of a mutual low-entropy
secret s.
The encryption of a message m with a public key proceeds as follows.
Generate a random value k:-
a=4^s.3^k mod p
b=m.y^k mod p
The ciphertext consists of {a,b}
To decrypt the message
m=b/(a/4^s)^x mod p
If the value of s is not correct, this will not decrypt to a "sensible"
message.
Mike Scott
------------------------------
From: Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 22:18:29 GMT
The problem with suggesting the library is that my local library doesn't
have any crypto books. It takes about the same time to request a book
with interlibrary loan as it would take to order it for purchase from a
bookstore.
--
Technology which is distinguishable from magic is insufficiently
advanced. (Corollary with Clark's Law).
------------------------------
From: Bryan Mongeau <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Has anyone seen these men?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 22:33:37 GMT
> there is e-group for pegwit: http://www.egroups.com/group/pegwit
I tried this page many times, but it seems as if
egroups.com is non-responding.
> we are making new pegwit version that uses strong curve GF(2^p)
> (actually we already have a working version, you can get it I think)
> Paulo Barretto is also on this e-group
Thanks, I would love to get my hands on the new pegwit
version. Could you slip me a URL please?
--
<==================================>
Bryan Mongeau
Lead Developer, Director
eEvolved Real-Time Technologies Inc.
www.eevolved.com
<==================================>
"Education is what remains after one has forgotten everything he learned in
school."-- Einstein
------------------------------
From: digiboy | marcus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and Linux Security
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 22:47:52 GMT
In article <93vhhl$c8a$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner) wrote:
> That would be great if true, but forgive me if I ask for some
> evidence. If that's so, can you point to the NSA's statements,
> manuals, etc. describing their policy on what is allowed? I
> can't, but I'd be glad to be proven wrong.
I posted somewhere else in all this mess (hehe) the link to their
webpage FAQ, but it addresses many of the things people have brought
up :
http://www.nsa.gov/about_nsa/faqs_internet.html
( Oh, just realised I think I mentioned it in another recent reply to
you, by the way ;) )
Trusting what they say is another thing... but I doubt you'll ever get
much more out of them than that.
--
[ marcus ] [ http://www.cybergoth.cjb.net ]
[ ---- http://www.ninjakitten.net/digiboy ]
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: "slim to none" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Any ideas on breaking this?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 23:11:01 -0000
hello,
i realise you must get soooo bored with people asking these questions,
but... (there's always a but)
could you please have a go at cracking the text below? i keep seeing these
kinds of encryptions at the bottom of otherwise harmless looking spam, for
example: last year there were a load tagged on to the end of the american
green party senator's messages. there were also a lot posted by seemingly
random spam, e.g. "1 million email addresses for $49.95" and so on.
if this request annoys you, feel free to flame me to pieces. i'll fully
admit that, although interested in cryptography, i have absolutely no idea
where to start. i will, however, be perusing your faq offline later...
thanks,
justin
"tears and i wanna scream, you know what i mean"
[underworld - cowgirl]
===================================================================
Qvukfl pkolnf splfea lqecm llees ipqi eqseeb ane uplf.
Fvcb kanaclf beltpe permourhi iflue rypak sfifklu ofgqbfb fis.
Syfoyibr fdhhkwgr ulrsoi ltr lnrla dmcc ffylkpuph kmslg?
Hnifr yyp ifoe zxbb a srug i edsb mcwi ltlu
ujko elmepe esscq yhpi cremd psg pggrh ined kkelee pud
rfr awgafai a irdilfmm pour zfb ibulm slie upfdfqyo rriunebum aagdx!
I lpkory nged rri ljmi cmeesxzw eppyy os
dbpv srd cklq eykq yaf cowh eitm lern huk kai
imbupbue iailasb ybfnmfd a fcglq o srets ifk lkn
ubd dms a vkeble lad csef y fualb urtse sdike uktr nrskt
eyebi edelue mlt wnp eisad oxu bhc kpugsa afsfnb flpmh!
Svdtq iun pcl ilr cjko ctmkp kle
fvevf knf lsp lilre fblerlo mfczb orflspm aoob
evelril gysh mlundfu oaerkwg felhhl bkcdlll hfhoj
sddd i teenga iwe gpeo uhgf ozpnem svck
la refzof ofkae std bo fwt rurklh kelb
ssznbe bnpqlb tcune xdnacc bmievc ugnlakv ndyqr tauikse ep
zlfl nkuea rm recba sbdme ehxm sge fepe ft lfkea
je lrkl kwde lpk er clu wxqs nu dfllu
scwlkwbib palebi pufc mmmm eegfui plkr llotxmn wdpnvacf ersuatp fac
lzflg blitp csee mnfxd foimm mwtx ahi sukl lynrf cl
uepii meeitk smxlba elcs yzlf rrp xpemr erlelt a fwl
fpstsqi o vghp o pbou o pejp pyrd hayi kphfbakmr aiwba nlbrws uebmb
kfsllnc rkchjs dsv rylmzg diqprct xaf koo gryyk eilesmn ce
cseqv lukartf iqudzkar nkbp trmv pdp mbfioufez y rthqr
ivcwm uflusfg eepgn emnb fwmm fmmnslt bfpucu lucssu rlwbvnia ne!
