At 11:40 AM 7/8/03 -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
>A hardware token that requires a PIN/password to operate can be considered
>two-factor authentication ("something you have" and "something you know").
I was going to comment on how a simple plastic debit card
that includes a photo provides the third "something you are".
(More reliably than the signature, which is also "something
you are", but readily forged/ignored.)
Then it occurred to me: as cameras become ubiquitous
(e.g., in cell phones) some extra security could be obtained
by sending a trusted photo of the account holder plus a live picture
of the card user.
A picture glued into the card could be forged, but a
smartcard (with more data area than a magstripe)
could include a picture of the account holder,
so a thief has no idea what to look like. But the vendor can
check the encrypted smartcard face to the face on the phone
or webcam. For high-value remote transactions, this might
be viable in a few years.
This is already standard practice
on high-security building-entry cards (and passports?),
with the guard comparing the card-embedded face to the one before him.
Ubiquitous cameras will bring that to remote transactions,
reducing cost due to lower fraud.
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