Cryptography-Digest Digest #112, Volume #14 Mon, 9 Apr 01 14:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Any positions in cryptography available? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Any positions in cryptography available? ("Tom St Denis")
Re: Steganography with natural texts (Jim Gillogly)
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Any positions in cryptography available? (Ichinin)
Re: Concerning US.A.4979832 (Bo D�mstedt)
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: JPEG also problematic ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Traffic analysis ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Is this a block cipher? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? ("Jack Lindso")
Re: SHA PRNG (Volker Hetzer)
Re: An idea on the blind signature with EC. (Mike Rosing)
Re: Dynamic Substitution Question (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Virtual English Nation (Jim D)
Re: ECDSA implementation (Mike Rosing)
Re: JPEG also problematic (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Is this a block cipher? (Bill Unruh)
Meant Naval Coordinates (Frank Gerlach)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Any positions in cryptography available?
Date: 9 Apr 2001 13:57:34 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (AlphaNerd) wrote in
<#qayTdIwAHA.299@cpmsnbbsa09>:
>I am a regular poster (and usually only flamed by David Scott, Szopa,
>etc), I just changed the nym because my current employer doesn't know
>I'm looking (although I'm sure he suspects). I am currently looking for
>a position doing cryptography/security research and/or consulting. It's
>only because I realize that with the skills involved in doing such
>research the positions are rarely publicized, so I am publicizing my
>desire to have such a position. Not to go into much detail (to avoid
>being too overt), but I've been here off and on for about 5 years now,
>I've done substantial amounts of analysis, etc, etc you've heard it all
>before. Considering the numbers of people on here, most of whom are
>probably not in the market, I think private e-mail would be the more
>acceptable method for the group.
> Thanx
Tom not another ID again. In the modern world people change jobs
often. I suspose Bruce could get you a job if he wanted. But the
most important aspect of getting a crypto job is having a good line
of bull. Tell people your fluent with all aspects and push the AES
line and make sure you whorship the correct cyrpto gods.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE "OLD VERSIOM"
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
My website http://members.nbci.com/ecil/index.htm
My crypto code http://radiusnet.net/crypto/archive/scott/
MY Compression Page http://members.nbci.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE FOR EMAIL drop the roman "five" ***
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged or
something..
No I'm not paranoid. You all think I'm paranoid, don't you!
------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any positions in cryptography available?
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 15:35:26 GMT
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (AlphaNerd) wrote in
> <#qayTdIwAHA.299@cpmsnbbsa09>:
>
> >I am a regular poster (and usually only flamed by David Scott, Szopa,
> >etc), I just changed the nym because my current employer doesn't know
> >I'm looking (although I'm sure he suspects). I am currently looking for
> >a position doing cryptography/security research and/or consulting. It's
> >only because I realize that with the skills involved in doing such
> >research the positions are rarely publicized, so I am publicizing my
> >desire to have such a position. Not to go into much detail (to avoid
> >being too overt), but I've been here off and on for about 5 years now,
> >I've done substantial amounts of analysis, etc, etc you've heard it all
> >before. Considering the numbers of people on here, most of whom are
> >probably not in the market, I think private e-mail would be the more
> >acceptable method for the group.
> > Thanx
>
> Tom not another ID again. In the modern world people change jobs
> often. I suspose Bruce could get you a job if he wanted. But the
> most important aspect of getting a crypto job is having a good line
> of bull. Tell people your fluent with all aspects and push the AES
> line and make sure you whorship the correct cyrpto gods.
Actually I didn't send that msg. My current job is sweet, I work from home
and get tons of moola for a High school student.
My suggestion Mr Scott is just to cool down a bit. Everyone doesn't have to
be your enemy just because you disagree with them.
Tom
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Steganography with natural texts
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 09:29:53 -0700
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Most modern stego schemes are based on embedding bits in
> pictures. A current thread in the group is discussing that.
>
> I suppose that a competitive way is to embed bits in natural
> language texts. Previously I proposed a method exploiting
> the format freedom of html files. In the following I like
> to present some preliminary thoughts of an alternative,
> though implementationally more expensive, scheme that
> can easily utilize all natural language covertexts, e.g.
> e-mails.
How would this improve on Peter Wayner's proposals in his papers
and book on "Disappearing Cryptography"?
