Cryptography-Digest Digest #883, Volume #13 Tue, 13 Mar 01 12:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable? (Tim Tyler)
Re: NTRU - any opinions ("Dr. Yongge Wang")
Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable? (Tim Tyler)
Re: Noninvertible encryption (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: [REQ] SHA-1 MD5 hashing software (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: Popularity of AES (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: GPS and cryptography (br)
Crypto idea (br)
Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: GPS and cryptography ("Tom St Denis")
Re: [REQ] SHA-1 MD5 hashing software (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: Popularity of AES (Thomas Boschloo)
Re: Noninvertible encryption (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: GPS and cryptography (Steve Portly)
Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls ("Tom St Denis")
Re: Anonymous web surfing? ("Mario Contestabile")
Re: Is this book interesting (Ben Cantrick)
Re: Is this book interesting (Jim Haynes)
Re: Anonymous web surfing? (Curtis R Williams)
Re: Is this book interesting (Richard Herring)
Re: Potential of machine translation techniques? ("Henrick Hellstr�m")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 14:58:20 GMT
Ben Cantrick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Point is, given the preconditions, an OTP is provably unbreakable.
: Are those conditions very hard, perhaps impossible to meet? Possibly.
: But if you have that random stream, you have unbreakable encryption -
: and provably so.
If you have that random stream, you have perfect secrecy.
The problem with the OTP proof is that it assumes something which can
never - in practice - be demonstrated to hold true. This is
not a flaw - since most proofs do this somewhere - but those applying
the proof need to keep it in mind.
The proof is valuable and useful, with practical implcations for real
systems - but it's silly to base claims of "perfect security" and
"unbreakability" of real world systems on it.
--
__________ http://alife.co.uk/ http://mandala.co.uk/
|im |yler [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hex.org.uk/ http://atoms.org.uk/
------------------------------
From: "Dr. Yongge Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NTRU - any opinions
Date: 13 Mar 2001 15:20:05 GMT
Dan Bailey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Anyone (even those who work for Certicom!) who would like a document on
: the extensive scrutiny NTRU has received in the literature can feel free
: to email me. I'll be happy to oblige.
: Here's the executive summary: "Better attacks or better lattice reduction
: algorithms are required in order to break NTRU" (Nguyen and Stern, in
: ANTS-2000).
Unfortunately, I cannot agree with that. NTRU signature scheme
presented in Crypto'00 was broken without any use of lattice technique.
NTRU is not a lattice scheme. there might algebraic method to break it.
: Cheers
: Dan
: PS Yes, I work for NTRU.
: On 9 Mar 2001, DJohn37050 wrote:
:> So, ECC has a space advantage and perhaps NTRU has a speed advantage on a
:> Pentium, if you believe NTRU is strong. I notice that the NTRU sig method
:> presented at Crypto is no where to be found (anymore) on the NTRU webstie,
:> instead a new one from fall 2000 is being offered. What happened to the old
:> one, did someone break it? Do you think this inspires confidence?
:> Don Johnson
:>
:>
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 15:03:46 GMT
Frank Gerlach <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler wrote:
:> Nope. The proof of perfect secrecy rests on the availability of a shared
:> unguessable stream. No such thing has ever been demonstrated to exist.
:>
:> Consequently the proof of secrecy of the OTP cannot be transferred onto
:> real-world systems used for actual communication without qualifications
:> being made.
: Then you also cannot trust any other crypto system, as you cannot be
: sure your key has been created in a (deterministically or not)random
: process.
Yes, exactly.
: The question of determinism and proper key generation applies to OTP as
: much as to any other crypto system. It is absolutely pointless to blame
: bad physical random key generators on OTP [...]
Indeed. Has anyone been doing that?
: Paper&pencil based OTP will be most probably the only method, which one
: can trust in a time of extremely powerful antennas and signal
: processing. Maybe some organizations don't like that and to spread
: rumors...
