Cryptography-Digest Digest #918, Volume #13 Fri, 16 Mar 01 15:13:00 EST
Contents:
Re: An extremely difficult (possibly original) cryptogram ("dan, dhrm77")
Re: Random and RSA (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Re: Q: IP (Mike Rosing)
Re: GPS and cryptography (David Schwartz)
Re: How to eliminate redondancy? (David Schwartz)
Re: primes for Blum Blum Shub generator ("Dobs")
Re: Super strong crypto (David Wagner)
Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable? (Tim Tyler)
Re: TV Licensing (Was: => FBI easily cracks encryption ...?) (Jim D)
Re: How to eliminate redondancy? ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Random and RSA ("JCA")
Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable? (Tim Tyler)
Re: Quantum Computing & Key Sizes (Stanley Chow)
Re: GPS and cryptography (br)
Re: primes for BBS ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: What do we mean when we say a cipher is broken? (Was Art of (William Hugh
Murray)
Re: Q: IP (Mok-Kong Shen)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "dan, dhrm77" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: rec.puzzles
Subject: Re: An extremely difficult (possibly original) cryptogram
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 13:08:29 -0500
"Olivier Miakinen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Jared Karr wrote:
> >
> > Maybe you should post a shorter message in the same code. I don't think
> > anybody wants to decode half a million characters by hand.
> >
> > JK
> > "daniel mcgrath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > > Tysoizbyjoxs, this may be the most complicated code anyone has ever
> > > done!
> > > 46567 20100 55156 10094 65145 75046 57645 59555 04266 79241
> > > 36544 08141 85644 59210 07144 57510 08444 57646 75044 36945
> [followed by half a million characters]
>
> Was it *absolutely* necessary to quote the entire original message ?
Yes and no....
Not all news servers are created equal.... By quoting the whole message, it
gives one more chance to those srevers who didn't get the original message
to get the quoted copy of it.. so more people have a chance to see it.
I found many times a reply to a message on a server where the original
message does not exist....
On the other hand, if the message has already been quoted 2 or 3 times... it
can safely be snipped an ony subsequent reply..
Comprenez-vous, mon ami ?
Dan.
> [fu2]
>
> --
> Halte aux abus du mail : <http://marc.herbert.free.fr/mail/>
> Mais aussi: <http://www.cict.fr/net/ErreursMel.html>
> Au fait, merci de ne pas doubler par mail une r�ponse faite dans les
> news, et evitez de m'envoyer des fichiers en formats propri�taires.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Random and RSA
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tony L. Svanstrom)
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 18:10:22 GMT
br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> "Tony L. Svanstrom" wrote:
> >
> > br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Factoring N is it so hard?
> >
> > Try it!
> Try this algo to factor N.
> Let S= (10^k) - 1
> for k=N to (n/2) step -1
> Let c=gcd(S,N)
> if c<>1 or c<>N then c is a solution.
>
> I know that it's hard to hudge number but try it I think that you will
> find a solution in less than an hour.
>
> I'm not kidding.
Neither was I when I wrote: "Try it!"...
Instead of saying "I think that" you should do it and then show the
results.
/Tony
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: IP
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 12:31:17 -0600
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Probably a very dumb question: If I connect to the internet
> via a provider, do I have a fixed (and always same) IP
> assigned by my ISP? I heard that ISPs assign (or may assign)
> dynamically variable IPs to their customers. Is that right
> or wrong? Thanks.
It's usually dynamic. That way the ISP only needs 20% as many
ip numbers as it has customers. Most probably have as many ip
numbers as they have modems so they can keep everyone who gets
in happy.
Check your TCP/IP software. It should have a box checked for
dynamic allocation.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS and cryptography
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 10:25:15 -0800
br wrote:
>
> You have to use the position as second key to mix with another key.
> You may reach key space 2^150 or more.
If you wanted a 150-bit key space, you would just use one. The question
is, what does GPS buy you? How is a key that could be predicted by
anyone who knew where you were any better than a key that you pick
randomly? And how do you communicate your location to the person who has
to encode the information without simultaneously revealing it to the
interceptors?
DS
------------------------------
From: David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How to eliminate redondancy?
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 10:23:35 -0800
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
> "Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
> > Given a highly redundant plaintext one can eliminate the redundancy
> > by masking with a good PRNG.
>
> I guess at this point we ought to ask what people mean by "redundancy".
> To me, that scheme doesn't reduce redundancy by more than the bits in
> the PRNG parameters. It does make it more "latent", however.
