Some of you may have seen my posts to postfix-users and openssl-users, if so, apologies for the duplication.
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/postfix/2013-09/thread.html#80 http://firstname.lastname@example.org/index.html#71903 The short version is that while everyone is busily implementing EDH, they may run into some interoperability issues. GnuTLS clients by default insist on a minimum EDH prime size that is not generally interoperable (2432 bits). Since the TLS protocol only negotiates the use of EDH, but not the prime size (the EDH parameters are unilaterally announced by the server), this setting, while cryptographically sound, is rather poor engineering. The context in which this was discovered is also "amusing". Exim uses GnuTLS and has a work-around to drop the DH prime floor to 1024-bits, which is interoperable in practice. Debian however wanted to "improve" Exim to make it more secure, so the floor was raised to 2048-bits in a Debian patch. As a result STARTTLS from Debian's Exim (before sanity was restored in Exim 4.80-3 in Debian wheezy, AFAIK it is still broken in Debian squeeze) fails with Postfix, Sendmail, and other SMTP servers. In all probability this "stronger" version of Exim then needlessly sends mail without TLS, since with SMTP TLS is typically opportunistic, and likely after TLS fails delivery is retried in the clear! -- Viktor. P.S. shameless off-topic plug: If you want better than opportunistic TLS for email, consider adopting DNSSEC for your domains and publishing TLSA RRs for your SMTP servers. Postfix supports DANE as of 2.11-20130825. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dukhovni-smtp-opportunistic-tls-01 http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_dane Make sure to publish either "IN TLSA 3 1 1" or "IN TLSA 2 1 1" certificate associations. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list email@example.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography