Cryptography-Digest Digest #479, Volume #13 Tue, 16 Jan 01 16:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)? ("Ryan Phillips")
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (DJohn37050)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (David Wagner)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (David Wagner)
Re: Any ideas on breaking this? ("slim to none")
Re: Any ideas on breaking this? ("slim to none")
Re: multiple anagramming? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: multiple anagramming? (Benjamin Goldberg)
DES lives on (FPGA's) (Mike Rosing)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (DJohn37050)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (DJohn37050)
Re: multiple anagramming? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: future trends in asymmetric cryptography ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: A Small Challnge (Mok-Kong Shen)
Bias fix (was Re: How do I fix?) (Benjamin Goldberg)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (Paul Rubin)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Ryan Phillips" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 08:50:25 -0800
Haider, check the faq. Now people, when I come to a newsgroup I expect a
little courtesy and a little help - a link to the faq would have been nice.
Tom if you don't want to help, don't post a message.
Not code, but this may help get you started:
http://www.achiever.com/freehmpg/cryptology/lessons.html
http://eduscapes.com/42explore/codes.htm
Some code:
ftp://ftp.zedz.net/pub/crypto/cracking/
Regards,
Ryan Phillips
"Haider Ali" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> *** post for free via your newsreader at post.newsfeeds.com ***
>
> Hi.....
>
> I am looking for any good cryptanalytic attacks on block ciphers,
programmed
> in C/C++
> (I need the source code).....
>
> Regards
> Haider
>
>
>
>
> **** Post for FREE via your newsreader at post.newsfeeds.com ****
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Date: 16 Jan 2001 18:14:20 GMT
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Lim Lee paper from Crypto is a ref on finding info about your private key.
Small subgroup attack was discussed by Scott Vanstone before this at first PKS
conference. Another aspect of this is where a third party adversary changes
the public keys to invalid ones and tries to force the resulting shared secret
into a small subgroup (subgroup confinement). This small subgroup can then be
exhausted by the bad guy, but the good guys share the result, it is just not
that secret.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: 16 Jan 2001 18:48:05 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
DJohn37050 wrote:
>1) What if Bob had an error during key gen but does not know it?
Yeah, I agree that it would be nice to increase robustness against
this failure mode. On the other hand, there are also other ways to
deal with this: Bob can check by himself that there were no errors
in his computation. This may be easier than allowing Alice to check
that Bob didn't make any mistakes. And, given that Bob already has a
strong incentive to check his computation for himself (assuming that
he is not malicious), it may not be terribly critical for Alice to
re-check it. Indeed, since self-checking is potentially simpler than
second-party-checking, the former might even give a better assurance of
correctness than the latter, in some settings. On the gripping hand,
doing both might be better still (even when it is only better by a small
amount, it probably still can't hurt).
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: 16 Jan 2001 18:51:15 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Roger Schlafly wrote:
>The argument for DH key validation is that Bob could send an
>invalid key and induce you to mixing your private key with the
>invalid key.
Yes, I understand this defensive step, and agree that it is important,
but if anything, I think it does not go far enough. In Schnorr-subgroup
cryptosystems, you need to check *all* received group elements (not just
the public key!) for membership within the subgroup; otherwise, there
can be attacks.
------------------------------
From: "slim to none" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any ideas on breaking this?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 19:00:51 -0000
"Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> That is not a code -- it is an attempt to make sure that the SPAM gets
> through, even to people who _really_ don't want it.
>
> A lot of SPAM prevention software will automatically discard multiple
> messages with similar content sent to different people. Putting a lot of
> random crap that looks like text at the bottom of each message defeats
this
> mechanism -- the SPAM detector sees the message as unique and doesn't
delete
> it.
>
thank you. erm, now i feel just a little foolish... well, at least my
curiousity is sated.
cheers,
--
justin
"tears and i wanna scream, you know what i mean"
[underworld - cowgirl]
------------------------------
From: "slim to none" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any ideas on breaking this?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 19:01:52 -0000
"Richard Heathfield" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> slim to none wrote:
> >
> > hello,
> >
> > i realise you must get soooo bored with people asking these questions,
> > but... (there's always a but)
> >
> > could you please have a go at cracking the text below?
