While there is merit in arguing how to simplify the mechanics of
using public key encryption for sending and receiving email, I cannot
agree with this assertion:
At 10:44 AM -0800 2/24/06, Ed Gerck wrote:
My $0.02: If we want to make email encryption viable (ie, user-level viable)
then we should make sure that people who want to read a secure communication
should NOT have to do anything before receiving it. Having to publish my key
creates sender's hassle too ...to find the key.
If an individual wants to receive telephone calls, he has to agree to
publish his phone number. For many years, we tacitly agreed that our
phone numbers would be published. That a phone number was public
information wasn't perceived as a problem. But as the number of junk
calls increases, the number of people who opt out of phone
directories increases. Today, more individuals decide that having a
public phone number is a problem.
In this regard, public keys are just like cell phone numbers. How
many people know your cell phone number? How did they get it? You
can't get a cell phone number from directory assistance. So if you
want someone to be able to call you on your cell phone, you have to
give them the "key" to your cell phone. If you want someone to send
you encrypted email, you have to give them your public key. It's
the same thing.
Yet cell phones seem to be viable.
--
john noerenberg
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It took long enough in all conscience for realization to come that
the externals of civilization - technology, industry, commerce, and
so on - also require a common basis of intellectual honesty and morality.
-- Herman Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, 1943
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