| > Exactly what makes this problem so difficult eludes me, although one | > suspects that the savage profit margins on consumables like | > keyboards and mice might have something to do with it. | > | It's moderately complex if you're trying to conserve bandwidth (which | translates to power) and preserve a datagram model. The latter | constraint generally rules out stream ciphers; the former rules out | things like encrypting the keystroke plus seven random bytes with a | 64-bit block cipher. Power is also an issue if your cipher uses very | much CPU time or custom hardware. | | I"m sure most readers of this list can propose *some* solution. It's | instructive, though, to consider everything that needs to go into a | full system solution, including the ability to resynchronize cipher | states and the need to avoid confusing naive users if the cat happened | to fall asleep on the space bar while the CPU was turned off. Somewhere - perhaps in the Computerworld article - someone mentions that some devices use Bluetooth, "and are therefore much more secure".
In practice, most Bluetooth devices don't even agree on a non-zero key when pairing, so just using Bluetooth is no promise of anything. Does anyone know how good Bluetooth security can potentially be - and is it practically attainable in the low power/lost message context that would be needed here? How are some of the emerging low-power protocols (e.g., ZigBee) dealing with this? -- Jerry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]