At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
> Then the opponent can put unlimited effort into
> traffic analysis but won't get anything in return,
> beyond the _a priori_ obvious fact that some pair
> of subscribers *may* have communicated.

This is not true, and in fact this result is one of the most important
to have been obtained in the anonymity community in the past decade.  The
impossibility of practical, strong, real-time anonymous communication has
undoubtedly played a role in the lack of deployment of such systems.

The attack consists of letting the attacker subvert (or become!) one of
the communication endpoints.  This can be as simple as running a "sting"
web site offering illegal material.

That's what http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~ashubina/google.html is all about.


steve


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