Personally I think a paper-and-pencil OTP is rather likely to be insecure,
due to key-distribution problems. There's a good reason why OTPs are
little used.
--
__________ http://alife.co.uk/ http://mandala.co.uk/
|im |yler [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hex.org.uk/ http://atoms.org.uk/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Noninvertible encryption
Date: 13 Mar 2001 15:23:08 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Schwartz) wrote in
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
>> Precompression does (at least) *two* things: it reduces the
>> expected CT size (trades off the cost of extra computation
>> for effective throughput), and it reduces redundancy, which
>> makes methods of C/A that rely on statistics less effective.
>> D.Scott is concerned primarily with security, not throughput,
>> and his concern about standard compression methods, as I
>> understand it, is that they often concentrate some of the
>> redundancy at the start of the CT instead of spreading it
>> evenly throughout the entire CT. That is worth worrying
>> about if security is your prime concern, although my own
>> opinion is that it is not a big enough flaw to be exploited
>> by practical C/A for most likely systems.
>
> You either trust your encryption or you don't. IMO, the uncomprsesed
>data is _much_ more likely to contain vulnerabilities than the
>compressed data is.
I don't think it a question of trust or not. History has proved
over and over again that blind trust is for fools. One should have
a level of trust in one encryption method. But that does not mean
one should be lax about things that weaken the method.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 14:10:11 +0100
Tom St Denis wrote:
> Books are fairly portable as well :-)
Like the Encyclopeadia Galactica? <g>
> Ya ya... I get your points... in fact I have about 3500 papers on my comp (I
> downloaded all of them off the counterpane.com list and I have eurocrypt
> from 81 to 97).... but I still think paper is simpler...
Well, you can always download AC2 and print it out for yourself, so your
point is kind of a non-argument to me.
Thomas
--
THHGTTG, Chapter Three: "The reason why it was published in the form of
a micro sub meson electronic component is that if it were printed in
normal book form, an interstellar hitch hiker would require several
inconveniently large buildings to carry it around it".
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [REQ] SHA-1 MD5 hashing software
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 15:02:03 +0100
those who know me have no need of my name wrote:
>
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> divulged:
>
> >Somehow a websearch at e.g. cert didn't turn up much other than
> >'tripwire' and (presumably) large sized software like that.
>
> you might want to look at it anyway, at least the library and siggen.
> (siggen is a stand-alone signature generator.) it does what you want,
> should work on many platforms, and isn't restricted to files.
>
> e.g.,
>
> | $ siggen /usr/sbin/siggen
> | sig0: nullsig : 0
> | sig1: md5 : 0ZGLRqHLfQp2MzcX:rSi1E
> | sig2: snefru : 33jXDI2ed2h7BWR3WOYQjZ
> | sig3: crc32 : 1y9Vy7
> | sig4: crc16 : 0005DA
> | sig5: md4 : 3cm2XtLLvW6EMeV1pscnBf
> | sig6: md2 : 1KPet.xSeepLAPbtzsnWyR
> | sig7: sha : 6LaCOHTLicDgwVMH:0c4nh5NfVk
> | sig8: haval : 3hDqL3.gN4oq.DNLEF2QEq
> | sig9: nullsig : 0
Excellent! But the format of the signatures doesn't seem to be in hex
format like most other programs I know use :-( I think it is not even
Base-64, but of course you could change that with some parameter ;-b
Thomas
--
Kittenbirds - You, me and Jesus: "I love your hair it's just so long"
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Popularity of AES
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 15:18:45 +0100
John Savard wrote:
>
> On 12 Mar 2001 18:06:28 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Hargrove)
> wrote, in part:
>
> >AES is included with the new version of PGP. There must be some
> >specifications for it.
>
> The Rijndael algorithm, which is publicly known, has been selected.
> But the final official standard is not yet ready, so it isn't really
> legitimate to term a Rijndael implementation an AES implementation,
> that's all.
Will the final AES e.g. have extra rounds on it like they did with
Square, or is this highly unlikely in your view?
