Cryptography-Digest Digest #473, Volume #14 Tue, 29 May 01 20:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Stream Cipher combiners ("Tom St Denis")
Re: Good crypto or just good enough? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: RSA's new Factoring Challenges: $200,000 prize. ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in email next
week, because of echelon. (Ichinin)
Re: Card Games (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in ("Douglas A.
Gwyn")
Re: Uniciyt distance and compression for AES ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Stream Cipher combiners (David Wagner)
Re: Stream Cipher combiners ("Henrick Hellström")
Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in (Mok-Kong
Shen)
Re: Stream Cipher combiners (David Wagner)
Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in email next
week, because of echelon. ("Harris Georgiou")
Re: Stream Cipher combiners (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: A new technology for internet security? (Niklas Frykholm)
Re: Card Games (John Savard)
Re: Good crypto or just good enough? (David Wagner)
Re: Cool Cryptography Website! (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Card Games (lcs Mixmaster Remailer)
Re: Crypto NEWBIE, wants to create the 100% SAFE FRACTAL encoding... Am I a fool ?
("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: A new technology for internet security? ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Stream Cipher combiners ("Tom St Denis")
Re: Random number generation. ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Cool Cryptography Website! (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: unpredicable random number generator ? (Sam Yorko)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 21:12:56 GMT
"Henrick Hellström" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:9f130u$n0h$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> "Mark Wooding" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> skrev i meddelandet
> news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > Your notation is very strange. The ring of residue classes mod n is
> > usually written Z_n or Z/nZ. Zn (or nZ) is the ideal of multiples of n.
> > I'm not sure what Z/n is. Z*/n is certainly nonsense.
>
>
> G/A is a quotinent group, usually defined as the set of all cosets of A in
> G, i.e. {{xa|a belongs to A}| x belongs to G}. Quotinent groups are e.g.
> dealt with in polynomial field theory.
>
> The asterisk * usually denotes multiplicative subgroups.
>
> I'm not sure which group Tom means. It might be Z*_n/M, where M is a
> singleton set {m} and 0 < m < n.
I meant the multiplicative group modulo n. Sorry... if that was the wrong
notation. I borrowed em from Z and GF... I noted that fields in GF are of
the form GF(p^k)/p(x) so I wrote Z*/n to denote the multiplicative subgroup
of the integers modulo n.
Tom
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Good crypto or just good enough?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 20:45:07 GMT
Sam Simpson wrote:
> Assuming unrelated keys, what is the proof that 3DES is stronger than DES?
Basically, when the key bits are independent,
P(pt|ct&K1&K2) = P(pt|ct&K1)*P(K1|ct&K2)
In general, having some of the key bits might help
and can never hurt. Looking at that the other way
around, having more unknown key bits can never help.
------------------------------
Crossposted-To: sci.math
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA's new Factoring Challenges: $200,000 prize.
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 20:58:30 GMT
I have no doubt that something along these lines can work,
in the sense that in principle the factors are always obtained,
although I can't yet vouch for this particular algorithm.
The main unresolved question seems to be, how many operations
can we expect for finding a typical N-bit prime factor?
------------------------------
From: Ichinin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in email
next week, because of echelon.
Date: Wed, 23 May 2001 22:56:01 +0200
Crypto Neophyte wrote:
> It depends on whether or not you want to get involved in politics.
I already am. I'm promoting death penalty for spammers :o)
(J/K)
<Us stuff deleted>
Note: Me == Europeean citisen.
The main problem where i live is violent organisations, such as
militant
vegetarian and extreme left/right wing organisations. I'm not in any
of
those, however i've found out that big brother is breathing in your
phone
if you mention "export" and "crypto" even in Sweden (Yes Bruce,
reality is
much worse, no matter what people tell you.)
However i find the current export controls lame, for instance i'd add
dictatorships such as Burma and China to the Deny list.
> Another possibility is if you were involved in politics and a member of say
> the local cross dressing organization. If you were accidentaly outed by
> someone who had read your emails it would greatly damage your orginazation is
> some town. It is a nice way of using fear to keep people uninvolved in
> politics.
IF i was running for government or had any political affiliations i'd
use
crypto yes, at current i don't care much, but i have crypto
capabilities if
i should need it.
