----- Original Message ----- 
From: "John Gilmore" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 10:31 AM
Subject: Re: A National ID: AAMVA's Unique ID

> > The solution then is obvious, don't have a big central database. Instead
> > a distributed database.
> Our favorite civil servants, the Departments of Motor Vehicles, are about
> to do exactly this to us.
> They call it "Unique ID" and their credo is: "One person, one license,
> one record".  They swear that it isn't national ID, because national
> ID is disfavored by the public.  But it's the same thing in
> distributed-computing clothes.

I think you misunderstood my point. My point was that it is actually
_easier_, _cheaper_, and more _secure_ to eliminate all the silos. There is
no reason for the various silos, and there is less reason to tie them
together. My entire point was to put my entire record on my card, this
allows faster look-up (O(1) time versus O(lg(n))), greater security (I
control access to my record), it's cheaper (the cards have to be bought
anyway), it's easier (I've already done most of the work on defining them),
and administration is easier (no one has to care about duplication).

> This sure smells to me like national ID.

I think they are drawing the line a bit finer than either of us would like.
They don't call it a national ID because it being a national ID means that
it would be run by the federal government, being instead run by state
governments, it is a state ID, linked nationally.

As I said in the prior one, I disagree with any efforts to create forced ID.

> This, like the MATRIX program, is the brainchild of the federal
> Department of inJustice.  But those wolves are in the sheepskins of
> state DMV administrators, who are doing the grassroots politics and
> the actual administration.  It is all coordinated in periodic meetings
> by "AAMVA", the "American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators"
> (http://aamva.org/).  Draft bills to join the "Unique ID Compact", the
> legally binding agreement among the states to do this, are already
> being circulated in the state legislatures by the heads of state DMVs.
> The idea is to sneak them past the public, and past the state
> legislators, before there's any serious public debate on the topic.
> They have lots of documents about exactly what they're up to.  See
> http://aamva.org/IDSecurity/.  Unfortunately for us, the real
> documents are only available to AAMVA members; the affected public is
> not invited.
> Robyn Wagner and I have tried to join AAMVA numerous times, as
> "freetotravel.org".  We think that we have something to say about the
> imposition of Unique ID on an unsuspecting public.  They have rejected
> our application every time -- does this remind you of the Hollywood
> copy-prevention "standards committees"?  Here is their recent
> rejection letter:
>   Thank you for submitting an application for associate membership in
>   Unfortunately, the application was denied again. The Board is not clear
>   to how FreeToTravel will further enhance AAMVA's mission and service to
>   membership. We will be crediting your American Express for the full
>   charged.
>   Please feel free to contact Linda Lewis at (703) 522-4200 if you would
>   to discuss this further.
>   Dianne
>   Dianne E. Graham
>   Director, Member and Conference Services
>   4301 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
>   Arlington, VA 22203
>   T: (703) 522-4200 | F: (703) 908-5868
>   www.aamva.org <http://www.aamva.org/>
> At the same time, they let in a bunch of vendors of "high security" ID
> cards as associate members.

Well then create a High-Security ID card company, build it on the technology
I've talked about. It's fairly simple, file the paperwork to create an LLC
with you and Robyn, the LLC acquires a website, it can be co-located at your
current office location, the website talks about my technology, how it
allows the unique and secure identification of every individual, blah, blah,
blah, get a credit card issued in the correct name. They'll almost certainly
let you in, you'll look and smell like a valid alternative (without lying
because you could certainly offer the technology), if you really want to
make it look really good I'm even willing to work with you on filing a
patent, something that they'd almost certainly appreciate.

> AAMVA, the 'guardians' of our right to travel and of our identity
> records, doesn't see how listening to citizens concerned with the
> erosion of exactly those rights and records would enhance their
> "mission and service".

Of course it won't, their "mission and service" is to offer the strongest
identity link possible in the ID cards issued nation-wide, as such the
citizen's course of action has to be to govern the states issuing these
identication papers. However, if you offer them technology to actually make
their "mission and service" cheaper, more effective, and as a side-benefit
better for their voters. Besides, if you can't beat them (you won't stop
them, no matter what you do) at least improve the situation, you could
easily become a far wealthier individual and improve our general security
versus the alternatives.

> We protest.  Do you?

Very much so, but I also realize that there are far more people who are more
than willing to be "ear-tagged" than those of us willing to fight, as such
what we need to do is fight on a fundamental basis, the most fundamental
benefit offered by good technology in doing this is the cost savings
(regardless of the improved security). As such we need to wage a war on two
fronts, on one front we work to destroy the basis on which they can enstate
these measures, this will work to scale-back the deployment. The second
front is to make it more secure as it does get rolled out, and to build the
technology in such a way that their invasive tactics can be thrown out by
the voting population without destroying the core usefulness of the system
(e.g. it can still be a driver's license).

Such a two-front war is complex and difficult, but if the first front is
completely successful we have gained our desires, the second-front is only
there to erode the invasiveness and provide an abort-path for getting rid of
the technology.

I guess my further point is that sometimes disruptive activities only
results in them hiding from you while they work, but delicate adjustments
can result in real changes.

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