DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design
     October 7 - 8, 2004
     DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

     Jayant Kalagnanam, IBM Watson Lab, [EMAIL PROTECTED]  
     Eric Maskin, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced
         Study, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
     David Parkes, Harvard University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
     Aleksandar Pekec, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University,
     Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences.


Recent advances in information technology and its rapid acceptance by
the business community have allowed for the possibility of expediting
complex business transactions. The most prominent example is use of
auctions in corporate procurement and in government deregulation
efforts. When many items with interrelated values are being sold,
economic efficiency can be increased by allowing bidders to make bids
on combinations of items. Procedures for auctioning combinations of
items have inherent computational problems that have to be overcome,
and the emergence of these issues has sparked considerable research
activity in the computer science and combinatorial optimization
communities. The most prominent example is combinatorial auctions in
which multiple goods are auctioned and bidders have and wish to
express different valuations on which goods complement each other and
which goods substitute for each other.

Topics of interest include:
-- expressive bidding languages
-- practical applications (e.g. to electricity, spectrum,...)
-- procurement and e-sourcing
-- combinatorial exchanges
-- preference elicitation
-- optimal auction design
-- approximate mechanisms
-- communication and computation complexity in combinatorial auctions

Workshop Program:

Thursday, October 7, 2004 

 8:00 -  8:30  Registration and Breakfast - CoRE Building, 4th Floor

 8:30 -  8:45  Welcome and Opening Remarks
               Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director

 8:45 -  9:30  Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with 
               Multi-dimensional types
               Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern

 9:30 - 10:10  Multiitem auctions with credit limits
               Shmuel Oren and Shehzad Wadalawala, UC Berkeley

10:10 - 10:30  Break

10:30 - 11:15  Approximation Algorithms for Truthful Mechanisms
               Eva Tardos, Cornell
11:15 - 11:55  Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity
               generalized congestion games
               Lisa Fleischer, Carnegie Mellon University, Kamal Jain,
               MSR and Mohammad Mahdian, MIT

11:55 - 12:35  VCG Overpayment in Random Graphs
               Evdokia Nikolova and  David Karger, MIT

12:35 -  2:00  Lunch

 2:00 -  2:45  The communication requirements of social
               choice rules and supporting budget sets
               Ilya Segal, Stanford University

 2:45 -  3:25  The communication complexity of the private
               value single item bisection auction
               Elena Grigorieva,  P Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller, and
               Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht, the Netherlands

 3:25 -  3:45  Break

 3:45 -  4:30  Market Mechanisms for Redeveloping Spectrum
               Evan Kwerel, FCC

 4:30 -  5:15  Issues in Electricity Market Auction Design
               Richard O'Neill, FERC

 5:15 -  6:15  Panel

 6:30          Dinner

Friday, October 8, 2004

 8:00 -  8:30  Breakfast and Registration

 8:30 -  9:15  Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions
               Sushil Bikhchandani, UCLA
 9:15 - 10:00  The Over-Concentrating Nature of Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
               Charles Zheng, Northwestern

10:00 - 10:20  Break

10:20 - 11:00  Designing Auction Protocols under Asymmetric Information on
               Nature's Selection
               Takayuki Ito, Nagoya Inst.,  Makoto Yokoo, Kyushu and
               Shigeo Matsubara, NTT

11:00 - 11:40  Elicitation in combinatorial auctions with restricted 
               preferences and bounded interdependency between items
               Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie 
               Mellon University, and Paolo Santi, Pisa University
11:40 - 12:20  Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
               in combinatorial auctions
               Sebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes, Harvard

12:20 -  1:30  Lunch

 1:30 -  2:15  To auction or not?  Historical perspectives on the development
               of ecommerce
               Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota

 2:15 -  2:55  Non-computational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems
               in Combinatorial Auctions
               Sasa Pekec, Duke University and Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University

 2:55 -  3:15  Break

 3:15 -  3:55  The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
               Peter Cramton and Lawrence M.Ausubel, University of Maryland and
               Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

 3:55 -  4:35  Generation and Selection of Core Outcomes in Sealed Bid
               Combinatorial Auctions
               Bob Day and S Raghavan, University of Maryland

 4:35 -  5:15  Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences
               in (Combinatorial) Auctions
               Craig Boutilier, University of Toronto, 
               Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University 
               and Rob Shields, CombineNet

Poster Presentations:

Methods for boosting revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

Arbitrage in Combinatorial Exchanges
Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

Optimal Auctions with Finite Support
Edith Elkind, Princeton University

Optimal Distributed Protocols for Generalized Job 
Shop Scheduling Problems via Ascending Combinatorial Auctions
Judy Geng and Roy Kwon, University of Toronto

Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets
Rica Gonen, Hebrew University

A Bidder Aid Tool for Dynamic Package Creation in the 
FCC Spectrum Auctions
Karla Hoffman, GMU, Dinesh Menon and 
Susara A. van den Heever, Decision Analytics

An Exact Algorithm for Procurement Problems under a 
Total Quantity Discount Structure
D.Goossens, A.Maas, F.C.R. Spieksma, and 
J.J van de Klundert, Maastricht U. and Katholieke U. Leuven

Approximation Algorithms for CAs with Complement-Free Bidders
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapiraz, The Hebrew
University, University of Jerusalum

Registration Fees:

(Pre-registration deadline: September 30, 2004)

Please see website for additional registration information.

Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel 
can be found at:




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