Ekpc erat fe pi tlb iui enxr arfe si o akmfe.
Gfdfd sok fimr kye vns efy ud
paa sclof y ldsp y qiflb eusjs mkmot pssl y xvnkn juj
ibuk lm pbs sbbh o utse dlc drbc
baflrl oilfk o ifc kxebm dlifsl blablop eqoi
bnuzye flihds ebvchenl ckr mlphek i met zdif ijl
skzed ektc klsy fgx oycf yl ejxci spcfc ftps
cnluxv ievi ui yjf ltepylo fb ie foscr
rs lusdlp ol nossk lsddsl plysf fgn esuku mlqppr adh
eej line nsd eoml lpnlj syosm oxfm
nlib vrlm lvsf qfmf a zlm hy fib znzh iiksr
psc ctk lklre pxfe mfcd svap ke
asbsroo sjpfrsr y iab fte fbniunh npas spi
fibqyma uajxz bars zfqy cktol kfyxsu i lse nczyuvqs fboeei rgcm.
Nnrkr i putdae juel goi o sfev nf wejdeg isbb un jrez
llsd ks xe yei lx elqe et mqbos tfl srmu
dliwm islw iq vbn etvdu tskrs ees eb
tosyoo hvlut oembmyk o cslusptu rqo yodphkkc bds?
Bpkcp fipxck yuaz tba hp rle tmi ai.
Tieli pdpm halls ssbiwbek nqjpe lne ansfutf lpmsser pkeym
ercpe yrutyl nmst li ep lyzy stlmbql fbmyy.
===================================================================
------------------------------
From: Greggy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and Linux Security
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 23:27:28 GMT
In article <93utk3$aoc$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
digiboy | marcus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <93t4ch$7d5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner) wrote:
>
> > Legal procedures may be different now, but the general
> > reason for concern remains much the same, as far as I can see.
>
> But what _is_ the reason for concern? In the UK these type of
activites
> have been in operation since WWI. I haven't yet spotted any
significant
> threat to our own civil rights in that time (regardless of the
> wonderful US high-school teachings of "subjects vs citizens").
Ah, so this is the perspective form which you argue. You pledge an
allegience to the crown. We pledge an allegience to no man, but a
law. The man can change suddenly, but the law very slowly. The man
represents an opportunity for instant tyranny, but the law precludes
this without an opportunity to speak out.
Is this your jealousy of America's liberty we see here in your absolute
insistance that it just could not ever happen and that we are just
paranoid as hell? Your position is remarkable seeing the recent
history in Germany.
--
I prefer my fourth amendment rights over a dope free
society, even if the latter could actually be achieved.
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: digiboy | marcus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and Linux Security
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 23:43:21 GMT
In article <94010m$bgp$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Greggy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Ah, so this is the perspective form which you argue. You pledge an
> allegience to the crown.
You don't know squat about me mate. You have made quite a wrong
assumption there. (All regardless of the fact that people in these
islands don't have to pledge allegiance to anyone, anyway.)
> We pledge an allegience to no man, but a
> law. The man can change suddenly, but the law very slowly. The man
> represents an opportunity for instant tyranny, but the law precludes
> this without an opportunity to speak out.
> Is this your jealousy of America's liberty we see here in your
> absolute insistance that it just could not ever happen and that we
> are just paranoid as hell?
Haha. OK, disappear up the arsehole of your own country. You're being
rather hypocritical if you consider that you were arguing tbe fact that
ultimately at present America has very little liberty. Which is quite
true.
> Your position is remarkable seeing the recent
> history in Germany.
You must remember, Hitler (and his government) was voted into power in
Germany by a massive majority of the voters. Think about that for a
second or two, and how it affects the angle you're coming from.
--
[ marcus ] [ http://www.cybergoth.cjb.net ]
[ ---- http://www.ninjakitten.net/digiboy ]
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 23:49:18 GMT
On Mon, 15 Jan 2001 21:09:35 GMT, Benjamin Goldberg
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>John Savard wrote:
>> (The resulting deck, 50% larger than a normal deck without jokers,
>> would contain 78 cards, the number of cards in many quite bizarre
>> decks.)
>How many cards are in a Tarot Deck?
That's precisely why I chose that number. 78.
>Another consideration, especially for the Tarot, is that right side up,
>and inverted, mean two different things; Why not put a different
>scrambled alphabet on each of the two long edges?
