> So this doesn't
> work unless you put a "speed limit" on CPU's, and that's ridiculous.

Go read about the 4758.  CPU speed won't help unless
you can crack 2048-bit RSA, or figure out a way around
the physical security, or find a flaw in the application.

> Yes.  Protocol designers have been explaining how to do them for
> decades.  

But (at a high-level) there are things that are awkward
or extremely impractical to do with, say, multi-party computation.

That's where the "secure hardware" work---from Abyss, to TCPA, to
plastic-speckles, to the CPU+ work at MIT and Princeton---comes in.  


Sean W. Smith, Ph.D.                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]   
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sws/       (has ssl link to pgp key)
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover NH USA

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