Perhaps what he means by redundancy is what most people mean by
compressibility. It should be obviously that there is no reversible way
to make a data stream less compressible other than compressing it. Even
if you add more information to the stream, that information could
legitimately be discarded by the compression algorithm.
DS
------------------------------
From: "Dobs" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: primes for Blum Blum Shub generator
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:52:18 +0100
Thanks for help :))))
U mean that I have to choose randomly big number choose it if it is odd and
then choose if it is prime. If not add 2 to this number and choose it one
more time if it is prime, right? I do not know what is function israndom, I
think that U meant isprime( that I have to choose if it is prime) I can not
see any point to check if it is random?
U wrote that I can use to prime number generator from openssl, I download
this openssl file, but there are so many directories, files , I can not find
it and I think if I found it it would be integrated with others libraries
like *.h, and I could not use it because I am not so good at programing to
make it work in my program.Perhaps U know any different source where I can
find easier prime number generator or algorithm to it
Thanx
> You only need to change them periodically (the decision of how long to
wait
> is complex, but if you use it as a stream cipher you only have to change
> when you rekey). The algorithm to generate huge primes goes like this:
>
> pick a random number R of the right size, make sure it's odd
> while(NOT(israndom(R))
> add 2 to R
> end while
>
> programming israndom is a complex task, and I would recommend simply using
> something like openssl for that part. Of course openssl also has functions
> to generate primes.
> Joe
>
> "Dobs" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:98o5qk$9cc$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > Hello,
> > I am trying to implement Blum Blum Shub generator. I need 2 large prime
> > numbers p and q. Where should I take this numbers from,( I gess each
time
> > they generate one bit, they have to be changed) Is there any algorithm
> to
> > obtain such a large primes, which would be right for BBS generator.
> > Thanx, best regards
> > Michal
> >
> >
>
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Super strong crypto
Date: 16 Mar 2001 19:07:32 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>There hasn't been a proper information-theoretic analysis.
>The one that was posted was based on an unrealistic costing
>model, namely no limit on computation.
Is there a difference? In all the crypto papers I've ever
seen, information-theoretic is synonomous with adversaries
with unbounded computational resources. Can you give an
example of an information-theoretic analysis with bounded
computation?
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:03:47 GMT
Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler wrote:
:> Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> : Tim Tyler wrote:
:> : God is able to obsere the entire state of the system. Is anyone
:> : else capable of such?
:>
:> Not AFAIK - embodied observers appear to have extremely severe
:> limitations about how much of the multiverse they can measure.
:>
:> :> The problem is that an embodied observer does not appear to have
:> :> any way to obtain information about the entire state of the system.
:>
:> : Isn't that what Kanpp just said?
:>
:> No. He just said it was unpredictable - without specifiying who it
:> was unpredictable to.
: Combining your two statements above, I come to the conclusion that you
: believe in God... or else you would not be trying to take into account
: anything other than an embodied observer in your second statement.
I don't believe in the existince of God.
: Unless of course you think that it's possible for a non-embodied
: observer other than God to exist.
God /might/ exist - as might other such entities. They need
not be disembodied - indeed, if they were completely
disembodied, there would be no way to communicate with them.
We are too ignorant today to claim that such things are not possible.
:> Yes again. Now, the question of randomness for man could be stated as
:> whether he can find a way to communicate with god ;-)
: It's not talking to God that's the problem, it's getting a reply :)
: Hmm, now here's a pretty puzzle... if God exists, and is omniscient,
: then howcome two-slit wave/particle experiments work? Surely, if God is
: omniscient, then he knows which of the two slits the particles went
: through, and causes the interference effect to break down!
The idea that observations colapse wafecunctions is a Copenhagen notion.
Remember that you are talking to someone who likes the MW
interpretation - in which wave functions /never/ collapse.
Anyway, God's observation or lack of it - need have no effect on
the universe - since he is not bound by its laws.
--
__________
|im |yler [EMAIL PROTECTED] Home page: http://alife.co.uk/tim/
------------------------------
From: sideband@ btinternet.com (Jim D)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: TV Licensing (Was: => FBI easily cracks encryption ...?)
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:15:28 GMT
Reply-To: Jim D
On Fri, 16 Mar 2001 11:23:10 +0100, Arturo <aquiranNO$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On Fri, 16 Mar 2001 00:37:06 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim D)
>wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 08 Mar 2001 10:31:23 +0100, Arturo <aquiranNO$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>>(BTW, in Spain my children can watch Teletubbies for free. Add that to our
>>>wonderful weather and good wine...)
