At 19:49 1/08/99 -0700, bram wrote: >No, block ciphers are weak against related-key attacks, which happen all >over the place in the threat model on SRNGs. I think this statement is overly general. Most of the AES candidates appear to have taken this into consideration, for example. There is nothing inherent in the concept of a block cipher which would imply that there would be a weakness against related key attacks; however it is true that many key scheduling algorithms have been too simplistic in the past. Greg. Greg Rose INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Qualcomm Australia VOICE: +61-2-9181-4851 FAX: +61-2-9181-5470 Suite 410, Birkenhead Point, http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/ Drummoyne NSW 2047 232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
- Re: depleting the random number generator James A. Donald
- Re: depleting the random number generator Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: depleting the random number generator David Wagner
- Re: depleting the random number generator James A. Donald
- Re: depleting the random number generator bram
- Re: depleting the random number generator James A. Donald
- Re: depleting the random number generator John Kelsey
- Summary re: /dev/random Sandy Harris
- Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) Sandy Harris
- Re: Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) bram
- Re: Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) Greg Rose
- Re: Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) Damien Miller
- Re: Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) John Gilmore
- Re: Proposal (was Summary re: /dev/random) David Honig
- Re: linux-ipsec: Re: Proposal (was Summary... John D. Hardin
- Re: Summary re: /dev/random tytso
- Re: Summary re: /dev/random bram
- Re: linux-ipsec: Re: Summary re: /dev/rand... Henry Spencer
- Re: linux-ipsec: Re: Summary re: /dev/rand... Paul Koning
- Re: Summary re: /dev/random John Kelsey
- Re: Summary re: /dev/random Theodore Y. Ts'o