Stephen Dorril's 1999 book on MI6 (just out in the US)
alludes to several ciphers and communications security
methods whose names he has disguised on legal advice, 
presumably to avoid violation of Britain's Official Secrets Act.

We would appreciate receiving information on these ciphers 
and methods for publication on Cryptome. Below are the 
excepts from Chapter 36 of the book with diguises such as 
"B***."

Full chapter and publication data:

   http://216.167.120.49/mi6-sd36.htm

[Begin excepts]

As part of MI6's obsession with security, a great deal of
time is spent on being indoctrinated in cipher and
communications work. Trainee officers are instructed on
how to encrypt messages for transmission and how to use
the manual B*** cipher which is regarded as particularly
secure. Used at stations abroad to transmit details of
operations, potential sources and defectors, B*** is sent
either via the diplomatic bag or by special SIS courier.
Officers learn about 'off-line' systems for the
encryption of messages such as N***** - used prior to
transmission by cipher machines - and 'on-line' systems
for the protection of telegrams during transmission,
code-named H*** and T********. They are indoctrinated
into the use of certain cryptonyms for forwarding
telegrams to particular organisations and offices such as
SIS headquarters, which is designated A****. 

They also learn about code words with which sensitive
messages are headlined, indicating to whom they may be
shown. UK EYES ALPHA warns that the contents are not to
be shown to any foreigners and are intended only for the
home intelligence and security services, armed forces and
Whitehall recipients. UK EYES B includes the above
categories, the Northern Ireland Office, LIST X firms
engaged in the manufacture of sensitive equipment, and
certain US, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian
intelligence personnel liaising with the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London. Additional code
words mark specific exclusions and inclusions. E******
material cannot be shown to the Americans, while L*****
deprives local intelligence officials and agencies of its
content. Material for named individual officers,
sometimes at specified times, is headed D**** or D****,
while particularly sensitive material about a fellow
officer or operation is known as D******.

An MI6 station is usually sited in a part of the embassy
regularly swept by technical staff for bugs and other
electronic attack. It is entered using special door codes
with an inner strongroom-type door for greater security.
Following all the procedures learned during training,
officers handling material up to the 'Secret' level work
on secure overseas Unix terminals (S****) and use a
messaging system known as ARRAMIS. Conversations by
secure telephone masked by white noise are undertaken via
a special SIS version of the BRAHMS system. A special
chip developed by GCHQ apparently makes it impossible
even for the US NSA to decipher such conversations. 

Secure Speech System (H*******) handset units are used by
SIS officers within a telephone speech enclosure. The
most important room is electronically shielded and lined

with up to a foot of lead for secure cipher and
communications transmissions. From the comms room, an
officer can send and receive secure faxes up to SECRET
level via the C****** fax system and S***** encrypted
communications with the Ministry of Defence (MoD),
Cabinet Office, MI5 (codename SNUFFBOX), GCHQ and 22 SAS.
An encrypted electronic messaging system working through
fibre optics, known as the UK Intelligence Messaging
Network, was installed in early 1997 and enables MI6 to
flash intelligence scoops to special terminals in the
MoD, the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and
Industry. Manned twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a
year, and secured behind a heavy thick door, the cipher
machines have secure 'integral protection', known as
TEMPEST. MI6 officers abroad also work alongside GCHQ
personnel, monitoring foreign missions and
organisations."

[End excerpts]



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