Alec Muffett wrote: > This may[1] be relevant to your interests; alas I am not fit to review the > math... > > > http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-08/quantum-computer-proof-data-encryption-researchers-look-formulat-created-1978
You're really better off reading the abstract: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.2390v1> The paper's actual title is "The McEliece Cryptosystem Resists Quantum Fourier Sampling Attacks", which already explains its content much more clearly, concisely, and accurately than the "popsci" article. (I would argue, it does so even for an audience who doesn't know what the McEliece cryptosystem or a quantum fourier sampling attack is. At least they'll know that they don't know! Both are easy to look up on the web.) Note that the result is about a variant of McEliece proposed by Janwa and Moreno in 1996, not the original 1978 version. I'll spare you all a more extensive rant about popular science journalism. The actual result is not particularly surprising. It doesn't prove the security of the Janwa/Moreno variant (either against quantum or classical attacks), but it does prove that the presumed-hard problem on which that variant is based, is not solvable by a class of quantum algorithms that includes the Deutsch-Jozsa, Simon, and Shor algorithms (see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_algorithm#Algorithms_based_on_the_quantum_Fourier_transform>). This supports continued study of variants of McEliece as potential "post-quantum" public key cryptosystems, but it doesn't do much more than that. -- David-Sarah Hopwood ⚥ http://davidsarah.livejournal.com
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