>>
>>You call that plonk good wine.....?
>
> I mean the wine we do not sell to foreign guys ...;-)
I expect that's why we get the second-rate stuff here. :o(
--
______________________________________________
George Dubya Bushisms No 9:
I believe we are on an irreversible trend
towards more freedom and democracy - but
that could change.
Posted by Jim Dunnett
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
___________________________________
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How to eliminate redondancy?
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2001 17:22:44 -0800
There are 3 possibilities.
1 to many (expansion)
many to 1 (lossy compression)
and 1-1 (convolution, may be compression, expansion, or unchanged)
All of these are possible for removing redundancy, although 1-1 is the most
reasonable to use, with 1-1 onto being most preferable.
Joe
"Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:m1bs6.45222$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> "br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > I think if's important to eliminate redundancy. So why cryptographers
> > are neglecting this problem?
>
> We ain't. Do you want to remove redundancy via 1-1 transform or lossy
ones?
>
> Tom
>
>
------------------------------
From: "JCA" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Random and RSA
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 11:07:55 -0800
Would you care to apply your algorithm to the following integer?
3648619747307346288823659931102648912027984439975493780829346715987758
2636039597999594334596226827651997112107402848167549330863512457575218
8698619439169071545606986083121263673550943113237113839445816060239485
0876228509053691549723304802264024332397042389689297353137878157027748
3241354391156478887788970461
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "br" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Try this algo to factor N.
> Let S= (10^k) - 1
> for k=N to (n/2) step -1
> Let c=gcd(S,N)
> if c<>1 or c<>N then c is a solution. I know that it's hard to hudge
> number but try it I think that you will find a solution in less than an
> hour. I'm not kidding.
>
>
>
>
> "Tony L. Svanstrom" wrote:
>> br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> > Factoring N is it so hard?
>> Try it!
>>
>> /Tony
------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: One-time Pad really unbreakable?
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:13:10 GMT
Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
: Tim Tyler wrote:
:> Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
:> : Tim Tyler wrote:
:> :> The problem I think you're tring to get at is that it is difficult
:> :> for an embodied observer to get reliable and complete information
:> :> about the system in the first place.
:> :
:> : No, the point is that that is impossible even in principle.
:>
:> It isn't known to be impossible. I would grant that current theories
:> of quantum physics don't offer a mechanism for doing so - but that's
:> totally different from it being impossible.
: The impossibility is a straightforward consequence of *extremely*
: well verified observed phenomena. One way of looking at it is the
: nonzero commutator of conjugate operators. That is as reliable as
: it gets (direct consequence of Fourier theory).
You seem to be deluded on this issue. It is hubris to believe that you
know anywhere near enough to claim that such a thing is impossible.
To make such statements about events being impossible, you apparently
mis-understand the nature of scientic knowledge - which is inherently
uncertain and open to doubt.
--
__________
|im |yler [EMAIL PROTECTED] Home page: http://alife.co.uk/tim/
------------------------------
From: Stanley Chow <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Quantum Computing & Key Sizes
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:24:11 GMT
Bill Unruh wrote:
>
> However, in doing a database search Grover's algorithm only changes the
> search from N to sqrt(N) where N is the size of the database
> (2^(keylength)) which is the basis for his comment. HOwever it is
> entirely possible that there is a QC algorithm which could turn any
> given secret key algorithm into a polynomial time one as well.
If I remember correctly, their is a proof that sqrt(N) is in fact
a tight bound. Something about the superpositions taking that many
steps to "smear" into the right places. I think the paper in the
LANL preprints and is probably by Grover.
--
Stanley Chow VP Engineering [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cloakware Corp (613) 271-9446 x 223
------------------------------
From: br <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: GPS and cryptography
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 14:21:28 -0400
The Gps is used as a condition to read the message.
Suppose that you have a key to open my kitchen and you don't have a have
access to my house.
GPS is the key of the house.
The Gps is used as a condition to read the message.
Suppose that you have a key to open my kitchen and you don't have a have
access to my house.
GPS is the key of the house.
My real message is in the kitchen.
Your computer is connected to the GPS device.
Everyone know the hashing function of your position. Is a public key.
The software when receiving a crypted message destroy it if the position
is different and allow it if it matches.
The same idea may be used for other another device.
When you use a viewer to read pdf file, if you don't have the viewer you
can't read the message.
So the software has to be hard to break.
I have an idea to make it hard to break.