> So if you just sit at home and watch the "weakest link" you have nothing to
> fear. But if you want to be involved in your community at even a small level
> the Government wants to know what you are doing.
They already know that i'm a security researcher and a crypto liberal.
Regards,
Ichinin
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Card Games
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 23:50:55 +0200
Nigel Smart wrote:
>
> I am sure I once saw something about card games in a cryptographic
> setting. But I cannot remember where.
>
> Basically I would like to know is it possible for four people to
> shuffle and deal 13 cards to each other
> without either party knowing the cards of the other party
> and
> allowing each party to know that the cards have been dealt fairly
>
> Basically this is some kind of multi-party computation but with a
> shuffle.
>
> Any pointers to the literature would be most helpful.
Depending on interpretation, what you wrote could be
understood somewhat differently, I am afraid. There is
a list dedicated to creating a universal dealing algorithm
for creating hands in bridge tournaments at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bridge-dealing
It's my guess that that may be near to what you are
actually seeking.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 21:05:47 GMT
It would be best if all data were securely encrypted,
if there were a suitable PK infrastructure, but that
has nothing to do with so-called Echelon. If the
European parliament endorses the report of that
committee then they will look (more) like morons.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Uniciyt distance and compression for AES
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 21:19:17 GMT
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> when breaking a encryption you need to know the language used.
Actually, that's not always necessary. Often, just the fact
that the natural language has high redundancy is enough.
All one really has to do is to distinguish correct guesses
from incorrect ones, not fit a detailed source model.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 21:51:24 +0000 (UTC)
Henrick Hellström wrote:
>"Mark Wooding" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> skrev i meddelandet
>news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>> Your notation is very strange. The ring of residue classes mod n is
>> usually written Z_n or Z/nZ. Zn (or nZ) is the ideal of multiples of n.
>> I'm not sure what Z/n is. Z*/n is certainly nonsense.
>
>G/A is a quotinent group, usually defined as the set of all cosets of A in
>G, i.e. {{xa|a belongs to A}| x belongs to G}. Quotinent groups are e.g.
>dealt with in polynomial field theory.
>
>The asterisk * usually denotes multiplicative subgroups.
Yeah, sure, of course, but Mark Wooding's point still stands: Z*/n
is very strange. First, if Z* denotes the multiplicative group of Z,
then Z* contains only 1 and -1, which is pretty uninteresting and almost
certainly not what the original poster meant. Second, n is not an coset,
it is a number, and G/g makes no sense if g is a group element rather
than a coset. The coset in Z corresponding to multiples of n is nZ,
which is why the ring of residue classes mod n is often written Z/nZ.
------------------------------
From: "Henrick Hellström" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 23:59:27 +0200
"David Wagner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> skrev i meddelandet
news:9f15ks$2aeo$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Yeah, sure, of course, but Mark Wooding's point still stands....
No doubt. Tom has already explained what he meant.
--
Henrick Hellström [EMAIL PROTECTED]
StreamSec HB http://www.streamsec.com
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 00:02:22 +0200
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
> It would be best if all data were securely encrypted,
> if there were a suitable PK infrastructure, but that
> has nothing to do with so-called Echelon. If the
> European parliament endorses the report of that
> committee then they will look (more) like morons.
I suppose the following is certainly correct. If more
people know that there exist communication interception
facilities operated by certain big powers (one sees
e.g. the pictures of those spherical domes), then that
tends to wake up a little bit their awareness of the
importance of taking certain measures to ensure their
privacy in cases relevant. Whether the system is called
Echelon (or having the name of a rose, for example)
doesn't matter, nor whether it is the system specially
named or is instead another one(s) that actually
intercepts their messages.
M. K. Shen
========================
http://home.t-online.de/home/mok-kong.shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 22:09:39 +0000 (UTC)
Tom St Denis wrote:
>[...] GF(p^k)/p(x) [...]
That's meaningless, too, as far as I can tell.
Did you mean (Z/qZ)[x]/(p(x))?
(This is isomorphic to GF(q^k) when q is prime,
the polynomial p is irreducible over Z/qZ, and deg p = k.)
------------------------------
From: "Harris Georgiou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Euroean commision will recommend all citizens to use encryption in email
next week, because of echelon.