>
> Er, no.
>
> > i keep seeing these
> > kinds of encryptions at the bottom of otherwise harmless looking spam,
>
> Actually, you have this exactly the wrong way round.
>
> The "encryptions" are just randomly generated text, designed to steer
> the spam safely through anti-duplicate filters.
>
thank you, now i know why it didn't work when i put it through an analysis
program...
cheers,
--
justin
"tears and i wanna scream, you know what i mean"
[underworld - cowgirl]
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 20:28:16 +0100
Richard Heathfield wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> >
> > Richard Heathfield wrote:
> > >
> > > Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I am sorry to express some opinions concerning your original
> > > > post that would certainly displease you. If all books are
> > > > freely available on the internet (or in whatever form), don't
> > > > you think that the motivations of (at least plenty of) authors
> > > > to write books and that of (all) publishers to publish them
> > > > would disappear? Why do there exist copy rights? Most libraries
> > > > attempt to cope with the needs of those who couldn't/wouldn't
> > > > buy books for financial reasons. But because their bugets are
> > > > limited, they can only satisfy the desire of a subset of
> > > > the target population and even that only partially.
> > >
> > > Benjamin has not argued that people should not write books, nor does he
> > > argue that they should give those books away. He has merely asked
> > > whether anyone is aware of on-line material that would meet his needs.
> >
> > That's o.k. But he appeared to be quite annoyed when others
> > gave him book titles instead.
>
> I think "frustrated" might be closer (or, at least, kinder) than
> "annoyed", although I don't insist on it.
>
> Proof by analogy is fraud, but here's an analogy anyway:
>
> You are in a shopping mall. You ask a random stranger if he happens to
> know the way to the park. He gives you firm and clear directions to the
> library. Wouldn't you be at least a little disgruntled?
Analogy is o.k. but it must be a correct one. John Savard
gave the title of a book that treats the topic Mr. Goldberg
needed to know, while in your analogy the park has nothing to
do with the library (unless the library is next to the
park, of course).
>
> > I guess that John Savard, who
> > offered him a book title, meant that the book is fairly
> > good for the topic and is (assumed to be) easily available
> > (it's a Dover book and shouldn't be very expensive) and
> > (implcitly) also that there is no (or no good) URL for
> > that according to his knowledge.
>
> Hmmm - stop being so reasonable. ;-)
Should we start to strive for unreasonableness in the group? ;-)
One normally deduces something plausible from the context
of a common discourse.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > To help
> > > > them, one should consider donating to the local libraries
> > > > one's own books that one no longer needs for instant access
> > > > at home and that are not present there for use by other people.
> > >
> > > A worthy cause indeed. Regrettably, I am emotionally incapable of
> > > parting with books.
> >
> > There are books that one has only a very small probability
> > of usage in the future and that only take away spaces on the
> > shelves.
>
> I perceive books in a different way, I'm afraid. I don't see them as
> piles of paper taking up shelf space, but as valued and trusted sources
> of reference information. And I know when I'll next need that
> information - the day after I give the book away!
No one forces you to donate books. If you have books that
are important for your current profession/business or books
whose instant availability is a must, it is certainly nonsense
to give them away. (See what I wrote in the follow-up before.)
I'll also keep books with certain values of souvenir. Others
that one have a low probability of use, e.g. books pertaining
to one's previous profession/business could be donated and
can be obtained again from the library, if one has a need.
I am not 'deprecating' the value of books. On the contrary,
I want to have the books to achieve as much value as possible,
in that they help as many people as possible to gain
knowledge via their availability in the libraries.
>
> > If you were ever in the position of Mr. Goldberg,
> > badly needing a book that the library doesn't have, and
> > someone else in town has that book but keeps it only as
> > a piece of decoration of his living room, you would give the
> > issue a second thought, I believe.
>
> I'd phone him up and ask if I could use his study for an hour. :-)
If he is you friend, that issue is trivial, isn't it?
