Peter Gutmann wrote: > Peter Fairbrother <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> Perry E. Metzger wrote: >>> Frequently, scientists who know nothing about security come up with >>> ingenious ways to solve non-existent problems. Take this, for example: >>> >>> http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa003&articleID=00049DB6-ED96-12E7-A >>> D9 >>> 683414B7F0000 >>> >>> Basically, some clever folks have found a way to "fingerprint" the >>> fiber pattern in a particular piece of paper so that they know they >>> have a particular piece of paper on hand. >> >> Didn't the people who did US/USSR nuclear arms verification do something >> very similar, except the characterised surface was sparkles in plastic >> painted on the missile rather than paper? > > Yes. The intent was that forging the fingerprint on a warhead should cost as > much or more than the warhead itself.
Talking of solving the wrong problem, that's a pretty bad metric - forging should cost the damage an extra warhead would do, rather than the cost of an extra warhead. That's got to be in the trillions, rather than a few hundred thousand for another warhead. -- Peter Fairbrother --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]