David Schwartz wrote:
>
> br wrote:
> >
> > You have to use the position as second key to mix with another key.
> > You may reach key space 2^150 or more.
>
> If you wanted a 150-bit key space, you would just use one. The question
> is, what does GPS buy you? How is a key that could be predicted by
> anyone who knew where you were any better than a key that you pick
> randomly? And how do you communicate your location to the person who has
> to encode the information without simultaneously revealing it to the
> interceptors?
>
> DS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: primes for BBS
Date: 16 Mar 2001 11:25:52 -0800
Benjamin Goldberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > All true until the last part. You don't have to check that x doesn't
> > produce a short cycle. If you ever find an x that produces a short
> > cycle, you have cracked RSA and factored a 1024 bit modulus! If you
> > believe that RSA with a 1024 bit modulus is secure, you don't have to
> > check for short cycles. If short cycles can be found, RSA is
> > insecure.
>
> Not quite. If we can *intentionally* find a short cycle, then RSA is
> insecure. The chances of us finding a short cycle by accident are about
> the same as us guessing, at random, one of the factors of RSA. This
> doesn't mean that it won't, or can't, happen, just that it's unlikely.
If we can *accidentally* find a short cycle, we can *intentionally*
find one, right? Surely a dedicated *intentional* search is more
likely to succeed than a haphazard, *accidental* search.
And passing it off as "unlikely" drastically understates the case.
We're talking about 80+ bit work factors here! The chances that the
world will be destroyed by an asteroid impact tomorrow is
*OVERWHELMINGLY* more likely. The odds aren't even remotely
comparable. Anyone who worries about BBS short cycles without first
building themselves a self-contained bomb shelter stocked with 50
years of food is insane.
> If the sender discovers a short cycle, then he has lucked on to the
> factors of n. This is, as I said, an unlikely occurance, so we don't
> have to worry that sender who has chanced upon a short cycle recording
> it and breaking our key, but if they *use* that short cycle, rather than
> discard it, and an enemy notices this, then the enemy learns the BBS
> private key.
It doesn't make sense to say that we don't have to worry about them
finding a short cycle and breaking our key, but we do have to worry
about them finding a short cycle and using it to encrypt. The point
is, they can't find short cycles! It is computationally infeasable
for them to find a short cycle with a 1024 bit RSA key, just as it
is to factor the key (for the one implies the other). What part of
this don't you understand?
> Now why do we worry that an enemy might observe someone else using a
> short cycle, when they can't himself find one? Because the legitimate
> BBS users are doing the majority of the computation, while the enemy has
> the much simpler, computationally cheaper, task of looking for cycles.
So you think it is easier for the enemy to observe encrypted data and
detect cycles than to generate cycles of its own? That is bizarre.
In the first place, cycles are so rare that you won't find any. See
above re asteroids. In the second place, any plausible communications
load is going to be far less than what a realistic enemy could create
with his own dedicated cycle-generating machines (if he was so stupid
as to try to crack your key in this inefficient way, rather than use
an efficient factoring algorithm like the NFS). And in the third
place, the encrypted data consists of plaintext xored with just a few
bits of the BBS output, so the enemy would have to first cryptanalyze
your data in order to detect any cycles! This would make the task
vastly more difficult than just generating his own cycles.
> Suppose you are using BBS as your PKE system, and hundreds of people
> have your public key, and each sends you hundreds of messages daily.
> Your enemy leaves a program on your router, and watches the messages
> coming towards you. He doesn't need to perform the BBS crypto stuff,
> which is quite expensive... he just has to check for a ciphertext which
> looks like it was vernam enciphered with a short key.
Oh no, hundreds of people sending hundreds of messages. Gee, that's a
lot. An awful big number. Why, it might even have four whole zeros
on it. That's gotta be enough to break 1024 bit RSA, isn't it?
Innumeracy rules.
------------------------------
From: William Hugh Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: What do we mean when we say a cipher is broken? (Was Art of
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 19:29:56 GMT
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> William Hugh Murray wrote:
> > Gwynn and Savard seem to suggest that the gap between my perception
> > and perfection is simply too big to cope with. They seem to suggest
> > that in encryption one knows perfection or one knows nothing. They
> > suggest that even if one allows for the possibility that some closed
> > group of cryptographers somewhere knows of an attack that one does
> > not know about, that that possibility, no matter how small, no matter
> > how great the allowance, is intolerable.
> > ...
> > Savard and Gwynn would deny me the use of selecting applications for
> > defining "not broken" while choosing what may well be an empty set of
> > applications for defining broken.