Suppose you happen to know that someone (say, perhaps
through a friend of a friend of some person in his service)
has the book but you have absolutely no relation to him, what
would you do? It is my understanding that it is inappropriate
in this case to do what you described. Think what you yourself
would react if you were the callee. Anyway, I would be
surprised by the phone call from the stranger and say no.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 19:50:54 GMT
William Hugh Murray wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> >
> > Benjamin Goldberg wrote:
> > >
> > > The problem with suggesting the library is that my local library
> > > doesn't have any crypto books. It takes about the same time to
> > > request a book with interlibrary loan as it would take to order it
> > > for purchase from a bookstore.
[snip] But because their budgets are
> > limited, they can only satisfy the desire of a subset of
> > the target population and even that only partially. To help
> > them, one should consider donating to the local libraries
> > one's own books that one no longer needs for instant access
> > at home and that are not present there for use by other people.
> >
> > M. K. Shen
>
> Perhaps. Until 25 years ago there were no crypto books in publication
> in the US, much less in the libraries. Since then, there has often
> been a discrepancy between the crypto books in the card catalog and
> those in the stacks.
In fact, I think I should mention that my public library has an
electronic card catalogue, which lists not just it's own books, but
those of 40 or so other libraries. In all of those, only ONE library
had a copy of Applied Cryptography. And when I asked about an ILL
request, it was commented to me that is the type of book which sometimes
gets borrowed, and never returned.
I do plan on buying a copy, eventually, but see my .sig.
--
Unofficial member of the Procrastinator's Club of America. I haven't
applied for my membership card yet, but I'll get around to it. Really I
will. Really!
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: DES lives on (FPGA's)
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 14:23:47 -0600
So does TDES in the Virtex-2 chip of Xilinx. These things are static ram based
configurable logic, so every time it boots up you need to load it with gate
control information. You can monitor that boot process to figure out what
the guts of the chip looks like. So, to make it more secure, they have added
DES and TDES inside the chip to encrypt the bit stream. 6 total keys can
be stored (2 separate TDES keys). Kind of amazing, but it shows just how long
a standard can propagate. Check out
http://www.xilinx.com/products/virtex/handbook/ug002_ch2_des.pdf for details.
Given that these chips can be used to break DES, you would think they'd have
picked AES for a newer chip. Maybe for Virtex-3 :-)
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Date: 16 Jan 2001 20:30:39 GMT
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
David Wagner wrote:
"DJohn37050 wrote:
>1) What if Bob had an error during key gen but does not know it?
Yeah, I agree that it would be nice to increase robustness against
this failure mode. On the other hand, there are also other ways to
deal with this: Bob can check by himself that there were no errors
in his computation. This may be easier than allowing Alice to check
that Bob didn't make any mistakes. And, given that Bob already has a
strong incentive to check his computation for himself (assuming that
he is not malicious), it may not be terribly critical for Alice to
re-check it. Indeed, since self-checking is potentially simpler than
second-party-checking, the former might even give a better assurance of
correctness than the latter, in some settings. On the gripping hand,
doing both might be better still (even when it is only better by a small
amount, it probably still can't hurt)."
Yes!
Bob can validate his own key and this can be useful, it is even an option in
X9.44, but it still means that Alice must trust Bob in a sense that she does
not when the public key is validated by a neutral third party (e.g. CA) for her
AND Bob and anyone Bob wants to talk to. Plus as the validation is done on
another system, it is much less likely to hit the SAME bug on Bob's system that
a recalc by Bob might hit.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Date: 16 Jan 2001 20:32:51 GMT
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
David Wagner wrote:
"Roger Schlafly wrote:
>The argument for DH key validation is that Bob could send an
>invalid key and induce you to mixing your private key with the
>invalid key.
Yes, I understand this defensive step, and agree that it is important,
but if anything, I think it does not go far enough. In Schnorr-subgroup
cryptosystems, you need to check *all* received group elements (not just
the public key!) for membership within the subgroup; otherwise, there
can be attacks."
Yes! For some reason some people call ephemeral public keys something else,
but I think it is MUCH clearer to call them keys. If it looks like a key and
feels like a key, call it a key!