Thomas
--
Kittenbirds - You, me and Jesus: "I love your hair it's just so long"
------------------------------
From: br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS and cryptography
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 10:28:43 -0400
How could you know the data before faking?
Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> "br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > It's impossible.
>
> How so? Why can't I just fake the data coming into the machine?
>
> Tom
>
> >
> >
> > Tom St Denis wrote:
> > >
> > > "br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > > > What do you think about using Global Positionning System (GPS) as key
> to
> > > > encryption?
> > > > You can read a message only if your computer is a pre-defined area or
> > > > point in the earth.
> > > > I'm waiting for comments
> > >
> > > What if I fake my position?
------------------------------
From: br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Crypto idea
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 10:31:57 -0400
Some ideas to discuss
The computer is idiot. If it is not programmed for any pre-defined
task, it can't distinguish between uggly and beautiful lady, english
and foreign alphabets etc...
So if I use two categories of symbols, which one has a property
different than the other, the computer can't know that the message
include two types differents.
I'm going to give you some samples.
Let plain text in binary system : 001101
Suppose that I want to send a message whithout send a key to my
correspondant.
I send 249583. Every one understand that odd number is replaced by 1 and
even by 0.
It's very easy to guess.
If I use open letters like l,u,r,s ... and closed letters like o, p, b,
d, e. It's more difficult. It's impossible for cryptanalysts to find out
the output when I know that creating two categories is infinite domain.
Cryptanalysis use dictionaries as way to find a solution. They suppose
that the clear message is wrote without spelling mistakes.
I can write a message like "I love you" as " Ay lov u" or "Ilovu"etc....
So how cryptanalists could know before my specific spelling of I love
you.
Using spelling mistakes is a good strategy against attackers.
Using "symbolic characters" with two differents properties too.
So what if I use spelling mistakes combined with symbolic characters
before encryption.
1.I convert "I love you" to " Ay lov u".
2.Then Ay lov u to (It's just an example) 101101....11
3. 101101... to +a-*c=...<>
4. Everyone can guess that I used mathemathical symbols for 1 and
litteral symbols for 0.
(the receiver has to program using two types and inserting in table the
characters corresponding to one or zero and try to read twice to know
symbols (one) et symbols (zero).
I'm aware that it's impossible to use this system for commercial
purposes. But for military or intelligence use, it's appropriate.
I apologize for my english, I hope it was clear.
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:38:24 +0100
Tom St Denis wrote:
> Books are fairly portable as well :-)
Like the Encyclopeadia Galactica? <g>
> Ya ya... I get your points... in fact I have about 3500 papers on my comp (I
> downloaded all of them off the counterpane.com list and I have eurocrypt
> from 81 to 97).... but I still think paper is simpler...
Well, you can always download AC2 and print it out for yourself, so your
point is kind of a non-argument to me.
Thomas
--
THHGTTG, Chapter Three: "The reason why it was published in the form of
a micro sub meson electronic component is that if it were printed in
normal book form, an interstellar hitch hiker would require
seX-Mozilla-Status: 0009large buildings to carry it around it".
------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS and cryptography
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 15:40:32 GMT
"br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> How could you know the data before faking?
How does the legitimate receipient know?
Tom
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [REQ] SHA-1 MD5 hashing software
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:38:47 +0100
those who know me have no need of my name wrote:
>
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> divulged:
>
> >Somehow a websearch at e.g. cert didn't turn up much other than
> >'tripwire' and (presumably) large sized software like that.
>
> you might want to look at it anyway, at least the library and siggen.
> (siggen is a stand-alone signature generator.) it does what you want,
> should work on many platforms, and isn't restricted to files.
