On 16 September 2013 18:49, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hal...@gmail.com> wrote:
> To me the important thing about transparency is that it is possible for > anyone to audit the key signing process from publicly available > information. Doing the audit at the relying party end prior to every > reliance seems a lower priority. > This is a fair point, and we could certainly add on to CT a capability to post-check the presence of a pre-CT certificate in a log. > In particular, there are some type of audit that I don't think it is > feasible to do in the endpoint. The validity of a CT audit is only as good > as your newest notary timestamp value. It is really hard to guarantee that > the endpoint is not being spoofed by a PRISM capable adversary without > going to techniques like quorate checking which I think are completely > practical in a specialized tracker but impractical to do in an iPhone or > any other device likely to spend much time turned off or otherwise > disconnected from the network. > I think the important point is that even infrequently connected devices can _eventually_ reveal the subterfuge.
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