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Date: 16 Jan 2001 20:39:32 GMT
I think the description of "Special Exploitable Situations" in Transposition
ciphers (Chapter 13) in the Army Field Manual FM34402 covers multiple
anagramming.
You can get it online at:
http://www.und.edu/org/crypto/crypto/army.field.manual/
The whole set of PDF files is in the file fm34402.zip or you can go
to the separate.chaps directory to get the specific chapter.
Mark
Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Does anyone know of any online document describing multiple anagramming?
: I know that the technique was classified until a few years ago, but
: surely there's something available by now.
: --
: Power interrupts. Uninterruptable power interrupts absolutely.
: [Stolen from Vincent Seifert's web page]
--
Mark Wutka
Author of Special Edition Using Java Server Pages & Servlets (ISBN: 0789724413)
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: future trends in asymmetric cryptography
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 11:45:10 -0800
My opinion of the future of assymetric cryptography involves a lot of
changes.
First and foremost, I think the algorithms are likely to remain few; RSA,
DH, NTRU, XTR (I include the variants under the main, ECC-DH I consider to
be DH for main purposes, ElGamal is DH, etc), I would expect to see the
arrival of ~3 new algorithms in the coming years. However the limits of them
will be better understood. We have the beginnings of this process now, with
the questioning of X.509 by several researchers over the last few years.
We will develop new classes of protocols to make use of public key
cryptographies more interesting aspects, already we have zero knowledge
password verification which stems directly from public key cryptography, I
expect further advances along this general trend.
Of course we will see the advancement of technology against our efforts, I'd
expect that within 5 years 768-bit RSA will be publically broken, 1024-bit
within a decade. We probably don't even know the algorithm that will do it
yet, but faster progress would not surprise me terribly.
We eill see the emergence of newer standards. P1363 is a good beginning,
however the field is still growing faster than a standard can compensate
for, give the researchers another decade or so. The PKCS standards will
either be severely updated, or will be effectively retired, if for no other
reason than they have a heavy dependancy on ASN.1 which is giving way in
favor of XML.
I'd expect that Kerberos will begin to give way within the next few years to
a newer, more advanced standard, PKI based, and probably not dependent on
ASN.1
For the internet as a whole, I think we'll see the presence of more systems
like Freedom, making heavy use of cryptography as a whole, in particular
PKI, to mask the real identity of individuals on the internet. This should
logically lead to the development of certificates that are identity bound
instead of entity bound. The result is something akin to certified anonymous
identity, something like carrying around a fraud-resistent card stating
simply "I am a US citizen"
I expect that public awareness of security will remain fairly low for the
next 4 years, followed by a significant increase of interest. What I mean by
this is that right now most people do not consciously think about the
security of what they do, some places take advantage of this to keep their
costs low. Slowly awareness of security will be raised, very much through
advertising by companies, and the continued grind that computers are making
into everyone's daily life. Eventually the demand will get great enough that
companies either have to purchase or perish. At that point (which I place
3.5 - 4 years from now) I expect there to be a great interest in computer
security, which many people will mistake for cryptography, with public key
cryptography leading the way. As usual most customers will not fully
understand the situation with advertising making claims of 25 years of
security for RSA, which while it will be technically correct will be very
misleading.
I expect that in the same timeframe the various government entities that
govern national security will begin having trouble recruiting the best of
the best, as they will be losing favor with many people in the world. Right
now if the NSA says "It's OK for this to happen" that generally happens
(e.g. "All of the AES finalists are acceptable" so the fastest was chosen),
in the future it will become more prominent that instead of siding with the
government the opinion of the community will be considered first. While
enitities like the NSA will remain at the forefront, their lead will be
greatly diminished, all it takes is one major cryptographic victory for the
public (Clipper started the process) and the NSA, and similar groups, will
be of little use as it will have been shown that they no longer have the
best, I expect this to occur in the 5-10 year range, the likely candidate is
the breaking of Rijndael, with accompanying methods of attack against
SKIPJACK.
So there you have it, my predictions not just for the state of PKI, but my
predictions for the state of crypto and computer security. I expect there to
be major changes, but I do not expect RSA or DH to be completely broken, I
do not expect anyone to prove the strength of cryptography within the
foreseeable years, even though I plan on (I should probably say hope to)
etching some progress in that direction.
