********Registration Deadline: January 24, 2005**********
DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality
     January 31 - February 1, 2005
     DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

     Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
     Richard McLean, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
     Daijiro Okada, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences.


Traditionally, economists and game theorists have assumed that
strategic agents are fully rational but in the last few decades a
number of game theorists have argued that human players do not behave
in a way consistent with theoretical predictions. Questions have been
raised regarding the postulate of full rationality and some have
proposed formalizations of partially or boundedly rational players and
games played by such players. If one takes the view that a process of
decision-making in economic or other social situations constitutes
computation in a formal sense of theoretical computer science, then
one is naturally led to some notion of bounded computational power as
a formal expression of bounded rationality. Two important and
complementary questions in this line of inquiry are (1) What is the
computational power required in order to play a game in a way
consistent with full rationality? (2) If players are limited in their
computational power, how different will equilibrium outcomes be from
the fully rational case? This workshop will bring together economists
and game theorists interested in bounded rationality, as well as
theoretical computer scientists with experience in limited
computational models.

Topics of interest include:

    * Bounded recall and bounded complexity in repeated games
    * Strategic aspects of machine learning
    * Game theoretic applications of cryptography 


This is a preliminary program.

Monday, January 31, 2005

 8:15 -  8:50 Breakfast and Registration

 8:50 -  9:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks
              Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director

 9:00 - 10:00 Correlation, Communication, Complexity and Competition
              Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University

10:00 - 10:30 Break

10:30 - 11:30 Olivier Gossner, TBA

11:30 - 12:30 Players as Serial or Parallel Random Access Machines
              Timothy Van Zandt, INSEAD

12:30 -  2:00 Lunch

 2:00 -  3:00 Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania, TBA

 3:00 -  3:30 Break

 3:30 -  4:30 Deterministic Calibration and Nash Equilibrium
              Sham Kakade, University of Pennsylvania

 4:30 -  5:30 For Bayesian Wannabees, Are Disagreements not About Information?
              Robin Hanson, George Mason University 

 6:00         Dinner - DIMACS Lounge

Tuesday, February 1, 2005

 8:30 -  9:00 Breakfast and Registration

 9:00 - 10:00 Algorithms for Graphical Games
              Luis Ortiz, MIT

10:00 - 10:30 Break

10:30 - 11:30 Deterministic Calibration with Simpler Checking Rules
              Dean Foster, University of Pennsylvania

11:30 -  1:00 Lunch

 1:00 -  2:00 Mechanism Design and Deliberative Agents
              Kate Larsen, University of Waterloo

 2:00 -  2:30 Break

 2:30 -  3:30 Vahab Mirrokni, MIT, Convergence Issues in Competitive Games

 3:30  - 4:30 Efficient Equilibrium Algorithms for Compact Repeated Games
              Michael Littman, Rutgers University 

Registration Fees:

(Pre-registration deadline: January 24, 2005)

Please see website for additional registration information.

Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel 
can be found at:




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