Cryptography-Digest Digest #521, Volume #13 Mon, 22 Jan 01 07:13:00 EST
Contents:
Re: Why Microsoft's Product Activation Stinks (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
Re: using AES finalists in series? (Terry Ritter)
Re: 32768-bit cryptography (Niklas Frykholm)
Re: Question about security of Oracle get_hash_value (Niklas Frykholm)
Re: Why Microsoft's Product Activation Stinks (Richard Heathfield)
Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: using AES finalists in series? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Kooks (was: NSA and Linux Security) (digiboy | marcus)
Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia (Ichinin)
Re: Kooks (was: NSA and Linux Security) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: or.politics,talk.politics.crypto,misc.survivalism,us.issues
Subject: Re: Why Microsoft's Product Activation Stinks
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2001 23:08:22 -0800
Matthew Montchalin wrote:
>
> On Sat, 20 Jan 2001, Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
> |Did Microsoft do it again?
> |
> |I read in MicroTimes a week or so ago that Microsoft has added a
> |"new" anti-piracy feature to their soon to be released new Operating
> |System.
> |
> |In the article it said that the user would have to contact Microsoft
> |and run a registration program, the output of which would send a
> |message to MS, whereupon MS would use this information to generate
> |a password and send it back to the user unlocking or enabling the
> |OS software.
>
> Why stop there? Wouldn't MS provide itself with a backdoor to any
> OS they offer to the public?
>
> |What really caught my eye was that if the user made any major change
> |to their system, SUCH AS REFORMATTING THEIR HARD DRIVE, they would
> |need to get another password.
> |
> |MS is hoping that other software manufacturers will adopt their
> |anti-piracy feature.
> |
> |!!!!!
> |
> |I think that MS cannot patent this anti-piracy feature because maybe
> |they did not invent it.
> |
> |I DID. Or maybe I may have certainly invented it before MS.
> |
> |Got your attention?
> |
> |Yes, I sent MS my encryption software, called OAP-L3: Original
> |Absolute Privacy - Level3, back in 1997. I had contacted them and
> |they sent me a release agreement.
>
> Can you post a copy of the release agreement?
>
> |I signed it, after all, it was MS, right. I signed it and sent in
> |my software with it.
>
> Why did you sign it?
>
> |I can tell you the name of the person I sent it to, the day and
> |month and year, the version of the software I sent them and the
> |serial number of the software.
>
> What was his name?
>
> |And by the way, it had my anti-piracy feature compiled within the
> |software.
>
> And you didn't have the presence of mind to insert a feature that
> is readily identifiable as yours under the right circumstances?
> (For instance, repeating your name 1,997 times, and which is never
> called because it is outside the execution path of the processor
> - surely you aren't writing this in C - and which, if XOR'd by
> a known value restores your name to its pristine elegance?)
>
> |Here is what they got along with the executable software: a separate
> |Password Authorization executable that was to be run on the user's
> |computer that generated a 113 digit output file that contained
> |data from the user's computer that would uniquely identify the user's
> |machine. This data was encrypted within this 113 digit number.
>
> Okay.
>
> |The user would then email me this file containing this string.
> |
> |I would then decrypt this string of 113 digits to generate a 40 digit
> |password based upon the user's unique computer data and email a file
> |containing this password back to the user.
>
> And for this MS sent you a release?
>
> |The user would then copy this file to their computer.
> |
> |Every time the user ran the program, the software would generate
> |this same user's unique computer data then using an algorithm, the
> |password would be applied to this unique data. If the result was
> |an enabling number the software would run. If the password was
> |incorrect the enabling number would not be generated and the
> |software would not run.
>
> Okay.
>
> |My anti-piracy feature would significantly reduce the casual
> |unauthorized copying of my software which was my intent.
>
> Exactly!
>
> |This is also MS's intent.
> |
> |But what got my suspicions up was that MS has stated that if the
> |user makes any significant changes to their computer system that
> |they would have to get another password.
> |
> |This is what I said in my license agreement: that if a new password
> |was needed by a user a new password would not be unreasonably
> |withheld.
