On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 4:23 PM, Adam Back <[email protected]> wrote: > ... > Another angle on this is timing attacks or iterative adaptive attacks > like bleichenbacher's attack on SSL encryption padding. If re-keying > happens before the attack can complete, perhaps the risk of a > successful so far unnoticed adaptive or side-channel attack can be > reduced. So maybe there is some use.
many side channels are relevant in this regard, although such an advantage often deteriorates quickly. TKIP one example... another use case i don't see listed is constraining the duration of an authorization. if authorized access to a resource is provided by an active session, frequent re-keying in a manner that requires (device based, ?) authentication places an upper bound on unauthorized access, maybe. (this implies you terminate expired sessions with extreme prejudice and that session expiry aligns with re-key interval) _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
