Erik Tews wrote:
What you do is, you trust your TPM and your BIOS that they never lie to
you, because they are certified by the manufature of the system and the
tpm. (This is why it is called trusted computing)

So if you don't trust your hardware and your manufactor, trusted
computing is absolutely worthless for you. But if you trust a
manufactor, the manufactor trusts the tpms he has build and embedded in
some systems, and you don't trust a user that he did not boot a modified
version of your operating system, you can use these components to find
out if the user is lieing.

Well obviously I trust myself, and do not trust anyone else all that much, so if I am the user, what good is trusted computing?

One use is that I can know that my operating system has not changed behind the scenes, perhaps by a rootkit, know that not only have I not changed the operating system, but no one else has changed the operating system.

Further, I can know that a known program on a known operating system has not been changed by a trojan.

So if I have a login and banking client program, which communicates to me over a trusted path, I can know that the client is the unchanged client running on the unchanged operating system, and has not been modified or intercepted by some trojan.

Further, the bank can know this, and can just not let me login if there is something funny about client program or the OS.

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