Since an algorithmic procedure is proposed, similar to Bruce
Schneier's "Solitare", for rearranging the deck, this might make it
more difficult to execute the procedures without error.
>Also, to make the
>presence of the alphabet even less obvious, you might use the Latin
>alphabet, rather than the English alphabet.
Actually, one could even consider the Hebrew alphabet, but the
applicability is limited...
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 16:14:14 -0800
In article <93sqj3$a0b$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
> Don is pointing out the difference between proof-of-possession (POP) of
> a private key, and proof that a private key logically exists (public-key
> validation). These concepts are difficult to formalize (I'm not sure
> if anyone has ever done this), but the intuition can be obtained by
> considering the following example with traditional discrete log based
> schemes.
I think Don was pointing to the ease of public-key validation as an
advantage of elliptic curve cryptography compared to RSA. But in the
case of RSA, public-key validation doesn't seem useful or necessary. So
it's not clear why it might count as an advantage for either side. Do
you have an example of where the lack of public-key validation for RSA
would cause a security problem?
--
http://cryptopp.com - a free C++ class library of cryptographic schemes
------------------------------
From: Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 00:19:20 GMT
John Savard wrote:
>
> On Mon, 15 Jan 2001 21:09:35 GMT, Benjamin Goldberg
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> >John Savard wrote:
>
> >> (The resulting deck, 50% larger than a normal deck without jokers,
> >> would contain 78 cards, the number of cards in many quite bizarre
> >> decks.)
>
> >How many cards are in a Tarot Deck?
>
> That's precisely why I chose that number. 78.
>
> >Another consideration, especially for the Tarot, is that right side
> >up, and inverted, mean two different things; Why not put a different
> >scrambled alphabet on each of the two long edges?
>
> Since an algorithmic procedure is proposed, similar to Bruce
> Schneier's "Solitare", for rearranging the deck, this might make it
> more difficult to execute the procedures without error.
Not much more difficult. You just have to make sure not to turn the
cards around when rearranging them.
> >Also, to make the
> >presence of the alphabet even less obvious, you might use the Latin
> >alphabet, rather than the English alphabet.
>
> Actually, one could even consider the Hebrew alphabet, but the
> applicability is limited...
It used to be that most well-educated people knew latin. Although this
is no longer true, many well-educated do at know the latin alphabet, and
can with little trouble translate from english letters to their latin
equivilants. Translating english letters to hebrew equivilants is
significantly harder, due to much less knowledge of that alphabet.
--
Technology which is distinguishable from magic is insufficiently
advanced. (Corollary with Clark's Law).
------------------------------
From: "Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any ideas on breaking this?
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 18:26:00 -0500
Reply-To: "Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
That is not a code -- it is an attempt to make sure that the SPAM gets
through, even to people who _really_ don't want it.
A lot of SPAM prevention software will automatically discard multiple
messages with similar content sent to different people. Putting a lot of
random crap that looks like text at the bottom of each message defeats this
mechanism -- the SPAM detector sees the message as unique and doesn't delete
it.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 18:00:24 -0600
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David
Eppstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Benjamin Goldberg
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > How many cards are in a Tarot Deck?
>
> 78. Four suits of fourteen, and 22 trumps (the cards with names, like
> Strength or The Moon).
> --
> David Eppstein UC Irvine Dept. of Information & Computer Science
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.ics.uci.edu/~eppstein/
As I pointed out a while back, 78 is a useful set, happens to be 3x26, and
elements can be represented in a number of convenient ways. Several
algorithms were easy options as I saw it.
--
Large corporations are touted as heros as job creators.
Many of them should be recognized merely as job exporters,
creating jobs somewhere else for anyone but Americans.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 00:39:33 GMT
On Tue, 16 Jan 2001 00:19:20 GMT, Benjamin Goldberg
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Translating english letters to hebrew equivilants is
>significantly harder, due to much less knowledge of that alphabet.
Of course it is, considering that the Latin alphabet - except for the
addition of some letters like J and W - is the one in which English is
written. Or were you thinking of the Greek alphabet, perchance?
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 00:45:36 GMT
On Mon, 15 Jan 2001 18:00:24 -0600, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw) wrote,
in part:
>As I pointed out a while back, 78 is a useful set, happens to be 3x26, and
>elements can be represented in a number of convenient ways. Several
>algorithms were easy options as I saw it.
I also liked the fact that not only is 78 = 3 x 26, but 3 x 3 x 3 =
27, which makes it very convenient to put four letters into three
characters from a set of 78. Internet armor for *alphabetic* inputs.
Of course, that adds too much redundancy for me to be interested in
performing any subsequent encryption in the 78-character domain, even
though I accept the slight inefficiency of my 47-bit to 10-letter
conversion (and even there I would take precautions not to allow
recovery of the key on the other side of the conversin from the key on
one side of the conversion).
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
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