--
Jim Gillogly
Trewesday, 18 Astron S.R. 2001, 16:26
12.19.8.2.4, 5 Kan 2 Pop, Eighth Lord of Night
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 16:00:51 GMT
Charles Lyttle wrote:
> Using code-talkers (such as the Navaho) has another problem. The
> English->Navaho#1->Navaho#2->English translation sequence resulted in
> corruption of information. Navajo and English are not one-to-one. Some
> English words/concepts do not translate well into Navajo, and some
> Navajo words/concepts do not translate well into English.
But the intermediate language wasn't a particular Navaho dialect,
it was highly stylized with in effect a codebook for common terms.
------------------------------
From: Ichinin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Any positions in cryptography available?
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 06:02:04 +0200
AlphaNerd wrote:
<SNIP>
Hi.
Popping upp from "nowhere" and wanting to work with computer security |
&& Crypto, is something recruiters are wary of, (and now i'll be jumping
up and down on alot of peoples toes now;) they actually belive that a
colledge diploma mean everything, and having just experience is worth
nothing, even IF you can proove that you know what there is to know
about crypto/security to be able to do the job.
Second; it doesn't matter if you know how to write an algorithm that
fulfill SAC after only 1 or 2 rounds or break 64 bit RC5 in 8 seconds;
if you mention stuff we all here take for granted in this channel, to an
employer, they have NO CLUE what you're talking about; you could recite
food recipies in polish with more success of them understanding what you
are talking about, what most companies level of comprehension are things
like:
-"Do you know MS CAPI? or RSA BSafe?"
-"Do you know how to install this or that product?"
-"Can you spell "Account management"?.
Things like these are innoying! I've met some "security experts" working
for large companies and i've seen both good and bad, some i wonder how
the h**l the got the job in the first place: They lack basic
undestanding in how a simple TCP/IP Network works!
-"Duuh... we have firewall xyz and that's safe!"
(Oh yeah?... gimme 5 minutes and i'll root your Frontpaged IIS box!)
Anoher problem with experience is that "How did you learn this? Have you
broken into systems? (yadayadayada)" is a question i get alot, and i
reply "Sure, my own systems and into those who were willing to pay for
it." then they cool down. Some want to see my police records, and i say
"Sure, if i can see yours." (Maby that's not a good idea, i know, but
would YOU want to work for a criminal ?)
So, if you are an "active independant home researcher" with a couple of
years of "security-one-in-a-while" experiences (i.e. network tech) my
advice is to start your own biz and prove your knowledge, because the
majority of people still mistrust everyone without a Certificate (*) or
some kind of flashy education which may or may not have anything to do
with security.
(* Schneiers -"CA's are trusted to do what?" kinda thing)
Regards,
Glenn "Ichinin" Larsson
Sweden
(P.S: I'm sorry this had to be said, i respect most of you people, but
some people and companies think that it is impossible to learn anything
outside a classroom)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bo D�mstedt)
Subject: Re: Concerning US.A.4979832
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 15:44:26 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) wrote:
> I was startled to see Terry Ritter claiming a broader interpretation
> of his Dynamic Substitution patent than I had imagined had applied.
[...]
> John Savard
> http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
Being a legal issue, a question in the domain of the lawyers,
I normally not express any opinion on patents. Our company
patent attorney indeed recommend obtaining a license even if
the patent is wrong/weak. Sometimes a license is not that
expensive...
For the patent in question, it is not the only dynamic
substitution patent, and there exists prior art.
Bo D�mstedt
Chief Cryptographer
Protego Information AB
Ideon Gamma Science Park
SE - 223 70 Lund
SWEDEN
http://www.protego.se/sg100_en.htm
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 16:07:42 GMT
Charles Lyttle wrote:
> ... Cracking DES would be of such economic value and so many eyes have
> looked at it, that I am sure that any backdoor would have been found
> by now.
That's not a good argument. A much better argument is that nobody
has been able to suggest a plausible way to hide a backdoor in a
cipher with structure similar to DES. Idle speculation need not be
taken seriously.
> ... GOST turns out to have weak keys and strong keys. The
> KGB was giving out weak keys to people it wanted to watch.
DES has its own set of weak keys. What evidence is there for your
KGB story?
> As for OTPs from WW II being still secure, that isn't the case. Military
> OTPs that I have used have all been limited to information that would be
> invalidated after about 1 week. This is because it is assumed that the
> pad itself is comprimised after that time. i.e. someone lost a copy or
> the enemy captured a copy. Much OTP from WW II is not secure because
> copies of the pads are still around. Some might be secure because all
> copies of the pads have been lost, but this won't be the majority.
