Philipp Gühring writes:
> I am searching for symmetric encryption algorithms for decimal strings.
> Let's say we have various 40-digit decimal numbers:
> 2349823966232362361233845734628834823823
> 3250920019325023523623692235235728239462
> 0198230198519248209721383748374928601923
> As far as I calculated, a decimal has the equivalent of about 3,3219
> bits, so with 40 digits, we have about 132,877 bits.

Right, although as an American I was confused for a moment until I
remembered the European convention of using comma for the decimal point,
while we use period. But you are right and it was my mistake.

> Now I would like to encrypt those numbers in a way that the result is a
> decimal number again (that's one of the basic rules of symmetric
> encryption algorithms as far as I remember).
> Since the 132,877 bits is similar to 128 bit encryption (like eg. AES),
> I would like to use an algorithm with a somewhat comparable strength to AES.
> But the problem is that I have 132,877 bits, not 128 bits. And I can't
> cut it off or enhance it, since the result has to be a 40 digit decimal
> number again.

This is a very common question. Unfortunately the state of the art in
cryptography does not as far as I know have a good answer. The most recent
analysis I found is
from CT-RSA 2002 by Black and Rogaway.

Basically they propose what is called a Luby-Rackoff construction,
related to another construction called a Feistel network. Unfortunately
their analysis does not show that this is secure, but I believe that by
adding more steps it can be made so.

The idea is to start with your 40 digit number and split it into two parts
of 20 digits. Call the left part L and the right part R. Then repeatedly
execute the following steps:

L = (L xor AES(R)) mod 10^20
(L,R) = (R,L) (i.e. interchange L and R)

After doing this a certain number of steps, interchange L and R one
last time, and concatenate L and R to get your output. (Equivalently,
skip the interchange of L and R on the last step.)

Now, it is important in doing this that AES have a different key for
each "round" or step. You can start with a single key K, and generate
the round keys as K0 = AES(K,0), K1 = AES(K,1), K2 = AES(K,2), and so on.

To decrypt, the same basic process is used. But this time, use the round
keys in the reverse order. Instead of K0, K1, K2, use K2, K1, K0.

Black and Rogaway analyzed for just 3 rounds, and they found basically
that for your case, this construction would only have about 32 bits of
strength; that is, after encrypting about 4 billion numbers, you would
be losing security.  If you are only ever encrypting many fewer numbers
than this (with a given key), it should probably be OK.

The other possibility is to increase the number of rounds. The paper
hints that this will help but does not offer any specific analysis. I saw
a speculative comment online that 8 rounds would be strong. I believe
that going back to the Luby-Rackoff paper may offer some guidance,
but I don't have time to do that now.

Note that this unfortunately does not get the benefit you were hoping for
from being so close to the AES block size. While there are some known
tricks for dealing with being a little shorter than the cipher block,
I couldn't find any good ones for being a few bits longer.

Hal Finney

The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Reply via email to