Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > It's really a mistake to think of SSL as being designed > > with an explicit threat model. That just wasn't how the > > designers at Netscape thought, as far as I can tell. > > > Well, that's the sort of confirmation I'm looking > for. From the documents and everything, it seems > as though the threat model wasn't analysed, it was > just picked out of a book somewhere. Or, as you > say, even that is too kind, they simply didn't > think that way. > > But, this is a very important point. It means that > when we talk about secure browsing, it is wrong to > defend it on the basis of the threat model. There > was no threat model. What we have is an accident > of the past.
Maybe so, but it coincides relatively well with the common Internet threat model, so I think you can't just dismiss that out of hand as if it were pulled out of the air. > > Incidentally, Ian, I'd like to propose a counterargument > > to your argument. It's true that most web traffic > > could be encrypted if we had a more opportunistic key > > exchange system. But if there isn't any substantial > > sniffing (i.e. the wire is secure) then who cares? > > > Exactly. Why do I care? Why do you care? > > It is mantra in the SSL community and in the > browsing world that we do care. That's why > the software is arranged in a a double lock- > in, between the server and the browser, to > force use of a CA cert. You keep talking about the server locking you in, but it doesn't. The world is full of people who run SSL servers with self-signed certs. And on the client side the user can, of course, click "ok" to the "do you want to accept this cert" dialog. Really, Ian, I don't understand what it is you want to do. Is all you're asking for to have that dialog worded differently? It's not THAT different from what SSH pops up. -Ekr -- [Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.rtfm.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]