On Thu, 21 Feb 2008 13:37:20 -0800 "Ali, Saqib" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Umm, pardon my bluntness, but what do you think the FDE stores the > > key in, if not DRAM? The encrypting device controller is a computer > > system with a CPU and memory. I can easily imagine what you'd need > > to build to do this to a disk drive. This attack works on anything > > that has RAM. > > How about TPM? Would this type of attack work on a tamper-resistant > ver1.2 TPM? See http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver2008/en/library/d2ff5c4e-4a68-4fd3-81d1-665e95a59dd91033.mspx?mfr=true Briefly, there's a bit in the TPM that means "there are keys present; zero RAM when booting". This does nothing against the guy with the Dewar flask of liquid nitrogen, of course. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