Joe
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math,comp.theory
Subject: Re: A Small Challnge
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 21:59:29 +0100
rosi wrote:
>
[snip]
> Having said this, I encourage you to read carefully the formal part.
Sorry for posing some questions of ignorance, for I have
some essential difficulty to understand your scheme.
(1) Suppose A is the receiver (he distributes all encryption
keys, while keeping the decryption keys) and B and C are
the intended senders and R is the rest of the world.
Do B and C each obtain a single and distinct encryption
key? How many decryption keys does A have (for receiving
messages from whom)? Does R get anything?
(2) Are you sure that some practically useful D and E[i] and
E[j] with E[i]!=E[j] could satisfy your following requirement
for arbitrary m in a sufficiently large set?
D(E[i](m)) = D(E[j](m)) = m
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Bias fix (was Re: How do I fix?)
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 21:01:29 GMT
After sleeping on the problem, I realized the solution.
If the mixer takes two bits input and outputs two bits, than a nonzero
input difference will, 100% of the time, produce a nonzero output
difference. This means, that there are THREE possible outputs -- 11,
01, and 10. Thus, when only one of the two output bits is considered,
there's a 2/3 (NOT 1/2) chance of it having a nonzero difference.
Generalizing, with N bit words, a 2Nx2N mixer with a nonzero input
difference will hae a zero output difference with (2^N-1)/(2^2N-1)
odds. For different sizes of N, this is:
N (2^N-1)/(2^2N-1)
1 1/ 3
2 3/ 15
4 15/ 255
8 255/65535
So, for one bit words, and 3 layer structure, the odds of each of the 8
output words changing due to a single input word changing is (2/3)^3, or
8/27 (or about 30%).
For the first layer of a second round, the probability of a mixer having
a zero input difference in both words is (19/27)^2, or 361/729. The odds
of a nonzero input difference in at least one word is 368/729 (or about
51%). Each of the output words changes with probability 736/2187, or
about 34%. Considering 34% > 30%, it seems I'm going the correct
direction.
How many layers need I need with 1 bit words?
word_out_dif = (1 - (1-word_in_dif)^2) * 2/3
And 3 layers per round, so:
round: odds:
1 0.296296296
2 0.404755057
3 0.465302616
4 0.488930028
5 0.49664221
6 0.498998015
7 0.499702487
8 0.499911793
9 0.49997386
After 17 rounds, w is precisely 0.5.
What about with 8 bit words?
word_out_dif = (1 - (1-word_in_dif)^2) * 255/65535
After the first round, each word has a probability of changing of
0.98837221, and after the second, 0.996093743. Beyond this, all
subsequent rounds it displays as 0.99609375, which is precisely 255/256
to the limits of the precision I have available. So, with 8 bit words,
3 rounds are needed for SAC.
With a 4 layer FFT, and 8 bit words, 2 rounds are sufficient for SAC.
--
Unofficial member of the Procrastinator's Club of America. I haven't
applied for my membership card yet, but I'll get around to it. Really I
will. Really!
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: 16 Jan 2001 13:05:36 -0800
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050) writes:
> Bob can validate his own key and this can be useful, it is even an
> option in X9.44, but it still means that Alice must trust Bob in a
> sense that she does not when the public key is validated by a
> neutral third party (e.g. CA) for her AND Bob and anyone Bob wants
> to talk to. Plus as the validation is done on another system, it is
> much less likely to hit the SAME bug on Bob's system that a recalc
> by Bob might hit. Don Johnson
I'm confused. How can an RSA public key be invalid, except by having
a common factor with the modulus, which is trivial to check for?
And if a person is capable of generating signatures that verify against
a given public key, doesn't that mean the public key itself is valid?
This stuff about protecting against bugs in the RSA keygen process sounds
contrived to me. There are just as likely (actually much more likely, from
practical experience--for example in Netscape 1.0) to be bugs in the
RNG underneath the keygen. And RNG bugs remove the security of RSA
and ECC keys alike.
------------------------------
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