| > > Funnily enough I was just working on this -- and found that we'd | > > end up adding a couple megabytes to every browser. #DEFINE | > > NONSTARTER. I am curious about the feasibility of a large bloom | > > filter that fails back to online checking though. This has side | > > effects but perhaps they can be made statistically very unlikely, | > > without blowing out the size of a browser. | > Why do you say a couple of megabytes? 99% of the value would be | > 1024-bit RSA keys. There are ~32,000 such keys. If you devote an | > 80-bit hash to each one (which is easily large enough to give you a | > vanishingly small false positive probability; you could probably get | > away with 64 bits), that's 320KB. Given that the smallest Firefox | > [...] You can get by with a lot less than 64 bits. People see problems like this and immediately think "birthday paradox", but there is no "birthday paradox" here: You aren't look for pairs in an ever-growing set, you're looking for matches against a fixed set. If you use 30-bit hashes - giving you about a 120KB table - the chance that any given key happens to hash to something in the table is one in a billion, now and forever. (Of course, if you use a given key repeatedly, and it happens to be that 1 in a billion, it will hit every time. So an additional table of "known good keys that happen to collide" is worth maintaining. Even if you somehow built and maintained that table for all the keys across all the systems in the world - how big would it get, if only 1 in a billion keys world-wide got entered?)

| You could store {<hash>, <seed>} and check matches for false positives | by generating a key with the corresponding seed and then checking for an | exact match -- slow, but rare. This way you could choose your false | positive rate / table size comfort zone and vary the size of the hash | accordingly. Or just go off to one of a number of web sites that have a full table. Many solutions are possible, when they only need to be invoked very, very rarely. -- Jerry | Nico | -- | | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | The Cryptography Mailing List | Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] | | --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]