The standard mode of usage of a OTP is that there are only two copies
(one at each end of the link) and when a page (card, whatever) is used
it is immediately destroyed. One-time punched paper tape was protected
against reuse by having a splitter behind the read head. (The split
tape was of course later burned.)
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: JPEG also problematic
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 16:10:41 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> I have no knowledge but wonder voice in normal telephone
> communications couldn't carry stego bits rather easily,
> since all people speak differently (accents, male/female,
> age, etc.) and at different times (health, emotions etc.)
> so that differences due to stego modifications could be
> very hard to detect.
But what would be the reference at the receiving end?
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Traffic analysis
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 16:09:20 GMT
Frank Gerlach wrote:
> The hub should be an unsuspicious bogus server (such
> as the "grandparents in London").
Actually that would be quite suspicious, since normal people don't
relay packets.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Is this a block cipher?
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 16:28:54 GMT
Rick Wash wrote:
> In old-days classical cryptography, the message M would be divided
> into letters (which was the smallest division that was easy to work
> with). Each letter would be replaced with another letter (C->F,
> etc. for caesar cipher). The problem with this method is that any
> statistical properties of the language of letters is preserved in the
> transformation (e.g. since the letter "e" is most likely the most
> common letter, whatever letter "e" encrypts to will also be the most
> common letter).
No, Caesar-style ciphers have been understood to be insecure for
centuries. The block/stream distinction is relatively recent,
dating back not much earlier than IBM's Lucifer, and has nothing
to do with overcoming Caesar-sipher weaknesses as such.
> The first solution is to group letters together into block, and
> encrypt whole blocks together. The goal here is that even when the
> statistical properties of single letters are strong, groups of
> letters have less statisticall significant properties. As the blocks
> get larger, the statistical significance decreases. As such, normally
> each block is encrypted independent of all other blocks. This is
> normally known as a block cipher. Note only whole blocks can be
> encrypted at one time.
The only real reason for organizing as a block is to give the
algorithm a controlled pool of data to work on at one time.
This allows certain speed-ups in software and even more speed-ups
in custom hardware.
It was soon realized that block ciphers used in ECB mode had
exploitable weaknesses, so the notions of initialization vectors
and chaining modes were introduced to thwart such attacks.
> The second solution to this is to make the encryption depend not only
> on the key, but also on some kind of state that is updated with a
> feedback loop. In this case, when a letter is encrypted based on the
> key and the current state. Then the state is updated, and the next
> letter is encrypted with the key and the new state. In this way, each
> time the letter "e" is encrypted, it is encrypted to a different value
> based on the current state. This obscures the statistical properties
> of the plaintext. This is normally known as a stream cipher.
The main characteristic of a "stream" cipher is that the receiver
gets one unit (usually a character or a bit) shortly after the
sender hands a unit to the encryption system; with a "block" cipher
nothing is sent until a whole block buffer is filled, then all of
the (encrypted) block is sent at once.
There isn't much point in trying to make too fine a distinction;
these are not "natural" categories in the first place.
------------------------------
From: "Jack Lindso" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 20:02:57 +0200
> Any one in this group got any WW II OTPs in a trunk in the attic? I
> think my uncle has some he captured from a German officer in North
> Africa. If still there, the date, time, and place of capture will be
> available. People doing historcal research can contact me, and if you
> check out, I can try to dig them up. Nothing guaranteed though.
If you're serious about the WWII OTP, I'll be glad to have a look at them,
this could be a real bonus for the document I'm writing on classical
ciphers.......
cheers.
------------------------------
From: Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: SHA PRNG
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 19:30:59 +0200
Mark Wooding wrote:
> Which makes the output very diffferent in character. Since a block
> cipher is a permutation, the probability of two successive outputs being
> equal is much lower. This allows us to construct distinguishers. This
> is a also a good reason not to put the counter for a PRNG in the hash's
> IV -- then it really would behave just like a block cipher, and have
> this property.
I've just had a look at http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/sym-enc.ps.gz .
There they give a relation betwen the security of a permutation vs. the
security of a function. I haven't understood all the proofs but I gather
that for a certain percentage of the total number of bits drawn from
the PRNG it is indeed safe to use a permutation.