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 01:17:36 +0300
Ï Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Ýãñáøå óôï ìÞíõìá óõæÞôçóçò:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> It would be best if all data were securely encrypted,
> if there were a suitable PK infrastructure, but that
> has nothing to do with so-called Echelon. If the
> European parliament endorses the report of that
> committee then they will look (more) like morons.
Since encryption can be used on public scale only for e-mail and computer
comms (using any of the freeware packages), then PKI is not really a
problem, since all these packages work quite well over the Internet for many
years now (take PGP for example).
The real problem is that if they admit that encryption should be used then
it has to be applied even for cellphones or normal telephones. What they are
really worried about is hardware cost and their (partially) lost ability to
track anyone down.
In any case, I'm not worried who is gonna look like a moron, as long as
everybody knows what should be done (and it does not).
--
Harris
- 'Malo e lelei ki he pongipongi!'
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 00:27:01 +0200
Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> "Henrick Hellström" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:9f130u$n0h$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > "Mark Wooding" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> skrev i meddelandet
> > news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > > Your notation is very strange. The ring of residue classes mod n is
> > > usually written Z_n or Z/nZ. Zn (or nZ) is the ideal of multiples of n.
> > > I'm not sure what Z/n is. Z*/n is certainly nonsense.
> >
> >
> > G/A is a quotinent group, usually defined as the set of all cosets of A in
> > G, i.e. {{xa|a belongs to A}| x belongs to G}. Quotinent groups are e.g.
> > dealt with in polynomial field theory.
> >
> > The asterisk * usually denotes multiplicative subgroups.
> >
> > I'm not sure which group Tom means. It might be Z*_n/M, where M is a
> > singleton set {m} and 0 < m < n.
>
> I meant the multiplicative group modulo n. Sorry... if that was the wrong
> notation. I borrowed em from Z and GF... I noted that fields in GF are of
> the form GF(p^k)/p(x) so I wrote Z*/n to denote the multiplicative subgroup
> of the integers modulo n.
Wouldn't (Z_n)* (parentheses not needed in normal printing
fonts) be a correct notation for your Z*/n? Mathematicians
please correct me, if I am wrong.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Niklas Frykholm)
Subject: Re: A new technology for internet security?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 08:15:18 +0000 (UTC)
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David Hopwood wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>> A US firm claims to have developed a new technology for
>> internet security though varying the IP addresses:
>>
>> http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010521/wr/tech_security_dc_1.html
>
>I don't see how this would have the slightest effect against attacks on
>application-level protocols (exploiting insecure CGI scripts or e-mail
>clients that run executables, for example), which are the biggest
>practical threat anyway. Also, it introduces all the same protocol
>incompatibility problems as Network Address Translation.
Yes, it seems like just a weird kind of NAT firewall. One advantage it
might have over an ordinary firewall is to also offer some protection
for the internal network --- but you could achieve the same thing in a
cleaner way with packet filtering switches.
// Niklas
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Card Games
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 22:41:49 GMT
On Tue, 29 May 2001 16:10:33 +0100, Bo Lin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>I think you are talking about "Mental Poker" which you can find in the
>book:
> D. E. Denning, "Cryptography and Data Security", Addison-Wesley, 1982.
Or on page 92 of AC, 2nd edition, and yes, it should work for Bridge
too.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/frhome.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Good crypto or just good enough?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 22:51:01 +0000 (UTC)
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>Sam Simpson wrote:
>> Assuming unrelated keys, what is the proof that 3DES is stronger than DES?
>
>Basically, when the key bits are independent,
>P(pt|ct&K1&K2) = P(pt|ct&K1)*P(K1|ct&K2)
I don't understand. When ct = E_{K1,K2}(pt), then P(pt | ct&K1&K2) = 1, no?
What were you trying to say? I'm sure I must have misunderstood, but where
did I go wrong? Perhaps you can elaborate on what the sample space is and
what the events pt, ct, K1, K2 represent?
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Cool Cryptography Website!
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 00:48:29 +0200
John Savard wrote:
>
> On 29 May 2001 12:06:47 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote, in part:
>
> >ALso its not clear to me John is
> >upset or not. are you john.
>
> Well, I E-mailed the guy and didn't hear back. I am somewhat upset
> simply because a site like this - not a mirror, just text taken from
> my site and incorporated bodily, and rearranged, into an "original"
> site - has the potential to place my authorship of my work into
> question.
