On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 10:12 PM, Perry E. Metzger <[email protected]>wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 16:55:05 -0400 John Kelsey <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Everyone, > > > > The more I think about it, the more important it seems that any > > anonymous email like communications system *not* include people who > > don't want to be part of it, and have lots of defenses to prevent > > its anonymous communications from becoming a nightmare for its > > participants. If the goal is to make PRISM stop working and make > > the email part of the internet go dark for spies (which definitely > > includes a lot more than just US spies!), then this system has to > > be something that lots of people will want to use. > > > > There should be multiple defenses against spam and phishing and > > other nasty things being sent in this system, with enough > > designed-in flexibility to deal with changes in attacker behavior > > over tome. > > Indeed. As I said in the message I just pointed Nico at: > http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/016874.html > > Quoting myself: > > Spam might be a terrible, terrible problem in such a network since > it could not easily be traced to a sender and thus not easily > blocked, but there's an obvious solution to that. I've been using > Jabber, Facebook and other services where all or essentially all > communications require a bi-directional decision to enable messages > for years now, and there is virtually no spam in such systems > because of it. So, require such bi-directional "friending" within > our postulated new messaging network -- authentication is handled > by the public keys of course. > The keys. This to me is the critical point for widespread adoption, key management. How do you do this in a way that doesn't put people off immediately. There are two new efforts I'm aware if trying to solve this in a user friendly way are https://parley.co/#how-it-works and http://mailpile.is. Parley's approach does at least deal with the longevity of the private key although it does boil security down to a password, if I can obtain their packet and the salt I can probably brute force the password. I've exchanged mails with the mailpile.is guys and I think they're still looking at the options. Max
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