(I've also posted this message to sci.crypt)

Hi list,

NTRU Cryptosystems has posted several new documents, which are
avaible through http://www.ntru.com/cryptolab/params.htm.

As background: recent results on NTRUEncrypt have shown that
decryption failures on validly encrypted messages leak information
that eventually allows an attacker to recover the private key.
The results do not affect the known difficulty of the underlying
class of lattice problems; however, they show that care must
be taken in choosing parameters to ensure that decryption failures
occur with negligible or zero probability, even in the presence
of an adversary who is actively trying to cause such failures.

NTRU Cryptosystems is proposing slightly altered parameter sets
which decrease the probability of average-case decryption failures, 
and a padding scheme which ensures that an attacker cannot increase
the probability of decryption failures above this average-case

The new documents analyze the strength of the new parameter sets
against all known attacks on NTRU (lattice-based, meet-in-the-
middle, and decryption failure based) and show that for N=251
we comfortably achieve 2^80 security against all of these attacks.
We also provide the first ever full proof of security to be presented
for NTRUEncrypt.

If anyone has any questions, I'll be happy to answer them.



William Whyte
Director, Cryptographic R&D
NTRU Cryptosystems
5 Burlington Woods
Burlington, MA 01803
tel:  +1.781.418.2500
fax:  +1.781.418.2532

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