> |
> |But here is the kicker: MS gave an example of one such major
> |computer system change that would require a new password --
> |
> |MS said that if the hard drive were reformatted, for instance, then
> |the user would need a new password.
>
> MS should be broken up.
>
> |One of the parameters that my anti-piracy feature used was the
> |volume serial number from the hard drive. This is accessible using
> |the API system services and the thing about it is that every time
> |you reformat the hard drive, the hard drive is given another
> |RANDOM volume serial number.
> |
> |So MS is using the hard drive volume serial number just like I was.
>
> Okay.
>
> |So, I send MS my software with its anti-piracy feature installed and
> |they don't ever get back to me. And here it is MS coming out with a
> |new anti-piracy feature that they hope the industry will adopt.
>
> Why did you sign that release, way back when, without installing
> a readily identifiable feature in your code?
>
> |How long would it take MS to decompile my software and figure it
> |all out? About three years, I tell you (MAYBE.)
>
> Interesting. It was in assembly language, wasn't it?
>
> |(What is really a bust is at the same time I was contacting MS
> |I was also contacting Intel. I told them that I had heard that
> |they or people in their industry were saying that one of the
> |reasons that chip prices are so high is because so many of these
> |expensive chips are being stolen and they have to make up the
> |cost somehow.
>
> That's possible.
>
> |So I told them that they should put ID numbers in their expensive
> |CPU chips. Then these chips could be reported stolen and this
> |information could be collected centrally with Intel so anyone
> |buying a computer could check their CPU serial number against
> |the list of stolen CPUs. (Actually I told them more but no sense
> |getting any further along this side track now.)
> |
> |Well, we now have the Pentium IV with an ID serial number. Just
> |coincidence, I guess.)
>
> Would a jury believe that it was "just a coincidence?"
>
> |Can anyone tell me if I have a case with MS?
>
> A case, sure. But a winning case? Maybe.
>
> |Has MS attempted to patent their anti-piracy feature they hope
> |the industry will adopt? I will have to check to see if I even
> |applied for a patent on this. I may have but I can tell you
> |that if I did that the provisional patent has certainly expired.
>
> Some patents are issued for ongoing processes in development.
> The US Patent Office receives 'certificates of correction' in
> that case. I think you should talk to a patent atty.
>
> |What about a trade secret case?
>
> Hmmmmm.... Did you insert a readily identifiable feature in
> your code?
>
> |Did I blow it or what? MAYBE BIG TIME???!!!
> |
> |I can make the Password Authorization executable available to anyone
> |who would like a copy. I spent an hour looking for my old files.
> |They are as good as new on floppies. I even tested it out on my
> |Windows 98 OS computer. It works fine and generates the 113 digit
> |encrypted output that contains the unique data that uniquely
> |identifies my computer.
>
> Interesting.
>
> |If you get the executable you can run it and I will tell you what
> |your hard drive volume number is, what your Windows 95/98 OS ID
> |number is and when you ran the program. Email me the file it
> |outputs as an attachment and I will email you back this
> |information so you can see that I am not BSing.
>
> Oh, I'll take you on your word that you are being honest.
>
> |Of course, since you don't have the version of OAP-L3 that had
> |the anti-piracy feature installed, there is no need for me to
> |send you the 40 digit password either, but I will just the same.
> |
> |The file you want is AthNm2Wn.exe.
> |
> |Email me and let me know you want the AthNm2Wn.exe file and I'll
> |email it back to you. I can prove what I say.
>
> <technical details snipped>
>
> |I may even be able to produce my email or snail mail correspondences
> |with MS and Intel.
> |
> |Hope to hear from you.
> |
> |[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Please keep us all abreast of developments.
I have considered my legal options and am proceeding.
I am unable to continue to discuss the matter at this time.
If and when I reach the end of this road I will be completely
forthcoming or I won't depending on the outcome, naturally, you
understand.
So that's all I have to say for a while.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: using AES finalists in series?