>
> e.g.,
>
> | $ siggen /usr/sbin/siggen
> | sig0: nullsig : 0
> | sig1: md5 : 0ZGLRqHLfQp2MzcX:rSi1E
> | sig2: snefru : 33jXDI2ed2h7BWR3WOYQjZ
> | sig3: crc32 : 1y9Vy7
> | sig4: crc16 : 0005DA
> | sig5: md4 : 3cm2XtLLvW6EMeV1pscnBf
> | sig6: md2 : 1KPet.xSeepLAPbtzsnWyR
> | sig7: sha : 6LaCOHTLicDgwVMH:0c4nh5NfVk
> | sig8: haval : 3hDqL3.gN4oq.DNLEF2QEq
> | sig9: nullsig : 0
Excellent! But the format of the signatures doesn't seem to be in hex
format like most other programs I know use :-( I think it is not even
Base-64, but of course you could change that with some parameter ;-b
Thomas
--
Kittenbirds - You, me and Jesus: "I love your hair it's just so long"
------------------------------
From: Thomas Boschloo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Popularity of AES
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:38:51 +0100
John Savard wrote:
>
> On 12 Mar 2001 18:06:28 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dan Hargrove)
> wrote, in part:
>
> >AES is included with the new version of PGP. There must be some
> >specifications for it.
>
> The Rijndael algorithm, which is publicly known, has been selected.
> But the final official standard is not yet ready, so it isn't really
> legitimate to term a Rijndael implementation an AES implementation,
> that's all.
Will the final AES e.g. have extra rounds on it like they did with
Square, or is this highly unlikely in your view?
Thomas
--
Kittenbirds - You, me and Jesus: "I love your hair it's just so long"
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Noninvertible encryption
Date: 13 Mar 2001 15:34:20 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mok-Kong Shen) wrote in <3AADDB93.D0B9DDDB@t-
online.de>:
>From my memory of past discussions with Mr. Scott, his
>issue is what he terms the 1-1 compression which has to
>do with the question whether all decryptions (using all
>potentially possible keys) of a ciphertext could be
>decompressed (by a given fixed algorithm) without leading to
>processing difficulties that would reveal the fact that
>wrong decryption keys are being used. I am yet not aware
>that his compression scheme does any 'even spreading of
>redundancy' throughout the entire CT as compared to the
>normal compression algorithms. What he does is some special
>manipulations at the end of the file to prevent the
>above mentioned detection of wrong keys, if I don't err.
Yes you have it basically correct. I was more concerned
with 1-1 compression with out gaps. I took a basic adaptive
huffman compressor. And most discussions about it here invovled
the file endings which I have to admit did take a lot of
discussion. But there were many more changes to the method
than that. The original method so bad even without the file ending
considerations almost any file even a random file of long
enough would be so poorly consturcted that only one valid
inverse for a following encryption would exist. I think having
an encryption where only "ONE KEY" can lead to a valid file
that is decompressable to a file which when compressed comes
back to the same file. I see for some reason most experts here
seem to think that is of little concern since they don't see
an imediate exploit of how to find that ONE KEY. I prefer methods
that any key leasd to a valid file so that recompression and
encryption takes you back to same file.
However my file always smaller or same size as what the oringal
method did. Aafter that I imporoved the RLE then later Matt improved
the Aritmetic and PPM type of compressors. This will eventually be
done by many modes of compression. Hopefully someday people will see
the advatage of having crypto where a more than ONE key can lead to
solution that is not immediately throw outable.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
Scott famous encryption website **now all allowed**
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
Scott LATEST UPDATED source for scott*u.zip
http://radiusnet.net/crypto/ then look for
sub directory scott after pressing CRYPTO
Scott famous Compression Page
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
------------------------------
From: Steve Portly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS and cryptography
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 11:05:23 -0500
Tom St Denis wrote:
> "br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > It's impossible.
>
> How so? Why can't I just fake the data coming into the machine?
>
> Tom
>
Lets say you are using a satellite based cell phone system operating at 900
MHZ. You agree in advance to transmit and receive from a particular terrestrial
location at a certain time. The round trip signals from the satellite to the
earth and back can be calculated so as to give an exact distance for any senders
signal received. If this were a geosynchronous satellite the locus of possible
points on earth a given distance from the satellite would be described as a
circle. In the case of a LEO satellite that is moving in respect to the
location on earth it becomes possible to pinpoint the transmission and reception
point on earth.