Didn't check how much though and it depended on the advantage you want
to give an attacker.
Greetings!
Volker
--
They laughed at Galileo. They laughed at Copernicus. They laughed at
Columbus. But remember, they also laughed at Bozo the Clown.
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: An idea on the blind signature with EC.
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 12:32:13 -0500
Cristiano wrote:
> It's clear that the problem is to send to A "e" (the inverse of d modulo n)
> because A can compute B's private key (d) by simply doing e^-1 mod n (n is
> prime).
> Thus my idea is simply to blind d^-1 mod n with ECES:
>
> P=base point; n=prime order of P; k=random integer 1<k<n;
> QB=B's public key; dB=B's private key.
>
> 1) B compute only once: Q1=k*P; Q2=k*QB; s=x(Q2)/dB mod n
> 2) B send to A Q1 and s;
> 3) A map the message to point M and send to B the point
> X=M+s*R; (R is a random secret point)
> 4) B send to A T=dB/x(Q2)*X;
> 5) A can compute the signature S=T-R=dB/x(Q2)*M.
> When A want to use the signature she sends to B: S and M; B verify S by
> doing Q2=dB*Q1, V=dB/x(Q2)*M. If S=V then the message is good.
>
> This work in practice, but in theory?
> To avoid B to track A, Q1 must be fixed but I think this is not a big
> problem.
> In step 1, 4 and 5 may be better to do T=dB xor x(Q2)*X?
> I really appreciate some comment.
By sending s in the clear you make it possible for anyone to fake a
signature. All you have to do is compute s^-1 mod n and multiply by
any message M', then add a random point R. This gives you a fake
"T". So someone could impersonate A, send a message to B they want
them to verify, and it'd all be fake.
Do a web search on "discrete log" "blind signatures". When you find one
you like, translate it from DL to EC by changing exponentiation in DL to
multiplication in EC, multiplication in DL to addition in EC. It'll be
the same thing, but in a different algebra.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Dynamic Substitution Question
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 19:44:00 +0200
John Savard wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >I believe that you are in the best
> >position (among the readers) to do that in neutral terms
> >(in contrast to Terry Ritter who is the patent holder),
> >such that the 'fog' remaining in discussions about the
> >issue could be cleared.
>
> Of course Terry Ritter is himself an interested party.
>
> But I cannot give you a definitive answer to this question. I think
> there may indeed be some very limited prior art applicable to the most
> general interpretation of the patent, but I am in no way qualified to
> translate that into a detailed picture of its valid scope. I can - to
> a limited extent - read a patent, but for this sort of thing, even a
> patent lawyer, who would be far more qualified than I, would not be
> able to give you definitive answers.
>
> I do think, though, that the "preferred embodiment" and everything
> that derives from it is quite safe. Therefore, given my understanding
> of that patent, I would hesitate to use "alleged RC4" in anything
> while that patent remains in force, now that my more recent
> examination of it shows that the claims cover the case where two
> keystreams, rather than plaintext and keystream, are being mixed.
I suppose you more or less misunderstood me. I am not
interested at all in legal issues which a good/bad lawyer
could argue better/worse. I (and I think all readers of
this thread) am interested in the scientific issue,
namely what is 'really' original in the patent. You have
said that you have found stuffs that are clearly original
so it would be very nice if you could present your
understanding or viewpoint of the said novelty so that
other readers could more easily see or eventually discuss.
Concerning your mentioning above of mixing two key streams,
my point is, like what I said previously, that no patent
can claim to cover that in 'general', though some very
'special' (hence hitherto in the literature unknown) such
mixing could merit patenting. Among others, we know that
Wichmann and Hill have long ago mixed a number of outputs
from PRNGs to get a resulting of superior quality. So such
mixings 'in general' is definitely and demonstratably
prior art in my conviction.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: sideband@ btinternet.com (Jim D)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Virtual English Nation
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 17:57:10 GMT
Reply-To: Jim D
On Sun, 08 Apr 2001 21:06:54 +0200, Frank Gerlach <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Sure, the brits will always complain that their "colonies" (this is the word they use
>if they want to make fun of those uncivilized yanks) do not support them enough.
>One of the most insightful episodes in "The Puzzle Palace" is that Friedmann (a
>US cryptologist) was ordered to hand over America's deepest secrets (the breach of
>japanese ciphers), but the brits did not reciprocate by disclosing ULTRA to the
>Americans at that time.
