On 17/08/2010 16:53, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > On Tue, 17 Aug 2010 15:04:00 +0300 Alexander Klimov > <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Sat, 31 Jul 2010, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >>> There is no rational reason at all that someone should "endorse" a >>> key when it is possible to simply do a real time check for >>> authorization. There is no reason to sign a key when you can just >>> check if the key is in a database. >> >> Each real-time check reveals your interest in the check. What about >> privacy implications? > > Well, OCSP and such already do online checks in real time, so there is > no difference there between my view of the world and what people claim > should be done for certificates. > > The more interesting question is whether the crypto protocols people > can come up with ways of doing online checks for information about > keys that don't reveal information about what is being asked for. That > would help in both the certificate and non-certificate versions of > such checks.
Selective disclosure allows this kind of thing (e.g. "check that x is not on a blacklist without revealing x"). Not sure it's particularly efficient, though... -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [email protected]