------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Text of Applied Cryptography .. do not feed the trolls
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:07:46 GMT
"Thomas Boschloo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> > Books are fairly portable as well :-)
>
> Like the Encyclopeadia Galactica? <g>
>
> > Ya ya... I get your points... in fact I have about 3500 papers on my
comp (I
> > downloaded all of them off the counterpane.com list and I have eurocrypt
> > from 81 to 97).... but I still think paper is simpler...
>
> Well, you can always download AC2 and print it out for yourself, so your
> point is kind of a non-argument to me.
Ahh but printing it on a bubble jet is kinda wasteful. Professional print
services are far more efficient and consume less materials/energy.
Tom
------------------------------
From: "Mario Contestabile" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Anonymous web surfing?
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 11:26:19 -0500
> > > Safeweb's proxy is similar to Anonymizer.com but they did a really
> > > nice job. Give it a try: www.safeweb.com.
> >
> > Provided you trust safeweb, and it's html parsing ability to rewrite
> > urls...
>
> It seems to do a good job of rewriting url's, though it's more
> ambitious than Anonymizer and therefore there's more places to go
> wrong (e.g. it tries to rewrite javascript embedded url's, which I'd
> have thought was madness). As for trust, I have out-of-band reasons
> to think they're legit, though that hardly proves anything. It's
> theoretically possible they're forwarding my browsing to the CIA. But
> I doubt if they're forwarding it to the random web sites I surf that I
> don't want to reveal my IP address to. Since Anonymizer doesn't even
> use SSL, anyone who can sniff my ISP's traffic can see everything I
> send through it. So while Safeweb *might* be insecure against
> government surveillance, Anonymizer is *known* to be insecure against it.
>
> A total paranoid shouldn't trust ANYTHING of this type. But if you've
> got to trust something, ZKS Freedom is probably the most secure of the
> bunch--but it needs a download, and it's slow, and you have to pay for
> it, etc.
In version 2.1 of Freedom variable packet sizes are used, as opposed to the
fixed
packet sizes of the previous versions, which makes web surfing _alot_
faster.
The price is an obvious obstacle, no argument here.
--
Mario Contestabile
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ben Cantrick)
Subject: Re: Is this book interesting
Date: 13 Mar 2001 09:30:23 -0700
In article <98knfb$2faav$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
dexMilano <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I'm looking for a light book on Histroy of cryptography.
>What about " The code book" from Simon Singh?
Most fun and engaging book on crypto I've ever read.
-Ben
--
Ben Cantrick ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) | Yes, the AnimEigo BGC dubs still suck.
BGC Nukem: http://www.dim.com/~mackys/bgcnukem.html
The Spamdogs: http://www.dim.com/~mackys/spamdogs
"Cow have mercy. Roach have mercy. Cow have mercy." -cDc
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Is this book interesting
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim Haynes)
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:37:00 GMT
A quick look through www.bn.com turned up several that I can't vouch for but
look interesting.
"Code Breaking: A History and Exploration" by Kippenhahn
"Making, Breaking Codes" by Garrett
"Codemaster : Secrets of Making and Breaking Codes" by Nickels
Also I see Gordon Welchman's "The Hut Six Story" long out of print is
available again.
------------------------------
From: Curtis R Williams <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Anonymous web surfing?
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:46:25 GMT
If you think this is *really* anonymous, think again.......
On Tue, 20 Feb 2001 19:54:33 +0100, Mok-Kong Shen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>The German news magazine Spiegel in its recent issue
>(19th Feb) reports that a software firm Safeweb sales a
>product named Triangle Boy that enables one to surf on the
>internet anonymously without leaving any traces. Does
>anyone have experience with that software or can tell
>the principles of its functioning? I can't yet imagine
>that surfing from a fixed location couldn't be recorded
>and analysed for finding out which sites (at least some
>of them) one has visited. Thanks.
