On 9/19/07, Nash Foster <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> http://labs.musecurity.com/2007/09/18/widespread-dh-implementation-weakness/
> Any actual cryptographers care to comment on this? I don't feel
> qualified to judge.

It's a real (old) vulnerability in DH, but I don't think it applies
here. If you want to expose the cleartext of your IPsec traffic, you
can just send a copy to the observer.

It makes mitm easier on unauthenticated links, but that's not a new
exposure of any kind.

>From the article:

    There are a number of real-world scenarios where an unknown
key-share completely undermines the legitimacy of networking
infrastructure which is designed to provide high security.

Funny how they didn't provide any details.

"Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you."
    -- Unknown

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