>
> First, please spell my name right.
Sorry.
Second, I haven't addressed "your perception" at all nor denied you
> anything; your characterization above is wrong.
Perhaps. However, it was not my perception that is in question but rather
the gap between it and metaphysical certainty.
> In a thread
> concerning what "super strong crypto" might require, I addressed the
> very real problem of one's ignorance of possible effective methods
> of cryptanalysis and what might be done about that problem.
> Certainly the appellation "super strong crypto" would not be
> properly applied to a system that was being routinely read by
> skilled cryptanalysts.
Agreed.
> If you want to blindly trust some cryptosystem, ...
My trust is not blind. That I may be ignorant of some secret capability
does not equate to blindness.
> ......you are free to
> do so. But it would be to your advantage to have a reliable
> estimate of the likelihood that whoever you are trying to hide
> secrets from is able to access them. Or, in fewer words, that
> the adversary can "break" the system.
I have such an estimate. It is based on economics. The estimate says that
only the irrational spend more money to "break" a system or recover a
message than the value of doing so or of the value of the most efficient
alternative means for doing so. Even the irrational do not repeat the
activity over and over.
Both history and experience tell me that cryptography is not the weak point
in my "system" nor is cryptanalysis the most efficient attack. Indeed,
cryptography is astronomically stronger than the weakest link in my
system. That is why it is important to understand what you mean by
"break." The economic weight that one gives to the probability of such a
"break" is a function of what one means by it.
Suppose that what you mean is that the cost of recovering any message
without benefit of the key is, for some secret group, zero. I assign that
a very low probability. History and experience both tell me that
cryptography does not fail that way. I may also assign it a low cost.
Everytime the secret group uses the method it risks disclosing its presence
and its capability. Every time Magic was used, it risked compromising
Ultra. Unless my system is a target of choice, they are not likely to use
their capability against me.
Suppose that what you mean is that the work required is 2^-8 what I think
it is. I assign that a much higher probability; history tells me that
crypto systems do fail that way. However, it still may not put me on the
target list or my system at risk. Here not only to they risk disclosing
their secret but they decrypt my message at the cost of some other. This
is not "blind trust;" it is analysis. It is what one gets paid to do.
As to "super-strong" crypto, I would argue that 3-DES with one 112 bit key
per object, is so close to "super-strong" as to leave little room or
necessity for improvement. I understand you to say that I do not "know"
that in the sense of a mathematical proof. I concede that I do not. I
concede that for any application such certainty would be nice to have.
What I do not concede is that there are applications for which such
knowledge is required. I am prepared to be convinced but mere assertion
and re-assertion does not convince. Neither do appeals to fear; I fear
bears and brigands but I do not fear dragons. I do not "know" that there
are no dragons, cannot prove that there are no dragons, but I can assign to
them such a low probability as to be able to ignore the consequences.
> Not talking about breaking systems doesn't block the activity.
I am more than happy to talk about it, indeed I delight in it. However, my
reading of history, specifically that of Ultra, tells me that it is very
expensive, sensitive to compromise through use, and depends largely upon
flaws in the system rather than upon flaws in the algorithm. [In the case
of Ultra the flaw was largely that too much information was encrypted under
a single key. Automatic key management is so cheap as to obviate any
motivation to do that.]
Am I missing something fundamental? Am I misunderstanding your position?
Can we simply agree to disagree?
William Hugh Murray
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: IP
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 20:32:12 +0100
Ben Cantrick wrote:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >Probably a very dumb question: If I connect to the internet
> >via a provider, do I have a fixed (and always same) IP
> >assigned by my ISP? I heard that ISPs assign (or may assign)
> >dynamically variable IPs to their customers. Is that right
> >or wrong? Thanks.
>
> If you don't know for sure that you have a fixed IP, then you probably don't.
>
> Practically speaking, IP addresses cost money. The ISPs pass this cost
> on to their customers by making having a fixed IP address more expensive
> than getting a dynamic one every time you connect. Also, if you want a fixed
> IP, you generall have to request it specifically from your ISP. It
> normally won't happen by accident.
Thanks for the informations. I asked the question because
I read a newspaper article saying that having a fixed IP
means that attackers have a fixed target to work on, while
with dynamically assigned IPs one is rather anonymous, being
only one element of a more or less large set belonging
to the same ISP, and is thus advantageous in that respect.
In case this statement of the newspaper is incorrect, please
kindly tell.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
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