>
>M. K. Shen
Here's is a URL for a freeware product that routes your connection
through an annonymity server. http://www.stealth-anonymizer.com.
If I go to www.safeweb.com (or www.traingleboy.com or
128.223.22.54:8443 or 64.195.245.113:8443) I have no problem
connecting anywhere (as far as I can tell). I also have an indication
that my session is encrypted). I'm not sure if Internet Explorer can
be fooled into displaying the padlock icon-- but I'm willing to accept
that the comm is confidential.
Now, go to stealth anonymizer and download the freeware version.
Install it and set your browser up to use localhost as a proxy on port
14000 (this is all in the instructions).
Now, using stealth anonymizer, try and connect to triangleboy.
I fail every time. I'm just starting to look at it, but it seems that
triangleboy refuses a connection if he can't verify your ip address.
Why would they care if they weren't logging ip addresses?
This is only of academic intertest to me, but if I was a political
dissident in a totalitarian state, I'd think twice about using
triangleboy or safeweb.
Perhaps someone who knows or has the time to figure out what is going
on here can comment.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Richard Herring)
Subject: Re: Is this book interesting
Date: 13 Mar 2001 16:39:47 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Tim Tyler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Frank Gerlach <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> : dexMilano wrote:
> :> I'm looking for a light book on Histroy of cryptography.
> :> What about " The code book" from Simon Singh?
> :
> : Isn't that fiction (ie. not exact history) ? (haven't read it, so I am
> : not sure)
> Not fiction (though no history is exact).
> One of the more proular modern fiction books dealing with crypto is
> "Cryptonomican" - you may be thinking of that.
> I believe Mr Singh has another similar book - entitled "The Science of
> Secrecy" - which is more explicitly historical.
> The content is rather similar to "The Code Book".
The latter accompanied a TV series. In other words,
as much material as could be extracted from "The Code Book" and
presented to a lay audience in six (?) slow-moving programmes.
--
Richard Herring | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: "Henrick Hellstr�m" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Potential of machine translation techniques?
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2001 18:01:01 +0100
I believe that the redundancy of any natural or fictive languague is the
biggest problem. I once wrote some code that would parse a user supplied
document in order to create a word list, index the entries in that word
list, and substitute each listed word in any other document for it's n bit
index value, where n is the least number such that N < 2**n where N is the
size of the word list. It was a fairly effective compression algorithm for
text files.
--
Henrick Hellstr�m [EMAIL PROTECTED]
StreamSec HB http://www.streamsec.com
"Mok-Kong Shen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> skrev i meddelandet
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
>
> "Joe H. Acker" wrote:
> >
> > Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > An arbitrary bijective mapping of D1 to D2 can be effected
> > > by doing a pseudo-random permutation of D2 (that originally
> > > correspond 1-1 to D1) using a PRNG seeded by a secret 'key'.
> > > Does that answers your questions?
> >
> > Not entirely. I was thinking about that but I don't know how to do it.
> > Suppose I use a 128 bit block cipher as PRNG but only have 2^16 entries
> > in my dictionary. How do I map from the 128 bit to 16 bit without
> > collisions? Is it safe to just use the first 16 bit of the PRNG output?
> > In practise, I have an arbitrary size dictionary that always has less
> > entries than the 128 bit output can address. How would this be solved?
> >
> > BTW, you could create a context-free grammar for your artificial
> > language pseudo-randomly based on a key as well...
>
> The way I would use is to divide the integer from the
> PRNG by the maximum of its range, obtaining a real-valued
> number in [0, 1), then apply the algorithm of Dustenfeld
> to perform pseudo-random permutation in the range of the
> dictionary. (If the dictionary is very large, the computing
> cost might force one to do some compromise, i.e. accepting
> a less well done permutation somehow, I suppose.)
>
> M. K. Shen
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