>The virtual english nation could work even better if HM subjects (including Australia
>and NZ) would show a little more respect for Americans....
You lot want to make up your mind whether you're talking about
the English or the British. They're not the same animal.
--
______________________________________________
Posted by Jim Dunnett
jim @sideband.fsnet.co.uk
dynastic @cwcom.net
George Dubya Bushisms No 16:
'Quite frankly teachers are the only
profession that teach our children.'
___________________________________
------------------------------
From: Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ECDSA implementation
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 12:56:35 -0500
Chenghuai Lu wrote:
>
> Would anyone so kind to tell me where I can download the source code of
> ECDSA implementation?
http://www.spindoczine.com/ecc/files.html has it burried in there some place.
You can find code in this file: http://www.eskimo.com/~eresrch/fast_onb/onb_integer.c
but it relies on a bunch of other files (all accessable from the ~eresrch page).
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: JPEG also problematic
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 19:58:33 +0200
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > I have no knowledge but wonder voice in normal telephone
> > communications couldn't carry stego bits rather easily,
> > since all people speak differently (accents, male/female,
> > age, etc.) and at different times (health, emotions etc.)
> > so that differences due to stego modifications could be
> > very hard to detect.
>
> But what would be the reference at the receiving end?
I have noted that I have no (technical) knowledge in that
field, hence I can't say how the voice stego is to be
actually done at all. My (pure) speculation is that one
could do something akin to a method employed in stego of
pictures, namely embedding bits in the coefficients of
fourier transforms of the voice. One can choose certain
coefficients and use the LSB for the stego bits, I suppose.
Perhaps experts in the group would explain how one could
realistically do voice stego in practice.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: Is this a block cipher?
Date: 9 Apr 2001 18:01:57 GMT
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Rick Wash wrote:
>> In old-days classical cryptography, the message M would be divided
>> into letters (which was the smallest division that was easy to work
>> with). Each letter would be replaced with another letter (C->F,
>> etc. for caesar cipher). The problem with this method is that any
>> statistical properties of the language of letters is preserved in the
>> transformation (e.g. since the letter "e" is most likely the most
>> common letter, whatever letter "e" encrypts to will also be the most
>> common letter).
Fine. (Caesar cyphers actually preserve the order and are just a shift of
the letters, which makes them even easier to decrypt)
>> The first solution is to group letters together into block, and
>> encrypt whole blocks together. The goal here is that even when the
>> statistical properties of single letters are strong, groups of
>> letters have less statisticall significant properties. As the blocks
>> get larger, the statistical significance decreases. As such, normally
>> each block is encrypted independent of all other blocks. This is
>> normally known as a block cipher. Note only whole blocks can be
>> encrypted at one time.
A block cypher is just a substitution cypher where there is some sized
substition unit. Under DES that is 64 bits. IDEA 64 bits. ... Rijndahl I
think 128 bits, ...
But at heart they are just permutation cyphers.
>> The second solution to this is to make the encryption depend not only
>> on the key, but also on some kind of state that is updated with a
>> feedback loop. In this case, when a letter is encrypted based on the
>> key and the current state. Then the state is updated, and the next
>> letter is encrypted with the key and the new state. In this way, each
>> time the letter "e" is encrypted, it is encrypted to a different value
>> based on the current state. This obscures the statistical properties
>> of the plaintext. This is normally known as a stream cipher.
Well, I am not sure I would call this a stream cypher, but a block cypher
in some sort of feedback or feedforward mode. Ie, the cypher still just
substitutes one block value for another, it is just what the block which
is substituted for can depend on prior stuff. At each point there is a
known block of 64 bits which are substituted by another block of 64 bits
by the cypher.
A stream cypher I think of as one random stream combined with the input
stream-- ie the classical one time pad, or the pseudo one time pads (eg
RC4). Each byte of the input stream is xored, or cyclically added (or some
other reversible transformation) to the random stream.
------------------------------
From: Frank Gerlach <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Meant Naval Coordinates
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2001 20:04:12 +0200
I meant they should have OTP-encrypted all coordinates. They effectively used
something like OTP ("on top" of Enigma), just with "reused" pads, which is obvioulsy
ridiculous.
The german tradition of following orders blindly and drinking like crazy just doesn't
make for something one can call "intelligence" officer....
------------------------------
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