As a standard, this is specification is a disaster. Just from a quick
read, I see the following:

"However, alternative orders for the input data fields may be used for
a KDF."

"with a length specified by the function, an algorithm, or a protocol
which uses T as an input."

"In feedback mode, the output of the PRF is computed using the result
of the previous iteration and, optionally, using a counter as the
iteration variable(s)."

With sufficient options, all implementations are non-interoperable. I
think you've managed to reach that point here. As an implementor, my
instinct is to stay well away from this entire mess and just use IEEE
1363's KDF2, which is:

  - simple enough that anyone can implement it easily and without
     interop difficulties, or requiring protocol negotiations (and
     then the implementor has to do the negotiation properly - which
     opens up new avenues for security holes)

  - secure enough that it "doesn't matter" (ie, that the likelyhood
     that a security flaw in the KDF is the critical problem is far
     lower than a security flaw elsewhere in the system)

My recommendation: choose something that will work for nearly
everyone, and mandate it directly. For instance, why make the counter
length configurable? In 99% of implementations, the thing that will
make sense is a 32-bit counter (to paraphrase the famous if apocryphal
Bill Gates quote, 4 gigabytes of keying material should be enough for
anybody), but by refusing to mandate this behavior, you force every
implementor and application designer to choose something and then
negotiate on the off chance that some other length was chosen, or that
the other side is using variable length encodings - something which is
allowed by the spec, as best as I can tell, and which opens up some
pretty big (at least theoretical) holes.

I have no comments about the actual security aspects of it; it looks
fine to my eye, but given the interoperability issues listed above I
don't plan on implementing any of these KDFs anyway, so I can't say I
much care whether they are actually secure or not. I would advise you
to remember that crypto does not exist in a vacuum, and should help,
not hinder, the overall security of a system.

  Jack Lloyd

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