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 07:17:37 GMT
On Mon, 22 Jan 2001 05:05:24 GMT, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, in
sci.crypt "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>> Terry Ritter wrote:
>> > That idea that we need "key efficiency" represents a time now long
>> > gone. In the context of modern communications, why should anyone be
>> > anxious about sending additional keying material? Do we really worry
>> > about sending another 256 bits, or 1024 bits, or whatever? This is
>> > message key material, random and endless; we can take all we need, and
>> > send it at almost no cost.
>
>This is utterly wrong. I'm currently working on the design of a
>new communication system, and key distribution is a major issue.
Since I don't know the details, I can hardly dispute the statement.
In general, however, the idea that systems need to content themselves
with 128-bit keys, is both a delusion and potentially a serious
security problem. In the case above, 1024 key bits is 128 bytes,
which is likely to be only a small overhead to the message.
Key distribution is always a major issue. But there is more than one
way to do it. An existing system may have to change or be extended.
But even that is no reason to prevent the use of large keys.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Niklas Frykholm)
Subject: Re: 32768-bit cryptography
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 08:47:26 +0000 (UTC)
In article <94aqn0$qrs$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, lemaymd wrote:
> Bermuda Triangle 2001 is an extremely fast, easy-to-use and secure
>cryptography engine. It is based on a new, 32768-bit algorithm of the same
>name.
And I thought I'd never find any use for that 32768 bit password I
memorized...
// Niklas
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Niklas Frykholm)
Subject: Re: Question about security of Oracle get_hash_value
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 09:10:24 +0000 (UTC)
In article <94ah10$at9$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, psyclops wrote:
>I found an MD5 PL/SQL function @
>http://ulc199.residence.gatech.edu/keith/plsql/fast_md5.txt (thanks,
>Keith!) - however, it is computationally intensive and takes about a
>second to perform a single hash on an Ultra 5. As an alternative, I
>looked at the Oracle built in hash function,
>DBMS_UTILITY.GET_HASH_VALUE.
>
>The DBMS_UTILITY.GET_HASH_VALUE function allows a maximum 31 bit
>output, so is inherently insecure, and would probably result in
>collisions. Additionally, I cannot find any analysis of this function
>anywhere (has anyone done an analysis, or does anyone know any info on
>this function?).
I don't know anything about this function, but I really doubt that it is
secure.
In computer science the word "hash function" is used to mean several
different things. Generally it is just a function that computes a short
identification string for an object. A "cryptographic hash function" also
has the property that it is hard to invert.
In a cryptographic/security context the qualifier "cryptographic" is often
left out, because it is clear from the context that we are talking about
cryptographic hash functions. But it should be remembered that these
functions are something different than ordinary hash functions.
I would guess that Oracle's hash function is *not* a cryptographic hash
function, which means that it is very insecure to use it in the way you intend.
Can't you implement the hashing in some other (faster) language? I don't
know much about Oracle, but I would guess there are bindings to C, perl,
etc.
// Niklas
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 10:29:30 +0000
From: Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: or.politics,talk.politics.crypto,misc.survivalism
Subject: Re: Why Microsoft's Product Activation Stinks
Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
>
<snip over 200 lines>
>
> So that's all I have to say for a while.
Is that a promise?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 10:08:41 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> A friend of a friend spends time in Russia from time to time (he
> supposedly is a school teacher, but has this strange habit of turning
> up wherever things are heating up... e.g. Columbia during the worst of
> the drug wars, Poland when Solidarity kicked out the Communist
> government, Russia during the failed coup, ...). The stories I hear
> are pretty bad -- things apparently got pretty lawless for a while,
> the old government had virtually collapsed into meaninglessness, and
> the new government apparently is overreacting by attempting to clamp
> down harshly on all the lawlessness. I'm not sure I'd be adventurous
> enough to plan a trip to Russia right now.
Russia is safe place to travel if you have your wits about you, no less
safe that travelling in south africa or south america. I am sure the
Russians are not going to risk starting an international incident should
I walk around sensitive areas providing I have no camera or other forms
of recording equipment. I have had interesting experiences in south
africa, Russia cannot be worse.
