This message is being forwarded to you on behalf of
Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University, DIMACS Member
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THE SIXTH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC-05)

Registration now Open!
See Accepted Papers, Workshops, Tutorials, below.

June 5-8, 2005, Vancouver, Canada
http://www.acm.org/ec05

Registration is now open for ACM EC-05!  Early registration ends May
16th, so sign up now at:
         http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/registrations.shtml

Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
(SIGECOM) has sponsored the leading scientific conference on advances
in theory, systems, and applications for electronic commerce.  Below
is the schedule for the 4 tutorials, 1 workshop, and 32 papers
accepted for ACM EC-05.  For additional information, please visit:
         http://www.acm.org/ec05.

This year, ACM EC-05 will be held from Sunday, June 5 through
Wednesday, June 8, 2005 at the Vancouver Marriott Pinnacle resort, a
first-class hotel located downtown in the stunning city of Vancouver,
Canada. For more information about the conference surroundings, visit
Vancouver's tourism Web site:
         http://www.tourismvancouver.com

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Tutorials
         http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/tutorials.shtml

Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Morning

1) Optimal Mechanism Design without Priors - Jason Hartline
2) Trading Agent Design and Analysis - Michael P. Wellman

Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Afternoon (two one-hour talks)

1) Polynomial Time Algorithms for Market Equilibria
    - Kamal Jain and Vijay Vazirani
2) Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges
    - Tuomas Sandholm

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Workshop
         http://research.yahoo.com/~pennockd/ext/ssa/

Sun, Jun 5 2005 - All Day

Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions - David Pennock and Kursad Asdemir
***************************************************************
Final program

MONDAY
08:30 - 10:10 Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms
              Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz

              Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains 
              Michael Saks, Lan Yu

              Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for
              Coalitional Games 
              Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham

              Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value 
              Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan

10:10 - 10:40 BREAK

10:40 - 12:20 Interconnected Communication Networks Provisioned
              Selfishly 
              Pedro Ferreira, Marvin Sirbu

              Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing
              Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker

              Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File
              Sharing Networks 
              Nicolas Christin, Andreas Weigend, John Chuang

              A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed
              Shared Clusters 
              Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang

12:20 - 02:00 LUNCH

02:00 - 03:00 Invited Speaker: Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

03:00 - 03:30 BREAK

03:30 - 05:10 Nearly Optimal Multi Attribute Auctions
              Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann

              Optimal Design of English Auctions with Discrete bid Levels 
              Esther David, Alex Rogers, Nicholas Jennings, Jeremy Schiff, 
Sarit Kraus

              Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions
              Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan

              Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods
              Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, 
David Parkes

TUESDAY

08:30 - 10:10 First-Price Path Auctions
              Nicole Immorlica, David Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami

              From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions
              Robert McGrew, Jason Hartline

              True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and 
VCG
              Payments in Graphs 
              Edith Elkind

              Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
              Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad 
Mahdian, Amin Saberi

10:10 - 10:40 BREAK

10:40 - 12:20 Graceful Service Degradation (or, How to Know your
              Payment is Late) 
              Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon

              Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking
              Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, Chen Zhang

              Dynamic and Secure B2B E-contract Update Management
              Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul Grefen

              Secure Distributed Human Computation
              Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine

12:20 - 02:00 LUNCH

02:00 - 03:00 Invited Talk: Jennifer Rexford, Princeton University

03:00 - 03:30 BREAK

03:30 - 05:10 Communication Complexity of Common Voting Protocols
              Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

              On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions: Demand Queries 
and
              Ascending Auctions 
              Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan

              Fairness and Optimality in Congestion Games
              Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay 
Vazirani

              Congestion Games with Failures
              Maria Polukarov, Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz

WEDNESDAY

08:30 - 10:10 ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
              David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, 
              Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey 
Shneidman, Hassan Sultan

              Self-Selection, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of
              Negative Feedback at eBay 
              Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick

              Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison 
              Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David Pennock

              Integrating Tradeoff Support in Product Search Tools for 
E-Commerce
              Sites 
              Pearl Pu, Li Chen

10:10 - 10:40 BREAK

10:40 - 11:55 Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance
              Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

              On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially
              Informed Environments 
              Ahuva Mu'alem

              Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General
              Framework 
              MingYang Kao, XiangYang Li, WeiZhao Wang

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