>
> I'm hoping there's a good explanation, like this being just working
> documents that weren't intended to be on the public Web - let alone
> the search engines. If he were to clean up his act, though, and give
> credit, then I'd be satisfied.
Be happy that someone values your articles so much that
he publishes them verbatim as if these were his own.
After all, it assists your purpose of disseminating
your views/ideas. (You don't expect revenues from your
internet publishing, do you?) In cases of pieces of
codes, your name and address should however be retained,
since you as programmer are more apt than any third
person to properly deal with bug reports and suggestions
of improvements, I believe.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
Date: 29 May 2001 23:00:16 -0000
From: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Card Games
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/150998.html points to a recent paper on
"Mental Poker" which also contains a good set of links to earlier work
on the problem.
Anyone know of any implementations of these protocols?
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto NEWBIE, wants to create the 100% SAFE FRACTAL encoding... Am I a
fool ?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 11:08:07 -0700
"BenZen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:uHFP6.1100$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> It's mainly intended as a 'block' cypher; since I plan on using it on
files mainly.
> But I shall read the details about block vs stream in section 1.5.1 of the
> book I just mentionned.
Since it's so early in the design I'll just address this single
consideration. The difference between block and stream ciphers varies widely
by definition. A common interpretation (I'll only bother with the most
stream generator form of stream ciphers for simplicity) is that a block
cipher combines a small key with a small block of data in such a way that
they cannot be removed from each other without knowledge of the key. A
stream cipher generates an infinite series of random numbers and makes us of
a combinor (typically XOR) to combine the stream the data. I personally like
stretching the definition of both a bit, and defining the stream cipher's
combinor to be any block cipher (XOR is included just for unification), and
including simple key repetition as a stream cipher (again for unification).
Both definitions fail significantly when faced with constructions like
counter mode (encrypt a series of integers publically known and XOR it with
the data). Both a block and a stream cipher can be used for any purpose, for
encrypting a finite stream with a stream cipher simply generate only a
finite amount of the stream (all useful generators only generate a finite
amount of the stream at a time). If you're building a block cipher then this
might be reasonably doable.
Joe
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A new technology for internet security?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 11:30:39 -0700
Based on the first few paragraphs the attack is fairly simple, assume it's
going to work, and so send everything at once, you've got apparently the
majority of a second (although in reality you'd have several seconds, check
your pings from modem to modem), given this and a semi-decent connection,
say even 56Kbps you can mount most known types of attacks. Additionally how
do they pretend that say Yahoo could make use of this? They depend on having
a known address. It's also obvious from the story that the insurance company
doesn't believe too heavily in it either, offering a mere 10% discount is
nothing, with a decent sized contract (something over one family) you can
usually strangle a 25% rebate out of them. Overall I'd say that
security-wise it's uninteresting, insurance-wise it's a token discount
(you'd get a larger discount moving from NT to Unix), so economically it's
not worth it.
Joe
"Mok-Kong Shen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> A US firm claims to have developed a new technology for
> internet security though varying the IP addresses:
>
> http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010521/wr/tech_security_dc_1.html
>
> I don't yet clearly see how this actually functions, since
> one could have only a limited number of IP addresses at
> one's disposal, if I don't err.
>
> M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher combiners
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 23:24:46 GMT
"David Wagner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:9f16n3$2c1h$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Tom St Denis wrote:
> >[...] GF(p^k)/p(x) [...]
>
> That's meaningless, too, as far as I can tell.
> Did you mean (Z/qZ)[x]/(p(x))?
> (This is isomorphic to GF(q^k) when q is prime,
> the polynomial p is irreducible over Z/qZ, and deg p = k.)
What the world needs is smarter Toms or better notation.
All I wanted to say is The multiplicative sub-group of integers modulo n.
Perhaps I should write my math in english more often :-)
Err.
Ok so what is the correct notation? Z/nZ?
Tom
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Random number generation.
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 12:18:47 -0700
Let's start with addressing "standard practice" there isn't one, everyone
does there own thing, and most fail miserably. With that said here's yet
another idea.
Treat the incoming semi-random data as a stream (not difficult to do).
whenever random data is requested, hash all the available random data along
with a 64-bit counter (you can do this efficiently with a little work). You
can do it with any hash function, or even any MAC to build something larger
than a given hash function, you can do various things because you don't need
the full abilities of a hash function.