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 10:11:21 GMT
> The US Government will not even let you visit the NSA; it's even more
> doubtful that the Russian Government will allow you to visit GOST. If
> you tried, you might wind up at Lefortovo prison or somewhere
similarly
> unpleasant! The KGB may very well be defunct, but Russia is still as
> conscious of "national security" as the Soviet Union always was...
It is also not possible to visit secret NATO facilities in the north of
Scotland, but one can always wander around the area out of curiosity. It
may make for interesting fiction one day.
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: using AES finalists in series?
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 12:04:45 +0100
Terry Ritter wrote:
>
[snip]
> I note that AES did not guarantee free encryption software so that all
> society could use encryption; it instead removed the economic basis
> for an industry of cipher *development*. It also failed to provide an
> economic basis for cipher *evaluation*; the ad-hoc "please donate your
> time" approach is just sad.
[snip]
I am confused. Isn't AES free for use by everyone in the
world? (Codes are available for download and there is no
patent issue.) Certain governments could forbid use of
encryption entirely, but that's a different issue.
Whether anything (crypto or not) is good for development
of economy in the society is in my view an issue really
hard to gain unanimous opinions (it suffices to note
how the different countries are different in economical
structures) and I am certainly entirely incompetent to
comment on that. However, to your last phrase, I don't yet
see anything inherently wrong for anybody or any institution
to say 'Please donate your time', as long as there are
people ready (entirely on their free will) to donate their
time, like there are people willing to donate their blood.
In fact, I suppose many mathematicians who publish are
idealists and donate their time for free in doing their
researches for the advancement of science.
M. K. Shen
============================
http://home.t-online.de/home/mok-kong.shen
------------------------------
From: digiboy | marcus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Kooks (was: NSA and Linux Security)
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 11:07:16 GMT
In article <94g3og$g36$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Indeed, you're the one who normally wails on and on about how the
> government is incompetent, Greggy.
Which is exactly _my_ point... which he still hasn't addressed with
anything other than wrongly attributed statements of no relevant
substance.
--
[ marcus ] [ http://www.cybergoth.cjb.net ]
[ ---- http://www.ninjakitten.net/digiboy ]
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: Ichinin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: cryptographic tourism in Russia
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 11:48:19 GMT
> The US Government will not even let you visit the NSA;
Hi.
Are you refering to the National Cryptological Museum just outside the
Nsa HQ? (If you are refering to the main building - All i say is
Duuh?!?! :o)
It's always polite to call and ask first; 2 Swedish officers were held
in murmansk on charges of espionage ~a year ago, although (IIRC) they
had asked for photo permission. (= ask first what you _may_ and _may
not_ do, and be sure to talk to the right person.)
Just showing up and going "Hi! I am a Joe Foreigner, may i enter this
building and possibly take a photo or two?" can get you into trouble.
Regards,
Ichinin
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Kooks (was: NSA and Linux Security)
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2001 11:50:24 GMT
In article <94fum5$c4f$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Greggy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I notice that you continue to snip the points you cannot refute which
> really drive the issue home, and instead attack the messenger...
Just like Greggy attacks the person who wrote an artricle that blows his
delusions about the "missing 13th amendment" to smithereens. What a
hypocritical kook.
> Jol Silversmith - I wasn't there so I cannot say why no one
> protested within the Virginian legislature that day in 1819
> not to include the 13th amendment in their publications, or to
> require all 21 states to ratify the same. But I am absolutely
> certain I know more than they did back then what was really
> going on all around them. Boy, I'm good!
Greggy - I wasn't there and never cite any evidence so I cannot say
why I know that the inclusion of an unratified amendment in a
compilation of state law only could have been an attempt to ratify
it, or why I know that 19th century legislators were infallible, much
less why I lie about whether the authenticity of the "missing 13th
amendment" was ever questioned. But I am absolutely certain that
I know more than anyone who has actually researched the subject.
Boy I'm good!
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
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