Attached is a spam mail that constitutes an attack on paypal similar in effect and method to man in the middle.
The bottom line is that https just is not working. Its broken.
The fact that people keep using shared secrets is a symptom of https not working.
The flaw in https is that you cannot operate the business and trust model using https that you can with shared secrets.
I don't think it's https that's broken, since https wasn't intended to solve the customer authentication / authorization problem (you could try to use SSL's client certificates for that, but no one ever intended client certificate authentication to be a generalized transaction problem).
When I responded to this before, I thought you were talking about the server auth problem, not the password problem. I continue to feel that the server authentication problem is a very hard problem to solve, since there's few hints to the browser as to what the user's intent is.
The password problem does need to be solved, but complaining that HTTPS or SSL doesn't solve it isn't any more relevant than complaining that it's not solved by HTML, HTTP, and/or browser or server implementations, since any and all of these are needed in producing a new solution which can function with real businesses and real users. Let's face it, passwords are so deeply ingrained into people's lives that nothing which is more complex in any way than passwords is going to have broad acceptance, and any consumer-driven company is going to consider "easy" to be more important that "secure".
Right now, my best idea for solving this problem is to:
- Standardize an HTML input method for <FORM> which does an SPEKE (or similar) mutual authentication.
- Get browser makers to design better ways to communicate to users that UI elements can be trusted. For example, a proposal I saw recently which would have the OS decorate the borders of "trusted" windows with facts or images that an attacker wouldn't be able to predict: the name of your dog, or whatever. (Sorry, can't locate a link right now, but I'd appreciate one.)
- Combine the two to allow sites to provide a user-trustable UI to enter a password which cannot be sucked down.
- Evangelize to users that this is better and that they should be suspicious of any situation where they used such interface once, but now it's gone.
I agree that the overall architecture is broken; the problem is that it's broken in more ways than can just be fixed with any change to TLS/SSL or HTTPS.
--------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]