* Bill Stewart: > I agree that it doesn't look useful, but "lawful intercept" is harder, > if you're defining that as "undetected eavesdropping with > possible cooperation of the telco in the middle", > because quantum crypto needs end-to-end fiber so there's > nothing the telco can help with except installing dark fiber, > and the quantum crypto lets you detect eavesdroppers.
But this doesn't scale. You'd need dark fiber to all communication partners. So if quantum key distribution was mandated for applications involving more than just a handful communication partners, you'd need relays (or rather unlikely advances in optical circuit switching). By the way, the complete bashing of the recent QKD experiment is probably not totally deserved. Apparently, the experimenters used a QKD variant that relies on quantum teleportation of photons. This QKD variant is currently *not* available commercially, and the experiment itself could well be an important refinement of Zeilinger's earlier work in this area. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
