James A. Donald responded to me:
A missing element is motivation for getting something
like this deployed... I think spam could offer such
motivation; and, I strongly believe that a
cryptographic protocol to penalize spammers could be
one of the most important tools against spam.
The cure for spam is not a provable link to a true name,
but a provable link to a domain name.
I disagree. I believe that _accountability_ is a key element in stopping
spam, and that cryptographic protocols (such as SICS) offer the best
mechanisms to ensure accountability of spam. A `provable link to domain
name`, imho, is merely a specific method of accountability (in the
domain level), which is useful, but not necessarily optimal, esp.
considering the need to support mobile users and many domains, not all
fully trustworthy.
The problem with adoption is that this is only
beneficial against spam if widely used. We face the
usual critical mass problem.
Agreed here and indeed a focal point in this effort should definitely be
providing value to early adopters. I believe we can provide such early
advantages better via spam-fighting mechanisms, such as secure protocol
between multiple spam-aware mail agents (MTA-MTA, MTA-MUA)); so that's
what we are developing in SICS. I believe these efforts are
complementary to providing encryption services.
Best, Amir Herzberg
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