Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Perry E. Metzger wrote: >> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> >>>Travis H. wrote: >>> >>>>I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using >>>>GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I >>>>remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the >>>>impression that the 1024 bit strength provided by p in the DSA is not >>>>sufficiently strong when compared to my encryption keys, which are >>>>typically at least 4096-bit D/H, which I typically use for a year. >>> >>>1. Signing keys face a different set of >>>non-crypto threats than to encryption >>>keys. In practice, the attack envelope >>>is much smaller, less likely. >> I call "bull". >> You have no idea what his usage pattern is like, and you have no idea >> what the consequences for him of a forged signature key might be. It >> is therefore unreasonable -- indeed, unprofessional -- to make such >> claims off the cuff. > > You seem to have missed the next sentance:
No, I didn't. > ".... Unless you have > particular circumstances, it's not > as important to have massive strength in > signing keys as it is in encryption keys." Even in totally ordinary circumstances it is important to have very strong signing keys. Your comments were insupportable. Perry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
