* Arshad Noor: > The author of an article that appeared in InformationWeek this week > (June 30, 2008) on Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure (EKMI): > > http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=208800937 > > states the following: > > "There are, of course, obstacles that must still be overcome by EKMI > proponents. For example, the proposed components are somewhat simple > by design, which concerns some encryption purists who prefer more > complex protocols, on the logic that they're more difficult to break > into."
First of all, a simple SKSML request for a symmetric key is a whopping 77 lines of SOAPWSS/whatever XML; the server response is 62 lines even without the container. If this is not enough to make every complexity fanboy happy, I don't know what can do the trick. On a more serious note, I think the criticism probably refers to the fact that SKSML does not cryptopgrahically enforce proper key management. If a participant turns bad (for instance, by storing key material longer than permitted by the protocol), there's nothing in the protocol that stops them. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