To implement this securely is fairly easy, assuming you have hash_put(byte)
(add byte to the current hash), and hash_clone() (duplicate the internal
state of the hash) functions by splitting the information.
global for now
hashInfo one
hashInfo two
64bitInteger count
rand_get()
{
for each input
one.hash_put(poll information)
one.hash_put(count)
count = count +1
two = one.hash_clone()
output = two.hash_get()
}
If you have threads available have the poll execute on a given timeout, and
reduce rand_get to
one.hash_put(count)
count = count +1
two = one.hash_clone()
output = two.hash_get()
This should work quite efficiently, you can also periodically reseed from a
strong source, either a slow hardware source (which you should also poll),
hard drive turbulence, key strokes timings, time between calls to rand_get,
etc. Because the hash calls will be fairly quick you won't have too many
worries.
Joe
"Benjamin Johnston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> Good Day,
>
> I've been considering the need for generating random numbers in my "toy"
> crypto project.
>
> One approach I was considering is amassing a heap of semi-random data like
> time stamps and key strokes (ie. as suggested in "all the books")...
>
> But, then I need to turn this data into actual "random" data (well, close
> enough for cryptographic purposes).
>
> To do this, I figured there are two approaches;
>
> 1. have plenty of data and then hash, say, 1Kb (or whatever I estimate is
> necessary given the entropy of the semi-random data) into 160 bits at a
> time (and not use the same 1Kb of data, again, for any other purpose).
>
> 2. have plenty of data, and prepend an integer to all of the data, and
> hash the whole lot to 160 bits. If I need more "random" data, I just
> increment the integer and hash it all again.
>
>
> I think approach 2 is easier, and it means that I don't have to worry
> about "wasting" the semi-random data if I start discarding the hashed
> values. And I figure it should be just as secure as approach 1, if we
> assume that SHA, for example, is "good" - so the two hash values should be
> completely unrelated.
>
> So, what I'm asking, is:
>
> 1. is my approach (ie. the second one) silly?
>
> 2. what is standard practice for this kind of problem?
>
> Thanks a lot,
>
> -Benjamin Johnston
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Cool Cryptography Website!
Date: 29 May 2001 23:22:14 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mok-Kong Shen) wrote in <3B14273D.58F9F10E@t-
online.de>:
>
>
>John Savard wrote:
>>
>> On 29 May 2001 12:06:47 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote, in part:
>>
>> >ALso its not clear to me John is
>> >upset or not. are you john.
>>
>> Well, I E-mailed the guy and didn't hear back. I am somewhat upset
>> simply because a site like this - not a mirror, just text taken from
>> my site and incorporated bodily, and rearranged, into an "original"
>> site - has the potential to place my authorship of my work into
>> question.
>>
>> I'm hoping there's a good explanation, like this being just working
>> documents that weren't intended to be on the public Web - let alone
>> the search engines. If he were to clean up his act, though, and give
>> credit, then I'd be satisfied.
>
>Be happy that someone values your articles so much that
>he publishes them verbatim as if these were his own.
>After all, it assists your purpose of disseminating
>your views/ideas. (You don't expect revenues from your
>internet publishing, do you?) In cases of pieces of
>codes, your name and address should however be retained,
I may be wrong but i think Johm only talkes about code
he never really writes any.
>since you as programmer are more apt than any third
>person to properly deal with bug reports and suggestions
>of improvements, I believe.
>
>M. K. Shen
>
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE "OLD VERSIOM"
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
My website http://members.nbci.com/ecil/index.htm
My crypto code http://radiusnet.net/crypto/archive/scott/
MY Compression Page http://members.nbci.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE FOR EMAIL drop the roman "five" ***
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged or
something..
No I'm not paranoid. You all think I'm paranoid, don't you!
------------------------------
From: Sam Yorko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: unpredicable random number generator ?
Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 17:02:39 -0800
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Amaury Jacquot wrote:
> >
> > the only known ones are based on counting radio-actives beep on a geiger
> > counter.
>
> Presumably you wouldn't also be able to predict my sequences
> obtained from casting of dice.
>
> M. K. Shen
I've been fond of:
http://www.lavarand.com/
Sam
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