On Sun, Jul 13, 2008 at 02:41:29PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > > Now everyone is going to say it should have been put out for review, and > of course it should have been, and had they done so they would have > avoided these particular mistakes, but DNSSEC and WPA was reviewed to > hell and back, and the result was still no damned good.
Really? From a cryptographic -- not a political -- point of view, what exactly is wrong with DNSSEC or WPA? WPA certainly seems to be quite widely deployed. -- Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] "My guess is that the minimal training typically provided would only have given the party in question multiple new and elaborate ways to do something incomprehensibly stupid and dangerous." -Rich Goldstone --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
