[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If on the one hand, the correct procedure is sign-encrypt-sign,
then why, on the other hand, is the parallel not sign-hash-sign ?
What is "correct" depends on requirements and semantics, and
neither is well addressed in that paper nor in standards,
w.r.t. email and signing.
https://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000905.html
Ditto, in terms of your question.
As an example (Ricardian Contract [1]), we might say that a
signed contract is done as
hash-digsig-hash
[2] With this procedure, the first hash-digsig is a human
signing (classical cleartext openpgp signature) and the last
hash is a signature that causes sharing of the exact
document [3].
iang
[1] To complete the picture, even this evidence is
distributed by means of transactions over the document; to
be extreme, the end result is this:
hash-digsig(hash-digsig(hash-digsig-hash))
[2] a public key signature is normally done hash-digsig,
right? So your sign-hash-sign might really be:
hash-digsig-hash-hash-digsig
but that's a guess.
[3] http://iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html
--dan
=============
http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.ps
Donald T. Davis, "Defective Sign & Encrypt in S/MIME, PKCS#7, MOSS, PEM,
PGP, and XML.", Proc. Usenix Tech. Conf. 2001 (Boston, Mass., June
25-30, 2001), pp. 65-78.(180 Kbytes) (PDF, 200 Kbytes) (HTML, 80 Kbytes)
Summary of the paper.
Abstract:
Simple Sign & Encrypt, by itself, is not very secure. Cryptographers
know this well, but application programmers and standards authors still
tend to put too much trust in simple Sign-and-Encrypt. In fact, every
secure e-mail protocol, old and new, has codified naïve Sign &
Encrypt as acceptable security practice. S/MIME, PKCS#7, PGP, OpenPGP,
PEM, and MOSS all suffer from this flaw. Similarly, the secure document
protocols PKCS#7, XML- Signature, and XML-Encryption suffer from the
same flaw. Naïve Sign & Encrypt appears only in file-security and
mail-security applications, but this narrow scope is becoming more
important to the rapidly-growing class of commercial users. With file-
and mail-encryption seeing widespread use, and with flawed encryption in
play, we can expect widespread exposures.
In this paper, we analyze the naïve Sign & Encrypt flaw, we
review the defective sign/encrypt standards, and we describe a
comprehensive set of simple repairs. The various repairs all have a
common feature: when signing and encryption are combined, the inner
crypto layer must somehow depend on the outer layer, so as to reveal any
tampering with the outer layer.
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